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John. T. Stoddert.

John T Gaffit Mayland.

John T Gaffit Burlington N. Jersey

	Owners	Places of residence.		
1806 Graduated	John Croes Junior	New Brunswick,	New Jersey.	F. A. W. S.
1807	John Lindsay	New Brunswick	New Jersey	F. A. W. S.
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Graduated 1809	F. Andersen	- - - - - - - - - -	Maryland	F. A. W. S.
Graduated 1810	John J. Stoddert	- - - - - - - - - -	Maryland	F. A. W. S.
Graduated 1811	John F. Griffith	Burlington	New Jersey	F. & W. S.
	John McSherrod	Mansfield	New Jersey	F. H. & S.

LECTURES

on

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

BY

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"Vivo conscia sibi recti"

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

LECTURE 1st

Philosophy is an investigation of the constitution and the laws of nature, as far as the human mind alone is competent to discover them. We cannot penetrate into the essences of things, and from these determine what will be their effects either singly or in any possible combination. An accurate attention to effects is the only means by which we can gradually approach to a knowledge of their causes and attain to something like an acquaintance with the constitution either of body or of mind. Although we cannot discover their fine and subtle essences, we may in some degree understand their larger and grosser constituent parts. It is however experience alone, that from an attention to effects, can lead us to the knowledge of the component principles of things: and the same experience will frequently reconduct us from principles to effects, and enable us in many cases to foretell those effects that will result from particular combinations. From uniform causes, uniform effects are found to follow. These we rightly judge to be produced by some internal

ternal energy which we denominate the power of the cause and which will always continue to operate in the same way, when undisturbed by other causes. When the operation varies from what we have customarily observed, we conclude that some other principle within has vitiated the cause, or some obstacle without has prevented the effect. This power operating uniformly we call a law of nature, and the uniformity of the effects, we say is the consequence of established laws. Philosophy is divided into Natural and Moral. Nature indeed in its greatest extent, embraces the whole compass of things, corporal and mental, physycal and moral: but in this division of the science, Natural Philosophy means an investigation of the constitution and laws of body. Moral Philosophy is an investigation of the constitution and laws of mind, particularly as it is capable of voluntary action and susceptible of the sentiment of obligation. Its great object is to ascertain duty and to regulate conduct: and for this purpose, it must be acquainted with the principles, the tendencies, and the relations of that rational being, who is at once capable of conduct, and the subject of duty. In the universe there may be many orders of minds, we are acquainted however by reason only with two, GOD and the human soul. Our knowledge of the former is principally derived from our knowledge of the latter, and in this science, it is of great importance to form right views of the nature of GOD, because our duty must always have a reference to his will. Our nature being formed by him, the principles of duty must have been implanted by him, many duties must immediately ter-

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minate on him and the whole ought to be according to his view in creation. Our nature is then only perfect, when it is conformed to the evident design of the Creator. The science of Moral Philosophy therefore begins in the study of our minds, its dispositions, its sentiments, its affections, its powers of action, of enjoyment, or of suffering, its present state and connections, and its future hopes and fears. From a close examination of these, and from carefully comparing and combining them, we may at length derive a rule of duty, and determine what man was intended to be and what he ought to do in every state. In this investigation, it is necessary to follow analysis, and to reason from particular facts to the general laws of the human mind.

In both philosophies indeed the analytic method is the only certain guide to truth. It would be requisite that we should have formed the world, or at least that we should be able to penetrate the intimate essences of things, in order synthetically to propose their general laws, and to illustrate the phenomena that arise from them. The uniformity of a multitude of facts in the moral as well as in the natural world indicates some common principle or power from which they proceed, and which in similar circumstances will always operate in the same way. And when any action or any fact can be referred to a common class, where this uniformity or resemblance prevails, it is said to be referred to its proper law of nature, and the phenomenon is accounted for, as far as man can account for it. Thus in Natural Philosophy, we account for lightning, for the Aurora Borealis, and perhaps for Earth-quakes, by shewing the

the analogy of their effects, to the effects of Electricity. We know from experiment the manner in which this active and powerful fluid operates under certain given circumstances. These uniform operations are stiled its laws, and the phenomena above are explained by shewing that they are governed by the same laws.

In morals we account for the prevalence of rites and forms in the worship of D.D. by referring them to that general law which we collect from experience, the influence of sensible objects on our ideas and affections. Many resembling facts indicate a law: if a new fact is found to coincide with them, it is accounted for by referring to that law. If it is not referable to any general class or law yet known, it is called a solitary fact and left open to future enquiry.

In like manner by an attentive induction of facts, by observing the operations of the human mind in every variety of situation, which observation may be called moral experiment, we arrive at the laws of our moral nature, and by these at the knowledge of our duty. The mind of man being united with the body, is naturally affected by that union in all its perceptions and emotions. In examining it therefore we must have a constant regard to this connection; we must take into our view, the whole compounded nature of Man, and examine the organs and movements of the body, as far as they affect the action of the mind and consequently posess an influence on morals. It will be requisite likewise in entering on this science to examine whether human nature be

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the same in every country, or whether it exists under different species- This enquiry will be more necessary, because if it be not the same, the laws of conduct which we will collect from observing our own nature, cannot be universally applied. If notwithstanding the varieties, under which it is found to exist, it be radically one, the same law may be applied to every nation, & to every individual; subject only to modifications arising out of the difference of the circumstances. Unless human nature be one, no certain theory of duty can be framed. Not only will the laws collected by each nation from contemplating their own character, be various from every other nation; but from the infinite migrations & mixtures of Mankind, all observations must be vague, and all rules must be confounded. The philosophy of the different species will be marred, in proportion as the races are blended. In philosophising on Man, the same rules should be observed, which have been so long & so justly followed in the philosophy of Nature. "That no law should be admitted on hypothesis merely, but should rest solely on an induction of facts." "That laws collected from an ample and accurate induction of facts, should be deemed universal, till other facts occur to invalidate or limit the conclusions that have been drawn from them". "That laws founded on narrow & partial inductions, should not be extended beyond the limits to which they are certainly known to apply" "That similar appearances should, because of the uniformity of Nature, be referred as far as possible to the same causes" "That the testimony of our senses & of all our simple perceptions be admitted as true, & that no farther evidence or illustration be required of the facts which they confirm". The last rule is of the more importance, because Philosophers have appeared in Modern as well as Ancient times, who have denied the

certainty

certainty) of our senses, both external & internal or who have with an excessive subtlety reasoned upon them in such a manner, as to confound the most natural & obvious consequences that are drawn from their information. They have denied the existence both of body and mind, and have equally reduced the physical & moral world to a train of unsubstantial ideas. The object of this science is not a detail of particular duties, which from their infinite multitude, can never be fully enumerated, much less embraced in a single treatise, But the establishment of general principles, from which a rational & reflecting mind may deduce its duty in each case as it occurs. It is a science manifestly of the first dignity and usefulness. It brings us acquainted with man for whom this world was ~~intended~~ formed and for whose use, all the other sciences were intended. It brings us acquainted with the laws of duty, which to understand and practise was the design of our creation, and ought to be the primary object with every moral & intelligent nature. It contemplates man as an individual in his powers, his principles, & his tendencies, and in all modifications of these, that arise from the influence of situation & connection. It considers him in society, as the member of a family, associated in community as a subject of civil government, or as a citizen of the world. It explains his relations to the Deity, and the numerous & important duties that results from these, and it opens to his view those immortal hopes that give the greatest value to being and the greatest force to the obligations of duty. The happiness of individuals, the prosperity of states, and the harmony & order of the world, are intimately connected with a science, which has chiefly in view, the promotion of these great & valuable objects. It not only claims the attention of mankind, but preserv-

liarly merits

liarly merits and has indeed obtained the assiduous cultivation of the studious & ingenious of every age. At first we are led to conceive that this is a study as easy as it is important: That God must have laid the principles of duty open to a transient and common inspection; & that nothing can be so intimate & obvious to Man as his own nature from which his duty is derived. Yet the Philosophy of morals, is notwithstanding embarrassed with many uncertainties. Various causes have contributed to this effect. Not only is it liable to the same obscurity & doubt with other sciences, arising from the weakness of the human mind, from the ambition and vanity of system, from the difficulty of penetrating and discriminating appearances, and from defect of patience and attention in examining combining & distinguishing facts, but is exposed to peculiar difficulties from the depravity of our nature, whether we admit that depravity to be real or fictitious, from partiality to ourselves, and our own prevailing passions and habits, and from the prepossessions inspired by Education, by climate, by the State of society, & by national manners and ideas. Perhaps no writer has his mind entirely exempted from bias, and an improper influence arising from so many and such powerful causes. But it is the aim of Philosophy; and the gradual tendency of the improvement of science and society to correct these prejudices & to dissipate the clouds that arise from them, which may be accomplished by coolness and candor, by patient & extensive enquiry. Altho' we are not to expect intuitive certainty on every subject, & on many subjects, not more than probable evidence; yet we have as much reason to avoid the dangers of a weak and hesitating scepticism, as of a dogmatic assurance.

The evidence of sense, of consciousness, and well-authenticated history we ought to receive. We ought not to admit such subtlety in our disquisitions on the nature of the evidence, as to exclude all certainty. We ought to pursue our enquiries, with calmness, extent and perseverance. With these qualities, we may approach a system of truth—

The first object of enquiry is man considered as a species; and his distinction from other species.—

End of Lecture 1st.

J. Groves scripsit. 1806.

LECTURE 2nd.

Before we contemplate man as an individual, and examine the constituent principles of his nature, I shall first consider him as a species, & endeavour to explain the difference between him, & the other species of animals upon the earth. In this disquisition, I shall in the first place, consider his form, & the varieties under which it appears, while yet the unity of the race is preserved. In the second place, I shall consider his longevity, the successive periods of his life, and the numbers of the species in the different states of society & according to different modes of subsistence. In the third place his dispositions to society, & the forms of associations under which the species collects itself, so different from those of other gregarious animals: and lastly his susceptibility of improvement, under which head, we may include his powers of language, the invention of arts & the progress of science. In the first place the form of man is distinguished by its erectness, by a pleasing and elegant proportion of parts, by the expression of the countenance, and by an infinite multitude of muscles & articulations, that adapt it to a greater variety of easy movements, and useful purposes, than those of any other animal. The erectness of figure, indeed, has been supposed by some philosophers, to be rather acquired than natural. They have supposed that men originally used their hands and arms as feet and legs, and that this erect figure is the result of improvement. One or two have been weak enough, to imagine that the first men were formed with tails like beasts, which civilization has gradually lopt off. And they pretend on the marvellous relations of knavish or ignorant travellers to point a few people in the rudest state of Nature, who are still distinguished by this mark of degradation.

These philosophers however have gained more ridicule than attention for the novelty of their opinions. The erect posture is evidently natural to man, after the imbecility of childhood is past: & anatomists profess to shew that all his ~~joints & limbs~~ are formed for this position.

The expression of his countenance is incomparably more strong & various than that of any other animal. The body & the mind are intimately united & blended as it were in human nature. As the movements & feelings of the body greatly affect the perceptions of the mind; so the mind appears to be able to transfuse its ideas & emotions into every action of the limbs and every feature of the countenance. Expression in a low degree, belongs to every other animal. We often see them brighten & gambol with pleasure, or writhe & languish with pain. Their eyes sparkle with love, or flash with rage. But the structure of their face is not calculated to express a great variety of feelings. On the other hand, the flexibility of the human countenance is infinitely more various. There is hardly a thought or emotion that rises in the mind, but has its external character. And the language of looks & gestures[†] is often better understood, & is unspeakably more forcible than that of words. The analysis of mute expression, has been made an art, & it has lately been carried in practice to a high degree of perfection. The natural expression of the human countenance however keeps pace with the progress of society & knowledge. In savage life, the vacancy of the countenance, indicates a mind vacant of ideas. The face assumes a more meaning form, as civilization advances. The habit of expression makes it flexible & various. The delicacy of nerves & features enables it suddenly to paint the thought on the face. Every other power of expression increases in the same degree. But as society not only enlarges the sphere of our ideas, & multiplies the objects of our passions,

but increases also the number of those sentiments which we wish to disguise or conceal; the improvement of expression beyond a certain degree is checked, unless as an art in the possession of a few mimics, & politeness or artifice spreads a uniform face over all.

It is obvious that the powers of the human body, by means of the number & position of its muscles & articulations, & the delicacy of its nerves, can be applied to a much greater diversity of useful purposes, than those of other animals.- A structure evidently intended to favour his improvement in arts that contribute to his convenience & pleasure. The human frame is likewise distinguished by a remarkably elegant & pleasing proportion of parts. The stature of man on a medium, is between 5 & 6 feet. And the majesty of his aspect, the distribution & uses of his limbs, & the graceful swell of his muscles, when the body is in perfection, affect the eye with a peculiar pleasure. Man however is born in a more naked & defenceless state than any other animal. The nakedness & softness of his skin contribute to the delicacy of his feelings & eventually to his happiness. These circumstances render the kindness & attention of parents more necessary in the early periods of life. They quicken & improve his ingenuity, in providing the means of supplying his wants, and they cultivate the benevolent affections of the heart, by augmenting his sensibility, & enabling him from his own feelings, to enter into the feelings of others. As the great design of the author of Nature appears to be our improvement at once, in reason & virtue, this constitution seems to be early intended for both these ends. The flexibility indeed of his constitution, which enables him to adapt himself to all climates, & to suffer without danger, their utmost influence; as the same time, renders

him

him in a high degree, susceptible of the influence of climate, of situation, & of the manners of living, and these causes become the origin of many varieties in the human species. Men differ in stature from 4 to 7 feet. They differ in their degrees of corpulency—they differ in their features, & they differ in their complexion. Between 5 & 6 feet, is the middle stature of the human race. In the regions of extreme cold, it is shortest; & in the temperate, taller than in the torrid zone. In the high, temperate latitudes, the body is commonly more gross & corpulent, than in the colder or warmer climates. The features in the Northern regions, are usually coarse & harsh, in Southern, more soft & mild. In Savage society, they are wild, ferocious, & melancholy. In a state of civilization, they are composed & regular, & capable of expressing a much greater variety of sentiment. The complexion of man, is fair, sanguine, swarthy, olive, tawny & black. And of each of these, there are several shades. The sanguine prevails in the regions immediately below the arctic circle in Europe & a part of Asia. The Fair in the [illegible] countries below these, and in succession, we find the swarthy, the olive, the tawny & the black. The olive however prevails in the low, temperate latitudes of Asia. The swarthy in the south of Europe. Black is the general colour between the tropics, and a light grade of it is found in the south of Africa, in many parts of India, & tropical America, & within the arctic circle. Tawny, is the predominant colour of the temperate zones of America, & of the Northeastern regions of Asia. These complexions however, change so gradually, as we pass from one country to the other, that it is not easy to fix any definite limits to them, or to say precisely where they begin or end. In the Northeast of Asia, between the Caspian

sea, and the ocean; And below the arctic circle, is found the race of Tartars, divided into different hords, and distinguished from the rest of Mankind, by broad shoulders, short necks, large heads, and small eyes, and an uncommon depression of the nose, & elevation of the cheek bones. Their stature is shorter than that of the Europeans, or the southern Asiatics. Their complexion is tawny & their whole aspect extremely uncouth. Beyond these, to the north, is a race distinguished from the Tartars, chiefly by a shorter stature, & a darker hue. The Samojede as Buffon justly remarks, is only the Tartar reduced to the last degree of degeneracy. The Samoiede, the Laplander in Europe, the Greenlander, and the Esquimaux in America, have a strong resemblance. The Hindoo on the other hand, is of the ordinary stature of the human race, his features are soft & regular; but his make is slender, his eyes small, his ears large, his forehead flat, his hair long & black, tho' of a lighter shade, than that of the inhabitants of Tropical Africa, or even than the great Island of the Southern Ocean. The aborigines of America, are generally likewise of the ordinary stature. Their complexion is tawny & much like that of the rude tribe of the Tartars. It deepens however as you advance to the Equator; & in the interior parts of Amazonia & Brazil, it is as black as the southern Arabs, or of the deepest Hindoos. Their hair is black & coarse & long: They have been represented by many writers, as being naturally destitute of hair upon their chin, & on other parts of their body: but more accurate observation has discovered that this appearance arises from a custom

that

prevails among them, of plucking it out by the roots whenever it appears. Their cheeks are somewhat round, their features coarse and strong; & their countenance expressive of few sentiments, is marked with a lugubrious wildness, which shews that their chief emotions are those of rage against their enemies, and their habits have been formed in the midst of extreme solitude. The Tropical regions of Africa are marked by a complexion of a deep black, by hair short & curled close to the head, by a nose remarkably flatted, & by thick lips. From the southern tropic to the cape of GOOD Hope the hue is still black; but becomes gradually less deep, and the hair altho' longer is curled, as between the Tropics. The countenance both of the Negroes, & of the Hottentots indicates paucity of ideas: and the lowest & poorest classes of them have generally a certain inexpressible silliness and a disgusting distortion of looks approaching to Brutality. Similar people are found in some of the large islands of the Indian Ocean; and in New-Holland, a country that from its size resembles a continent, & from its remote situation has less intercourse, than any other country with the rest of the world, we find them in the most degenerate condition. The preceding are the principal physical varieties under which the human race appears. There are minute differences that gradually approach these kinds of men to one another. It is not easy to enumerate them all & mark their nicer shades of distinction. In a system like the present, it is unnecessary. For if a satisfactory account can be given of the greater distinctions, an intelligent & reflecting mind will readily

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apply the like reasoning to account for every minute variety. It is neccsary if posible, to explain the causes of these differences, because as I have said before, unless we can establish the unity of the human race, we take away all certainty from the theory of Morals. This subject I have discussed in another treatise, with greater extent than your time will permit me to do in the present course of Lectures. I shall however state in this place, the general causes of these changes with as much brevity as I am able, referring those who are willing to examine them more minutely, to the illustrations offered in that Essay. The causes of these varieties may be reduced to climate, to the manner of living & to the State of society. As the manner of living is governed in part by the improvements introduced into society, & in part by the productions of the climate, all the three causes may be comprehended under the first & the last. I shall however make a few observations on each of them seperately. By climate is meant the degree of heat or cold that prevails in any country, which is usually proportioned to the distance from the Sun, but may be greatly diversified by the nature of the soil, or the vicinity of Seas or Mountains. That climate has a powerful influence, we perceive from the effect of the Sun in our own Latitude. There is a visible change in the complexion of the Summer from the Winter, even in those who are well protected from its influence. But in those who from their occupations or their poverty, are greatly exposed to its power, the effect is great and striking. If then we observe a great swarthiness of Men, who have been

bred

bed to the sea, or of the poorest clafs of labourers, would not the effect be much higher if they were exposed entirely naked & unhoused to the full force of the Sun, instead of enjoying those conveniences, by which they are at present sheltered from a great part of his influence? Would it not be much higher still if the Summer heats instead of the short duration which they have in this country, prevailed throughout the year? And if to all this we add the great intensity of the heat in the Torrid Zone, we may easily conceive the effect to be such, as in that climate we may everywhere discern in the human species. The probability that colour is formed chiefly by the climate, is greatly strengthned by the gradation we observe in complexion from the Temperate to the Torrid regions. Exceptions from this law shall be hereafter considered. We likewise see freckles of various hues & frequently very deep created by the Sun. The power that produces colour on a small spot is capable of impreſsing it on the whole skin. And any of the dark colours may be justly considered as an universal freckle. If we enquire into the physical cause of colour, it may be sufficient to remark that any animal substance & particularly the bile exposed in a stagnant state to the Sun & air tends to black. The skin is the least mutable part of the Human System except the bones. In it the circulation ends, & the fluids contained in its veſsels may be considered as in a fixed and stagnant state; the bile is always augmented by heat: heat relaxes the constitution: and nature has thrown out this secretion to correct the effects of relaxation. Therefore in a warm climate, in a humid and

putrid

putrid atmosphere, in a state of relaxation occasioned by loss of blood, by poverty of diet, or by any other cause, we always see the skin tinged with a bilious hue. And the bile becoming stagnant in its vessels, receives the continued action of the Sun, which impresses a deep & indelible colour.* Indelible, I say, because every colour is indelible that affects the substance, and not merely the surface of the skin, as we see in figures impressed by paints, & inserted by punctures into this integumen. Perhaps the black complexion that prevails within the artic circle may be accounted for on this principle. The constitution weakened by meagre diet, & the overstraining of intense cold may throw out a great quantity of this discolouring fluid, which settled in the skin, contributes

× It was the opinion of a German chemist that the fat and ~~blood~~ bile of the human system into which enters a quantity of carbone, as also the bile of the body being by some operation of nature brought to the surface of the skin, and therefore acted upon by the Sun, the hydrogene of the former unites with the oxygene of the atmosphere, and a quantity of the carbone is precipitated in the cellular membranes of the skin, which causes the variety of colour.

* There is a striking diffeance produced by the action of the Sun on a complexion naturally florid, & one already discoulured with bile, such as we frequently see in this country & in the southern States particularly, along the coast of the ocean, & large rivers, or in the neighbourhood of stagnant waters & marshy lands. The colour of the former may be called a red swarth; the colour of the latter a black swarth. A similar cause may contribute to render the complexion of Asia darker than that of Europe between 30 & 40 degrees of latitude. Altho' the superior heat of the Sun that prevails in the climate of Asia may be admitted to account for it in part

tributes to deepen its hue. blimate also affects the stature & proportion of the limbs of these poor savages in the extreme regions of the North.— The stricture of intense & eternal cold must prevent the freedom of their growth: and its effects must be most visible in the extremities which are farthest removed from the source of circulation in the heart. Therefore the hands & feet of the Samoiede the Laplander & the Esquimaux are smaller in proportion than ther parts of the body; & the breast & head where the circulation posesses more force & warmth have a disproportioned magnitude. The size of these parts of the body diminishes the length of the neck, & this circumstance added to the habit that prevails in cold regions of raising the shoulders to protect the tenderness of the neck from the frost will assist us to account for the peculiar appearances of the northern savages, by which the head seems in a great measure to rest upon the top of the breast & sometimes to be sunk down below the shoulders.* These nations likewise have the eye small & frequently weak

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* Habit of any kind long continued becomes constitutional. This we often see in the awkard shapes & attitudes of clowns; and we see its power also in the better effects produced by the care of Masters or parents, or sometimes by instruments applied to different parts of the body to correct the figure of children. Whatever form habit has produced after a certain time becomes unalterable. This remark will serve also to account for the uncouth features of the face found in some nations by the excess of heat or cold, & for the fierce, the sad, or the vacant countenance that generally prevails among clavages.

weak, because the intensity of frosts & the glare of eternal snows, contract & often overstrain this tender & delicate organ: and they with the whole Tartar race have it deeply sunk in the head. For the disproportioned magnitude of this member lying chiefly in the upper parts where the brain possesses superior warmth & force to distend it, the forehead becomes uncommonly prominent & juts over the eyes. The harsh features of a Tartar face are such, as would seem naturally to result from the strictions & distortions of cold in their severe climates & their barbarous state, and there is a disgusting countenance in most of the poor class of Africans who are brought to this country that seems to be a compound of the pain & faintness created by the intense ardour of a perpetual & vertical sun.

I shall mention in this place only one other peculiarity, & attempt to account for it by the face of climate — that is, the hair of the Africans of the Torrid Zone. It is extremely sparse, and curled close to the head — the sparseness of the hair is the natural effect of the excessive heat of the climate. Coldness has a tendency to increase the coat of hair, or wool in animals. Nature has kindly established this law to protect creatures that do not enjoy the resources of reason, against the severity of the climate. The perspirable matter that is thrown off by heat & tends to render the body cool, is here retained by the contraction of pores & concreted into a coat of fur, for their defence & comfort; On the other hand, in warm climates, this matter is in a great measure evaporated, the pores are enlarged and relaxed; therefore the hair is easily extirpated.

From both these causes the hair is sparse, & from the

enlargement

enlargement of the pores it naturally becomes coarse. Its curl likewise arises from the climate, that tends to curl all animal or vegetable substances when it is sufficiently intense. But the climate tends also to augment the saline excretions, as appears from the rank smell of the Africans, & these from their ardent & volatile nature, make the hair grow involved, as is visible from their effect on the hair that is found on different parts of the human body in other climates. Their volatility keeps the surface dry, while the centre is distended by the circulating power; and this central distension, & superficial contraction necessarily produce an involution.

Having thus far proposed a short theory of the influence of climate on some of the capital diversities of the human species; permit me farther to remark that when any change becomes by time & the continued operations of its causes thoroughly incorporated in the constitution, it is then transmitted to posterity. Thus defects in particular parts of the body created by disease, or complexion altered by the same cause are transmitted from parents to children. On this principle, the Hottentots participate so many of the qualities of the Negroes, tho' inhabiting a more moderate climate. Every such defect however, may be meliorated by time & a happy alteration of circumstances. We accordingly find the features of the Negroes gradually changing for the better in the climate of America; especially where they enjoy an easy situation, & a more nourishing food than in their native country.

The nations of the Torrid Zone of Asia, that seem to furnish an exception from the law of climate, are in reality

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a confirmation of it. If their complexion is not so black, as those of Africa, if their hair is not curled, & if their features are more regular, it is because their zone is not so ardent. It is chiefly composed of water. The land is generally divided into peninsulas & islands, which are rendered cool by the surrounding Ocean. But in Borneo & New-Holland, where the extent of land assumes the appearance of a continent & where they are more constantly exposed to the direct rays of the sun, we find a race of Men resembling the Africans.

Next to the power of climate, we derive a cause of the varieties in the human race, from the manner of living. All animal bodies are greatly affected by the nature of the food with which they are nourished. This is well known to men who have the keeping of cattle & game of every kind. Buffon remarks that from the nature of the food, or the force of climate, or from both these causes combined, the best Arabian or Barbary horses transported to France entirely change their properties & figure in two or three races. He observed likewise that the meat of hares is changed both in colour & flavour according to the ground on which they feed. Those that feed on high lands have the finest & mildest meat, whereas in those that feed in low grounds, it is always grosser in the texture & darker in the colour. In the human race we may observe, that the poor who live upon coarse & meagre diet are generally more harsh in their features & dark in complexion, than the upper class of society in the same country,* who enjoy a more rich & nourishing food; & this is true not only of those whose occupations expose them to the sun & air, but of those who labour within doors.

Whatever

Whatever be the internal principle of a dark colour, it is augmented or diminished according to the nature of the common diet of the country. Diversity of soil & culture therefore will modify the effects of climate & under the same parallels of latitude will contribute to augment the varieties of the human countenance. The size of the human body, & the beauty of the human figure will likewise be affected as it is in the inferior animals, by the same causes. Finally,

The state of society contributes to diversify mankind. The savage state exposes them to the worst effects of both the preceding causes. Under the extremities of cold & that of heat therefore, where men are almost universally savage, we shall see the race reduced to its lowest point of degradation, & every savage is necessarily dark in his complexion. Civilization makes great improvement on the form & countenance of Man. We see the form of every animal, as well as of Man gradually brought to perfection, by the application of proper pains, according to the improved ideas of beauty. By negligence it becomes diminutive, coarse or distorted. Nature has formed the face to be an index of the sentiments of the mind, & it assumes from them its tone & expression. The countenance of a savage will therefore be vacant, because he has few ideas or emotions to express- it will often wear an air of melancholy from the solitude in which he lives- or fierceness from the passions that chiefly occupy him,

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*Note for page 21/26. I have said in the same country, because from the power of climate, or from other causes, the poorest class of one country may be finer in their complexion & better proportioned in their figure, than the highest of another.

or of disgusting silliness from the debilitating effects of climate, against which he has no means to guard himself, concurring with almost intire defect of sentiment. Various sentiment gives a various structure to the muscles, & consequently a various expression and form to the human countenance. Diversities arising from these causes therefore, become almost infinite. They become fixed by habit. They become incorporated by time, & are transmitted to offspring.

Thus I have endeavoured to represent & account for, the principal varieties of the human Race. I have been the more particular because I consider the unity of the Race under all these differences, as in a great measure essential to a just & certain Philosophy of human nature. If the race is one, it becomes an object of precise & certain experiment; the principles of duty and the laws of conduct become definite, and universal, which would be otherwise liable to infinite exceptions, & be incapable of being precisely ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ascertained or generally applied.

In the next lecture, I shall proceed to consider the longevity of Man, the different periods of his life, & the succession of generations. ~~~~~~~~

End of Lecture 2d.

J. Groes Junr. scripsit.

July 27 1805.

LECTURE 3rd.

The human kind, like other animal natures is preserved by succession. As his subsistence is derived from the fruits of the earth, which cannot from its own natural fertility, & the addied powers of cultivation exceed a certain quantity, the numbers of mankind must cease to multiply, in any country where they are sufficient to consume the produce of the land. Marriage then must be restrained or it must become unfruitful, or the supernumerary mouths must be taken away by death.

Death in order to make way for succesive generations, is a law of the animal nature. Men are liable to be cut off by many accidents and diseases; but without accident or disease, old age will put a period to life, by gradually rendering the nerves of the body rigid, & thereby stopping their action. The longest life rarely exceeds four score years: altho there are a few instances of its being protracted beyond a century. If life were extinguished by the effects of age alone, the prolific powers of the human species would appear to be much greater than they seem to be at present, when infinitely the greater part of Men perish by disease & accident. The whole earth might be peopled to the full amount of what it could contain in a few centuries. This is represented to have been the case in some degree before the general deluge, at which time however the powers of population were greatly augmented by the longevity of the inhabitants. Even at present, notwithstanding the immense destruction of the species from the causes I have just mention-

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ed, their numbers may be doubled by the ordinary laws of human increase in less than 20 years, in a country where as in America the means of subsistence are easily to be procured by industry, and there is consequently little restraint upon marriage.* Rarely however is a country in circumstances so favourable to rapid population as America, from soil, from climate, from skill in the arts of agriculture, & from the facility of acquiring property. But the increase of population in general must depend upon the age in which the sex begins to be prolific, the period during which they continue to be so, & the usual interval between one child & the succeeding; the ideas & habits which invite to marriage, the ease of maintaining a family, and obtaining subsistence, the numbers that remain unmarried, & who from constitution or from vice remain unprolific,

the proportion of those who either thro want or the refinements of luxury perish in infancy, or of those who between the period of infancy, & the ultimate term of human life are lost by war, navigation, or disease. A comparison of all these circumstances, and carefully taking the result of the whole, will determine whether mankind in any

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* By repeated enumeration in different states in America with as much accuracy as the nature of the case would admit, the people have been found to double their numbers by natural increase, without the aid of emigration, within the period just mentioned, and sometimes within 17 years. This ratio of increase however must diminish in proportion as the country becomes populated, & both property & subsistence become more difficult to be procured: till at length being peopled up to their resources for procuring subsistence, the deaths & births must nearly balance one another in each year.

in any particular region, increase or diminish in numbers. After a nation is peopled in such a degree as to consume all the fruits that naturally spring from the fertility of the soil, or that can be acquired by their usual habits of industry, the powers of population and the means of subsistence will become so equally balanced among themselves, as to preserve the numbers of people nearly at one point, liable however to a slow & gradual augmentation or diminution from the improvement or the decline of arts & manners. The number of any species of animals being in a great measure according to the quantity of their food, & this being also according to the nature of it—— the carniverous animals will be fewest in number because their provision is scarce & difficult to be obtained—— the granivorous & graminivorous will naturally be more numerous because the earth every where furnishes them subsistence.

But man who combines all these kinds of food in his manner of living, may become more numerous than any other species, especially as he is capable by reason, of prodigiously multiplying his resources for food. Man in the savage & hunting state, so nearly resembles a beast of prey, subsisting solely on flesh, and a few natural productions of the earth, that in this state population is always thinnest, because his subsistence is scarce & difficult to be procured, & extremely uncertain. In the first advance towards civilization, when men have begun to tame herds of animals, & to cultivate a spot of ground around their temporary habitation, subsistence being more certain & more plenty, population begins to increase. The Tartars of Asia are more numerous than the North American Indians in the same latitudes. But when

agriculture

agriculture becomes improved, when lands are divided in permanent property, & the fruits of industry are protected & secured by wise & equal laws, man can multiply his subsistence to an almost incredible degree, & population increases accordingly. In the remote latitudes of the North, the frozen & sterile soil yields little, even to the greatest efforts of human industry. The inhabitants of these regions, therefore will always be few.

In climates near the equator, a more luxuriant vegetation throughout the year, cherished by the warmth of the sun, furnishes sustenance without labour, to a much greater number of Men. And moderate labour supplies a prodigious accession to the stock of food. In these climates therefore & even under forms of government extremely defective, & unfriendly to the security of property, & the encouragement of industry, we commonly find multitudes of people.* But the fertility of the soil & the natural advantages of the climate being given, the population will depend on the nature of property, on the freedom of government, the improvement of arts, & the spirit & manners of the people. As population cannot go beyond the quantity of provision necessary for the support of human life, either raised from the soil within the country, or imported by commerce; that state & distribution of property which will furnish the largest stock for subsistence, will be most favourable to the increase of numbers. The most equal division of property

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* We find except from this remark those parched & barren deserts of sand so frequent in Africa, & in some parts of Asia, where vegetation is almost entirely consumed by the intensity of the sun.

erty, & especially of land, is perhaps one of the best expedients to promote population. Inequality tends to luxury, & luxury to dissipation, which wastes the provision which would be sufficient for many additional mouths. It has been made a question whether agriculture or commerce contribute more to the population of a country. This is a question that is not easily resolved. Commerce may undoubtedly collect on a small & barren spot, more people than could be sustained by the productions of the soil: but this commerce is chiefly foreign & is partly employed in importing provisions: it cannot produce the same effect on an extensive territory. The commerce of the world can be carried on by comparatively few hands—such is the distance & position of nations, that a sufficient portion of it cannot be concentrated in one country, if it be of great extent, to populate it to its utmost capacity.

Agriculture, if it is founded on a proper division of the territory, may support as many inhabitants as are equal to the consumption of the full production of the soil, altho' its natural fertility be aided by the arts of industry. Yet the soil may be made to yield its greatest quantity of provisions, by the labour of fewer hands than its fruits well support. The surplus hands that are not employed in the cares of government, in the administration of justice, or the defence of the country may be employed in commerce & the arts. Commerce might in this case maintain additional hands by the importation of provisions into a few sea port towns. The addition however could not bear a large proportion to the numbers of the whole community. And perhaps the increase of luxury, which commerce would bring with it,

would

would depopulate the country to the full amount of the increase of the cities. For luxury dissipates in pleasure the provision that would feed many industrious citizens: it wastes in ornament the ground that might be cultivated for use.

It is in vain to urge against this representation that the spirit of commerce is frugal; it is so, in the acquisition of a fortune; but when fortune is gained, it must be expended to gratify taste, otherwise the motive for acquiring it ceases. Population then might be as great by agriculture alone, as by agriculture combined with commerce. But agriculture affords less encouragement than commerce to those arts that contribute to elegance & pleasure: & therefore the combination of commerce with agriculture, in countries of considerable extent, gives ornament & enjoyment to life, while if it is properly regulated, it may not tend to diminish population. It has likewise the advantage of quickening the powers of the human mind, and perhaps carrying them to their greatest strength & perfection. But as no kind of property has a more favourable influence on numbers than equal & small divisions of land, so it will continue the degree of population for the longest period without diminution; because it contributes at the same time to preserve morals, by imposing a necessary frugality.

Several of the ancient legislators established their political systems upon this principle, & others endeavoured to approach it as nearly as the spirit of the people would admit. Moses & Lycurgus carried it into effect more perfectly than any other legislators whom history has recorded. The Roman state seems to have been originally founded on the

on the same principle: The Sabines who under Tatius were incorporated with the citizens, & received to all their privileges, had an allotment of 4 jugera; or about 3 acres to a family & Regulus declared that he was a dangerous citizen who was not contented with an estate of 7 jugera: and these countries contained a population of which modern times hardly afford an example, except in a few small spots, where commerce has assembled the wealth & the people of nations. It would surprise those who have not turned their reflections on the subject, or seen the experiment made, from what a small portion of land in perfect cultivation, the provisions of a family may be drawn, if they are contented to live with frugality & to use only the produce of their own soil. It requires therefore only a just distribution of the surface of the earth, greatly to augment its inhabitants. Population depends also on the freedom of government. Government is free not only in proportion as it secures personal safety, but as it secures to every citizen & his posterity the fruits of his industry. Such security gives encouragement to industry, & creates subsistence for numbers. But when property is insecure, the exertions of men languish, & the Earth in proportion remains untilled & uninhabited. Republics are genually more populous than monarchies, & monarchies that approach the principles of liberty, than despotisms where these are disregarded. China is a country of peculiar manners & laws: it is perhaps not yet sufficiently known, to be a certain object of political disquisition. But according as the principles of freedom enter into the system of government

vernment & are combined with other causes that affect population will the numbers of people be greater or less. The earth, I have said, may be perfectly cultivated by fewer hands than can be maintained from its product. The surplus hands, except those who are occupied in the cares of government, may be profitably employed in manufactures & arts. Arts are necessary to furnish the conveniences & pleasures of life. But the arts & agriculture should be practised by distinct classes. If the same men were alternately to cultivate the ground & to exercise the arts, the aggregate of their labour would be much less than if they were divided into classes, each of which were employed on one single object. The awkwardness, & expence of time in turning from one to another, & the want of adroitness & skill in all, would render the productions of labour both smaller in quantity & inferior in quality. But by a proper division & distribution of arts, the husbandman can produce more food, & the artizan more of other commodities, for the supply both of necessity & convenience*. The improvement of arts is therefore one source of population. In this however, as in all other subjects, there is a false and hurtful refinement: and the number of arts that minister to luxury, are a symptom of the decline rather than the increase of a state. — Numbers in the last place, will greatly depend on the spirit & manners of a people. Sometimes the climate, sometimes the form of government, & sometimes circumstances entirely accidental tend to create a certain

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*For a like reason the arts themselves ought to be subdivided. —

certain national spirit, whether it be of industry or oeconomy, of ambition, of gravity, of levity, of haughtiness, of moderation or extravagance. The spirit of a people which forms & which again is strengthned by its manners, has necessarily an influence on numbers. Haughtiness & indolence as in Spain, despise or abhor to work, & leave the land uncultivated. Luxury & extravagance dissipate in the gratification of one what would supply the wants of many. On the other hand, industry well directed, draws from the bosom of the earth the subsistence of multitudes: and frugality & aconomy measure it out with the greatest effect. A frugal people will naturally be the most numerous. This spirit likewise acquires additional influence, because it is generally connected with that equal division of property which has before been shewn to be friendly to population. That frugality however, or rather that want of elegance, which is the result of ignorance & defect in the arts of living, does not augment the numbers of the people. It must be a frugality derived from policy, from the publick spirit, & accompanied with improvement. Improvement is necessary to give a spring to the powers of human nature, to furnish an object & motive to industry, & to direct it to wise plans for augmenting subsistence & employment, & thereby increasing population.

To point out the most successful means of population, to ascertain the numbers that a country under proper cultivation will maintain, & by wise plans of policy to furnish additional means of subsistence are important objects of civil policy. It is an object also that deserves attention in every country, to

ascertain

ascertain the proportion of births & deaths- proportions of those who die at every period of life- the proportion of the sexes, & the number of those who are fit for every kind of service, from the earliest age at which they can be useful to the State.

Such calculations will become the wisdom of a prudent Legislator.—

End of Lecture 3.rd

I. Cross Junr. scripsit.

August 1st 1805.

LECTURE 4th.

The next object of attention is the social disposition of Man & the different forms of society under which the species is collected. Most animals discover some inclination to associate together. Some apparently for the pleasure alone which they derive from the presence of animals of the same species: some from attachment to their young & from the habit of being together during that period in which they most require assistance to obtain protection & provisions; & some from an instinct that unites them in seemingly regular associations for their common support. Man adds to all these principles the influence & direction of reason; and many other circumstances voluntary, casual or compulsory, contribute with regard to him to vary the extent & forms of his associations. The first form under which society appears is the

domestic.

domestic. Nature has attached parents to their children by a powerful affection that engages them with great pains & assiduity to provide for their subsistence, & for their instruction in such arts as they know to be necessary for their future comfort. The period of dependence is very long in Man, & during that time, the habits of submission to the parent & affection for him acquire strength in the breast of the child. After a certain age, experience renders him sensible of his obligations & reason & gratitude add their ties to those created by habit, & dependence & the memory of the early tenderness of parents. There is besides, a natural reverence paid to age, & to the wisdom acquired by experience & time, that when directed by a parent in whom are united so many other motives to engage our respect, must give great authority to his commands or his advice. Parents & Children are therefore united in a natural & harmonious association, in which mutual interest & happiness are their reciting objects & their chief care.

From this domestic union arise the first elements of civil society, which in the beginning was nothing more than the same kind of union somewhat extended. Antecedent to voluntary political establishments, the children of the first family when they came to mature years would naturaley acquire families of their own, united together by the same ties, & all bound by a similar & affectionate respect to their common progenitor. While the forest afforded game or their a convenient range of hunting, or yielded pasturage for their cattle, the love of society would prevent their dispersion & dispose them to establish themselves in one vicinity. With no other control than what nature, habit, affection & respect for age

impose

upon the free mind, they would consider their common ancestor as the umpire of their disputes, and be disposed to follow his sage and experienced advice on the measure of their conduct. After his death, the person who approached nearest to him in age, or a council of elders who had formerly been his assistants, would probably regulate the affairs of the tribe. Having no motives of interest in this early stage of things, that could create or give an object to tyranny, their councils would aim only at the common good, and the conviction of this would procure them respect. When hunting or pasturage would furnish them too scanty a supply to the growing tribe, some of the supernumerary families would remove to new regions & there repeat the same forms of society. Remote tribes would in time forget their common origin; and as they extended their limits, & approached near to one another, causes of dissention from personal injuries or from encroachments on their hunting grounds, would frequently arise.

This would produce a new object to society, its defence against hostility, and perhaps a new modification to Government, in order to fit it for the operations of War. The enterprise & courage natural to Man would soon create Soldiers: & some warrior of more bold and active spirit, than the rest would offer himself, & by general consent become their leader. Their martial enterprises would commonly be sanctioned by the advice of the Elders, or by the hereditary chief of the Nation. But sometimes the ardor of the young warriors might impel them against the opinion of age & experience. The hereditary heads of the people would not always, perhaps not often, be the most active warriors: &

Thus a

thus a distinction would be created between the Civil & Military chieftains. While the objects of ambition were not great & splendid, the military would usually be subordinate to the civil power. When in the progress of civil society, wealth & interest would offer greater objects to the passions of Men, the Military would sometimes be prompted & enabled to seize the Civil authority. Sometimes the civil, aware of this danger would take early means to associate the military commands with itself, as the surest basis of extensive & lasting power. The origin of civil government, out of domestic society has been casual. Nature has laid the foundation of submission & obedience to parents & the heads of tribes. Unsuspecting compliance & habit increased this subordination. Casual circumstances varied it, & gave also great variety to the forms of government that gradually grew out of the domestic. In associations like these, that have been more the result of accident than of design, the limits of subjection & power are always indefinite. No precise & certain system of government has been framed by the wisdom or adopted by the consent of the people. Custom generally regulates all. But the popular & enterprising character of a chief, may in seasons of public danger, enable him with the entire approbation of the people to extend his authority beyond the customary limits. When this has been done frequently, & has been long continued, these cases become prescriptions in favor of power. Thus may despotism by degrees be established; particularly if the situation or the spirit of a nation frequently engages them in wars, which require great subordination in the army, & favour the extension of power over the people. As long as men are in a savage state, that is before the introduction or improvement

rovement of Agriculture and Arts; no great encroachments can be made upon the liberties of the people. They do not possess that wealth which can provoke the attempts of ambition and Tyranny, or afford it the means of oppression.* In proportion as society advances, & property becomes fixed & extended, Tyranny finds its objects & its means: and the indefinite forms & boundaries of casual association and subordination afford it an opportunity with more plausibility & less observation to introduce and establish its dangerous claims. But the most complete & extensive despotisms are usually founded on conquest. The degraded populace in this case compelled to submission, have not the vigor to defend themselves: humbled & cut off from the means of improvement, they have not the wisdom to plan or conduct the means of deliverance. But without taking into view at present the evils of despotisms established by conquest, which are seldom cured except by other conquests, I remark, that the uncertainties & embarrassments which arise from casual & undefined associations, & the gradual encroachments & oppressions of power, have often obliged nations to have recourse to positive institutions, and a more certain organization, in order to remedy or prevent them. These positive institutions are the sentiments of general justice & utility reduced to laws which are usually written, as the most certain and permanent method of determining & securing the rights of all. Law is a known & public sentiment of right, declared to be the will, and sanctioned by

*Oppression can exist itself only on personal liberty & property. For personal liberty chiefly by means of property.

sanctioned by the power of the state. It may be declared by the people, by their representatives, or by persons appointed by the supreme authority to collect the rules of genical good from reason and experience. Laws may be political or civil (i.e.) they may establish the frame of government, or appoint the rules of conduct. Those only that regard the frame of government, I am to consider at present, as they ascertain the forms of association, under which men are collected. These forms are either simple or mixed: in the simple supreme power is vested in one person, or one body of Men: in the mixed, the supreme powers are divided among a plurality of persons or assemblies, in such a manner, that their respective authorities shall form some check upon one another in favour of the public liberty.

* The simple forms are democracy aristocracy monarchy & despotism†. — Democracy is the government of the people, by themselves, or by their representatives, who are ultimately accountable to them for the goodness & success of their measures. Aristocracy is the government of a few who are called nobles & who enjoy hereditary wealth & hereditary privileges superior to the body of the people. The government may be exercised by the whole class of Nobles convened in Senate or by a delegation made for the purpose out of their own body. Monarchy is the government of one man, agreeably to written & known laws which are usually deposited in the care of some tribunal or body of Men educated to interpret them. The prince must rule

* The different forms of government, their constitutions, principles, advantages & defects will be more fully treated of under the head of Polities.

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rule according to these laws by the agency of this grand depository, and of the tribunals subordinate to it. Many of these laws indeed have originated in customs founded on casual circumstances, & many of them have been introduced by the undue influence, which power & wealth naturally bestow on a hereditary prince. But this first depository professes to judge of the consistency of every new arret or decree, with the general system of legislation, & the body of laws already established. And in as much as its members have been taken from the body of the people, and their children must return and mingle with the people, these circumstances form no inconsiderable security for their fidelity. There are many instances of their forming formidable and effectual opposition to the arbitrary mandates of corrupted princes.

The influence of this body is greatly strengthned by an hereditary class of nobles, whose interests being permanent, and in some circumstances united with the power of the prince, and in others with the privileges of the people, helps by their wealth & influence to give at once stability to authority & security to freedom.

Despotism is the authority of one person not controlled by fixed laws or hereditary nobility. - All rank & all law are in the power of the despot. Both are the result merely of his will. His power was established by the army - his authority is strengthned by the army - and a military subordination & discipline pervade the whole state. The army itself however forms some controul to the excess of the

of the caprice of power. Princes, capricious, effeminate & cruel are apt to lose their respect with the military, as well as the people, & then a revolution delivers them from a monster. Honour & bravery which are usually associated with many useful political qualities will often be the recommendations of his successor. Besides some degree of wise & equitable policy must be employed to give that prosperity to the empire which is necessary to support the glory of the prince & to maintain the instruments of his power. So that despotisms do not always exhibit that extreme poverty & misery which has often been ascribed to them. The mixed forms of government are either republican or monarchical. If republican, they usually consist of a senate and an assembly representing the body of a people. These bodies are constituted with different powers and privileges in different states. They are differently balanced & established in different modes. The utility of two bodies in the constitution of the Legislature is so great that various methods have been devised, in our own country, in which there is no rank of Nobility, to construct them out of the same mass and to balance them so as to be proper checks, as well as aids to one another.

The politicians of America have endeavoured to constitute them in such a manner, that one shall represent the property, the other the number of the nation. Men of property are prone to abuse their influence to the injury of the equal privileges and independence of the multitude: and the multitude envious of the distinction of wealth are prone to abuse their power, to the injury of the security of property: they mutually need the controlle of a well balanced Legislature. Mixed monarchical forms of government may consist

by a king

of a king, a Senate, and a representative body of the people. The king may be either hereditary or elective- The senate may consist of the whole body of hereditary nobles, or of a number selected from themselves as their representatives. And the representatives of the people may consist of delegates for a longer or shorter time, according to a mode pointed out by law. The king may be merely an executive magistrate, or he may be also one branch of the Legislature. Each branch of the Legislature has usually a negative on the other, & yet their interests & powers are so balanced, as generally to dispose them to move in concert.

Thus I have traced the different forms of association, under which mankind have been united from their origin in domestic society.- The subordination of children to parents was natural- The increase of families enlarged the society- The death of parents transfered the allegiance- Casual circumstances varied & increased it- The defects of casual subordination gave rise to positive institutions in some of which the natural equality of mankind is maintained, subject only to dependence upon the whole body for the general good, and ascertained by law: in others subordination is confirmed, but rendered definite: and in others made indefinite and unconditional.

End of Lecture 4th

In the next lecture I shall proceed to consider man as susceptible of improvement.

I. Goes Inn. scripsit
Sep 24th 1805.

LECTURE 5th.

The object of the present Lecture is to consider man as susceptible of improvement. The inferior animals seem to be nearly in the same state in every age. Instinct, the principle by which they are governed, operates with great uniformity, and does not depend as reason does on the accuracy of observation, comparison and deduction. The principal difference among animals of the same species, is in bodily strength, agility & beauty. And these qualities depend in a degree on the climate, but chiefly on the manner of feeding, and in the animals which have been tamed and domesticated, on the care of man. Human nature is susceptible of improvement not only in bodily form and appearance, but much more in the qualities of the mind. Different states of society exhibit it in different degrees of improvement, and in different advances toward perfection. Its lowest condition is in the savage state, in which there are few objects to give variety to our ideas, and few means to extend their combinations and their communications.

As society advances, as the numbers of mankind increase, as arts are invented for their subsistence and accommodation, as their intercourse with one another becomes more frequent, & as their relations and connections are multiplied, the human mind becomes more quick and penetrating: reason is strengthened and extended to a greater variety of objects, and the powers of human nature are augmented. One of the principal sources of improvement in men and indeed one of his chief distinctions from other animals is his power of communicating and comparing thoughts and of increasing it by communication.

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This communication is made by signs either natural or instituted. Hence we derive the origin and growth of arts, and hence finally the principles of science.* The natural expressions of emotion and thought, are those of looks and gestures, and tones of voice, which are common to mankind, and which, without the assistance of words, convey to others, the feelings, ideas and wishes of the mind. Natural signs have a very limited field: they are confined chiefly to point out objects that pass under immediate review- or to express strong and sudden emotions, passions or sensations.#

Instituted signs contain the principal proofs of human ingenuity, and are indeed the principal sources of human improvement. I do not intend to speak here of the symbols of contracts or the monuments raised to celebrate great events which are also instituted signs, but shall confine my observations to those signs that form the common and ordinary expressions of thought. These are either spoken or written and constitute language. The spoken language consists of articulate sounds either simple or compounded, and used by custom and consent, as the expression of thought. The origin of language cannot be traced by History: and many fanciful theories have been offered to the world on this subject by ingenious and whimsical men. Some have imagined that language must have been imparted by revelation to the first man along with his existence.

Undoubtedly the power of speech was given to human nature in its first formation, and this perhaps was all that was necessary for all the purposes of life and of society. The objects about which men would have occasion or inclination to impart their sentiments would originally be few,

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* On these three sources or indications of improvement in man I propose to make a few observations in the present lecture.

Brutes have the power of using natural signs for similar purposes, and tho they are not as various and expressive as those employed by men: yet they probably convey much more expression to their animals of their own species than we can readily conceive.

few, for at that time, science and arts which give rise to the greatest part of improved language could have no place: and about the names of these few objects, they would easily agree: and the more easily because men would at first be in a domestic state, and children would naturally receive them from their parents. This narrow language would both from necessity and docility, be received by children, used afterwards in their own separate families, and propagated thro' the tribe as long as they should continue their residence in the vecinity of one another. Two objects deserve particular attention on the subject. — The diversity of languages that exist among men — and the similarity of structure that pervades all languages. The diversity of languages is the natural result of its original imperfection, and of the infinite migrations of mankind. The state of society was necessarily rude at first. The objects & combinations of thought were few, and speech was consequently extremely limited. Men situated in a boundless forest, and living by hunting or by pasturage, would soon become widely dispersed and continue long separate from one another. And as they would carry with them at first in their different migrations, extremely few and narrow elements of language in common, all the terms and modes of combinations in discourse that would afterwards be added in the progress of society, and which form the principal part of any language would necessarily be different in different tribes. Even the original terms which they proposed in common would in many instances be changed, by the change of objects in new situations; or by the alterations that time produces in all countries in the denominations of the same objects. Thus the diversities of language would become as numerous as the tribes into which mankind divided themselves in their several dispersions. There is however a similarity in the structure of languages that pervades them all. The similarity

larity to which I refer, does not consist in the resemblance of the names of things: altho' this is found in many examples among nations that have a near and common origin: but in the parts of which language is composed and the manner in which it is connected. The general theory of the principles of language constitutes universal grammar, and embraces those forms of speech in which all nations agree. Particular grammar points out the differences that exist between one language and others. These agreements and differences when traced to their minutest details, must be learned from those authors who have professedly written on the subject of Grammar. I shall however make some general observations on the theory of languages: because as language is the expression of thought, the philosophy of language is in some degree the philosophy of the human mind.

The substance of discourse must be composed of words that represent things and their actions. Things comprehend both qualities, and the subjects in which these qualities inhere, & actions may be considered as the operations of things, or the reception of their operations. So that the principal parts of speech, are the substantive, the adjective and the verb active or passive. These must be found in all languages that have made the smallest advances to improvement. Words that express ~~state~~ existence, states of being, and power of action unexerted, such as, I am, I sleep, I am able, will also have place under the form of Verbs as being more related to the class of actions than of things. Other words however must be employed to connect discourse, to point out the relations and dependences of its parts, and in some way to modify both things and their actions. Language therefore cannot be carried to any extent, without conjunctions, prepositions and adverbs or some variations ~~of~~ in the principal words of discourse which will ~~compound~~ correspond with these parts of speech and express the circumstances they are intended to indicate, such as the terminations of the nouns among the Greeks and Latins, which are called their cases. To

obviate

abviate the inconvenience of repeating too frequently the names of things pronouns have been introduced: and all nations have some peculiar sounds to express sudden and strong emotions, and these thrown into discourse without otherwise affecting the sentiment are called interjections.

This being the natural process of the Human mind & the natural principles on which language is formed, nearly the same parts of speech will be found in all languages. There is therefore a great analogy in the theory of their grammars. These few observations may perhaps be sufficient at present on the signs of thought expressed by sound. There are in the next place, signs of these sounds and of the ideas they represent expressed by visible and written characters. Men desirous of communicating their sentiments at a distance, or of ~~handing~~ transmitting them to posterity, and not being able sufficiently to rely on the fidelity of oral communication, would easily have recourse to some more faithful and permanent means of recording their ideas. These records would probably at first consist of pictures, giving such rude and imperfect representations of things, as an unpolished age would be capable of inventing or depicting. The figures of speech with which uncultivated nations and languages abound, would in time assist and extend the art of writing by painting. Thus an eagle might represent elevation of mind or imperial rank – a dove, innocence or mildness – a serpent ingenuity or cunning – and a circle endless duration.

When the Scythian prince sent to Darius a pair of wings, a mouse and an arrow, he might as well have sent their picture of these objects, which would have equally signified the sentiment they were intended to convey: that unless he could fly like a bird or hide himself in the Earth like a mouse, the Scythian arrows would overtake him. Progressive improvement would at length abridge the language of painting.

The

The head of an eagle would be used instead of the whole bird – a crown would represent a king, and a hand with a sword executive justice: & perhaps even the outlines of these figures themselves. But the signs of sentences being from their nature often vague, and conveying an uncertain and incomprehensible sense, some happy inventors would farther improve the art of writing by verbal and finally by alphabetical characters.* Verbal

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* There is an imperfection in all the modern alphabets of Europe, or perhaps I should rather say, in the modern alphabet of all Europe, because this alphabet has been borrowed with the other arts from the Ancients who applied these characters to sounds very different from those which obtain in ~~common~~ modern languages: as the most different sounds in various modern tongues are represented by the same borrowed letters. This imperfection & the cause of it are fully stated by the writers on Grammar. It is worthy of observation that there is a surprising uniformity in the number and names both of the vowels and consonants used by the greater part of Nations who posess alphabetical writing. This effect is perhaps partly natural and partly the ~~effect~~ result of imitation. The vowels being only emissions of pure sound, their variations must arise from different apertures of the mouth, & the different prolongations of the channel thro' which the sound passes. The broadest sound will naturally issue from the widest and deepest aperture: and as this opening is gradually contracted, and the impulse of the voice thrown farther forward on the palate, the sound becomes more slender, till at length the prolongation of the channel by means of the lips, will give the sound of O and the french U. These being natural will be general. The capital varieties of sound can be distinguished only into five or six. Nations differ by habit in the opening of the mouth, and the point of the palate on which they throw the impulse of the voice. But all voices emitted nearly from the same region or in the same manner have a similarity of sound. The names given to vowels by different nations are therefore only different degrees of the same sound: or to borrow a figure from painting, different shades of the same voice. There are more or fewer

diphthongs

characters represent each an entire word or phrase. We have a celebrated example of these in the written language of China. But the words of any civilized nation are so numerous that the multitude of characters necessary to designate them must become oppressive to the memory, and few scholars can be possessed of them all. Alphabetical characters have originated from an attempt to analyse the sounds of language, and their different modifications into their most simple elements. The simple sounds were attempted to be marked by vowels which were long or short, open or slender, according to their position in the word or the letters with which they were combined. The modifications of the sound were designed to be signified by the consonants and especially by the mutes. The semivowels have an obscure sound added to the modification of the vowels with

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diphthongs used by any nation in proportion as they have by accident or imitation multiplied the combination of these original and principal sounds. The modifications of vocal sound used by different nations being made by various contacts of the organs of speech, must in many instances be similar, if these nations had no other instructor than nature. The names of many of the consonants will therefore resemble one another. Imitation will multiply the resemblances. Greater diversities will take place in the form and arrangement of the letters than in their pronunciation. In those articles however, there is a striking similarity in the alphabets of most nations. People who were advanced in improvement would naturally impart their letters to the colonies who migrated from them, and rude nations would in the progress of time by intercourse with more polished people, improve their own alphabet, or perhaps entirely adopt the alphabet of their more enlightned neighbours, and fit it to their own language: at least they would often change the harsh and inconvenient forms of some of their letters, for such as were more beautiful and adapted to use (Agreeably to these observations, Antiquarians shew us the gradual changes in the alphabets of many nations, from the result of their own improvement, and some occasioned by borrowing improvements from others.) Nature and imitation therefore, both lead to great resemblance in the names and order of the letters of different nations.

which they are connected. This was a most fortunate invention. For thus by a few visible characters easily remembered, and easily combined, all the vocal signs of thought may be distinctly represented. After the discovery of alphabetical writings, the other forms would speedily be disused. There is however a celebrated example of that by painting, in its abridged and figurative form in the ancient hieroglyphics of Egypt. It was supposed to be an art invented by the priests to conceal their knowledge. But a more probable opinion is, that it was an art which preceded alphabetical writings in that country; and being employed by the priests who were the principal masters of science to record their sacred writings. was not speedily changed for the new invention; as we see in every country that whatever is attached to religion, even by a slight tie, is usually retained with greater perseverance than other customs. The hieroglyphics became obscure only by disuse, but this circumstance not being known, or adverted to, induced general belief that it was invented for the purpose of concealment. The art of speech, or of expressing thought by sound, and the art of writing, or of expressing sound by visible characters, are among the greatest efforts of human ingenuity. They form one of the principal distinctions of man from other animals, and contribute more than any other art to carry human nature to its ultimate perfection. Many arts are derived from the necessities of MEN, or from the wish of elegant accommodation and pleasure, and the Creator has furnished him with talents for their invention and cultivation. The necessities of subsistence, of protection from enemies, of lodging or cloathing, and the desire of convenience and ornament, or the ambition of reputation, are the sources of the numerous arts which are cultivated in Society.

The necessity of subsistence in the savage state, gives rise to the arts of Hunting and Fishing. In a state a little further advanced; to the Herdsman's art, and the rude and temporary cultivation of the soil that obtains among Barbarians - and in polished society to all the arts of Agriculture. The numbers are few that can be maintained merely by the production of the Bow and of the Hook. The spontaneous growth of the Earth, with

all the

all the uncertainties to which it is subject, from seasons, from climate, and from soil, can give support but to a small number of animals for the subsistence of Man. In this state of society therefore, a few inhabitants will be scattered over an immense forest. By degrees it would be discovered, That some animals were susceptible of restraint and culture, and that under Herdsmens' care, they would multiply in a much greater degree, than in a state of rude nature. Flocks would be collected, and population would be consequently increased, and gathered into moveable hamlets and villages.

Moveable because pasturage if not united with agriculture, requires frequent change of position. Herdsmen therefore, usually dwell in tents. Experiencing however in that temporary agriculture, that accompanies the shepherd state, the benefit of raising vegetables, fruits and grains that do not grow to advantage wild, they would gradually extend this culture. More land would be occupied in Husbandry. Less would be left for pasturage. Men would increase in numbers, in proportion, as subsistence increased. And to encourage industry, lands would be divided in perpetual property. As population is augmented, by the cultivation of the ground, other arts are multiplied in consequence. Protection from enemies, which was sought at first by the bow or javelin, or trusted to flight, or remoteness of situation, is gradually maintained by every species of offensive and defensive armour, and by the arts of fortification and attack, which we have seen grow up in civilized nations. Places of lodging and abode, which at first were wretched wig-wams, or moveable tents, became fixed and permanent houses adorned in time with the convenience of contrivance, the beauty of arrangement and the elegance of sculpture. Cloathing which at first consisted of the skins stripped from the animals taken in hunting, is exchanged for the workmanship of the loom, which is susceptible of innumerable improvements from the ingenuity of the artists. Convenience at first added to the necessities of life, and afterwards as wealth and population grew, innumerable ornaments that exercise innumerable arts. Arts at the beginning must have been extremely rude in their

execution.

execution. The demand for their product in an unpolished state would be so small, that the exercise of them would often be an appendage merely to the labour, more immediately necessary for subsistence. Even when they would become separate professions, so many branches would be exercised by one Man, that it would be impossible to acquire perfection, or even great dexterity in any. The work performed in this manner, will always be coarse in the execution and small in quantity. A subdivision of the arts contributes to their perfection, and the smaller the portions are into which they are divided, the simpler the division is, which is assigned to one man, with the greater expedition and beauty will every work be finished, provided that all the artists who profess the different branches of the same art, are assembled together in the same place, Each confined to one object acquires the greatest dexterity in its execution: all working ~~together~~, to one another, they finish the whole with incomparably more dispatch than the same number of workmen could do, attempting every branch, and awkwardly turning to them in succession, and wasting time in changing their positions and instruments of work. The improvement of Arts is greatly promoted by the establishment of commerce. Without commerce each man is obliged to supply himself by a rude and tedious industry with the different articles he may want, for his own use. But when commerce is once established, every artizan, altho' he confine his labour to one object, can exchange that surplus of his work which he does not need for himself, with other artizans, or with the tillers of the ~~ground~~ soil for other articles which his necessities require. Commerce is an art of great and general utility, and has an important influence on all Arts. It assists the common exchange of their productions which encourages and promotes the operations of each.

Commerce is either carried on by barter, in which one piece of goods or labour is given as an equivalent for another; or by a common medium, the representation of all commodities, which is called Money. Barter is the most defective method of exchange, that by money the most perfect. It facilitates the transfer of every kind of property, and thereby

thereby promotes the subdivision, and encouragement of all the arts*.

Finally, human nature is distinguished from that of the animals and raised above it, not only by its capacity for inventing and improving useful arts, and particularly the arts of speech and writing, by which all then are so happily advanced; but still more perhaps by its power of discovering and connecting the principles of science. Nature is uniform in all her operations, and proceeds by general laws. The principles of these laws or the essential powers by which she produces these effects, are not comprehended by the imperfect mind of Man, but the uniformity or analogy of the effects may be discovered by experience, and observation, and this uniformity or analogy we call a law of Nature. It is called a law, because it is considered as resulting from the will of the Creator, and the consequence of some energy implanted in nature, that in given circumstances will always operate in the same way. Philosophers by attentive observation may discern these uniformities or laws in particular trains of events, and the collection of them together is denominated science. Man alone of all the animals in the world, is capable of discovering those general rules, and therefore capable of reasoning justly from the past to the future, and of applying them to explain the phenomena that occur to their observation, and to judge of the truth or probability of those that are related in History.* The knowledge of particular phenomena is of little use except as they tend to the establishment of some general principle. General principles and laws alone deserve the name of science. They unfold the system of nature, assist

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Note 2.

* Any effect or event in nature to be explained is called a phenomenon: any general rule or law by which it is explained is called a principle. And any uniformity of effects indicating a common power from which it proceeds, is called a general rule or law of nature. The collection of these laws in their relations & dependences on one another, is called a Theory or system.

Note 1

* This subject however and some others that have been cursorily called up to view, will hereafter be more particularly treated in the progress of these Lectures.

sist us to know what we are, what is the state of things in which we are placed, and are to an intelligent being, the only certain rules of conduct. The discovery of the general rules of conduct, is the great object of the science of Morals. These must be derived from a knowledge of human nature, of its constituent principles, and of the mutual relations of Men to one another, and to their CREATOR. Having therefore in the four preceding lectures, considered Man as a species, and contemplating the distinctions that exist between him and the other species of animals, and in the present particularly pointed out his powers of improvement, I shall proceed in the following lecture, to consider him as an individual, and to examine the constituent principles of his nature.

End of Lecture 5th.

John Knox Junr. scripsit
October 12th 1805.

LECTURE 6th

Having considered man as a species, and taken a very cursory view of the qualities and characters that distinguish him from all other species of animals. I procead to consider him as an individual, and to explain with that brevity which your time renders necesary, the properties which enter into the composition of his nature considered as a moral agent.

In regarding the nature of man in this light, the first thing that demands our attention, is its being a compound of body and mind. The body is a system of organs fitted for receiving the impresions of outward objects, in such a manner, as to make their existence and their qualities sensible to the mind, and for acting upon them again as its instrument. ---- The mind is that rational principle which perceives, compares, and judges of things, and which directs our actions towards them. On this subject it has been made a question among Philosophers, whether or not the rational principle be different from the principle of sensation, common to us, with the inferior animals, or the same only with the addition of a superior faculty. Many of the ancient philosophers and particularly the Platonics held them to be two different principles; and this seems to have been the philosophical opinion of St. Paul. [Heb. IV, 12]

Some of the Moderns esteem the rational and sensitive parts of Human nature to be only different powers inherent in the same simple essence. They suppose that the rational and animal soul are the same in every other respect: but that of the latter is destitute of the power of comparing and judging or rather does not posess it to the same extent as the former. On this diversity of opinions we may remark, that we are not sufficiently acquainted with the nature of Brutes, to know how far they posess the power of comparison: but in our own nature, we are not conscious of different agents in sensation, and in reasoning; we perceive only, that the mode of acting is different: another

question

question That is of more importance, because it draws after it greater consequences, has divided Philosophers. It is whether mind be essentially different from matter, or whether sensation and thought may not result from a certain organization of the body, and in consequence of this, a peculiar and extreme refinement of the fluids. And certainly we see in matter, in some instances powers of astonishing activity, and a refinement and subtlety that is almost infinite. But the opinion that makes human nature wholly material, has been generally supposed to be connected with impiety and immorality: and without doubt unless we receive from revelation the doctine of the resurrection, it would destroy one of the strongest motives of virtue- the hope of immortality. Yet some religious Philosophers* connecting revelation with philosophy have embraced this sentiment. Its advocates however have generally rejected revealed religion. You will see it supported with ingenuity and carried to its greatest extent by the famous French Philosopher, Helvetius.

The opinion however of the perfect and essential difference of mind and matter is supported by the greater number of Philosophers, and indeed by the greatest and most ingenious men: and it seems also to rest on the most solid and rational principles. One proof that appears to posess considerable weight of the differences of these substances is drawn from the difference of their properties. The essences of things are too subtle to be the objects of our perceptions. We can judge of them therefore and of their agreement and distinction only by their properties. If then the properties of 2 substances are wholly different from one another, and have nothing in common, between them, we justly conclude that these two substances are themselves essentially different. The faculties by which we perceive the properties of matter and mind are wholly different in their nature. The one we perceive by the external senses- the other by the internal powers of consciousness. The properties themselves have no resemblance the one to the other: but they carry with them to our feelings, the conviction of their total dessimilarity. This will be plain by comparing color, figure, extension, taste, smell, which are qualities of

* among others, Dr. Priestly.

ities of Body, with Thought, volition, sympathy, affection which are qualities of Mind. Besides body is composed of parts separable from or moveable among one another. The qualities of the mind indicate one simple indivisible substance. The one is naturally inert, and set in action only by extrane ous impulse; the other is self motive. The one is moved by mechanical laws, the other is excited to move itself by laws that we perceive to be wholly variant in their nature from those which we observe in matter.

From this difference or rather opposition of properties we conclude that the soul is not of the same substance as the body. That our mental cannot spring from our bodily system, by any refinement or organization of parts, but that they are in nature and essence perfectly distinct. From the spiritual or immaterial nature of the soul, arises the physical proof of its immortality. The destruction of bodies is occasioned by the dissolution of their parts, or by that rigidity which in time grows upon their elastic organs, and at length stops their action. The unity, simplicity, and essential activity of the soul, seem not to be capable of being affected by the principles of dissolution, and if there are any others, they are unknown to us. An objection against this evidence of the immortality of the soul, and even against its surviving the body at all, arises from its being affected by all the changes of health, in the body. Its reasoning faculty is sometimes wholly deranged by bodily diseases, so that it seems probable, that it will perish by the dissolution of the body, or at least, that its action will be entirely suspended by that event. In answer to this objection, we may say, that while the body and mind are so immediately connected, they must have a mutual influence upon one another. The Body has not more influence upon the mind, than the mind has upon the body. If it is sometimes deranged by corporal diseases, or accidents, this arises necessarily from its situation. The body is the organ of all its sensations, notices, and informations. If these are perverted or disordered, they will introduce a similar disorder into all its ideas and conclusions. It is like a philosopher in his observatory, who is obliged to make use of defective

instruments

instruments, or like a man in a prison who forms a judgement of the world only through those false means of intelligence which his enemies permit him to enjoy; but the errors to which they are subject from the disadvantages of their situation, do not destroy their essential qualities, as a reasonable man or a philosopher. But at death when the union between our corporal and spiritual part is dissolved, the latter freed from the incumbrances and disorders of the former, may be supposed to act with more perfection. If we do not perceive the soul separating itself from the body at its dissolution, that is not surprising, because it is not an object of the senses. Besides, this is no more than what happens to many material influences, such as magnetism and electricity, which may be accumulated in bodies or separated from them imperceptibly, and which can be rendered obvious to sense only by their effects, or under certain peculiar circumstances.

Having made these remarks on the physical proofs of the immortality of the soul, I reserve the moral evidences of this important doctrine to another place:* and I return to those philosophic opinions on the nature of matter and mind which I had begun to illustrate when I took up the subject. ——— Some Philosophers believe that there is no spiritual subsistence distinct from matter; others with more reason believe matter and spirit to be essentially different. There is a third opinion opposed to both the former, which has been invented by some modern metaphysicians, and has been illustrated and supported with more ingenuity by Mr. Hume than any other writer. They deny the existence both of matter and spirit, as we understand these terms, and resolve all things in nature into ideas. They say it is conceded by the substantiae philosophers, that essences of things cannot be known, that we can only perceive their qualities and properties. If we ask what are those qualities or properties, these same philosophers are obliged to answer, they are merely ideas, as hardness, colour, taste, odour. The immaterialists then demand if ideas are the whole of what we perceive, what grounds have we to conclude that there is any thing else besides ideas existing. The like reasoning they say holds

* These will follow the evidences of the being and perfection of God.

holds with regard to the mind. Thus we can distinguish neither object nor percipient separate from ideas. What we call a thing therefore is only a collection of ideas which are always found together according to some constant law of nature, and what we call ourselves is only an unbroken train of ideas accompanied with self-consciousness, of which train this last idea is always one.---- On this philosophy I will just remark, that it is too subtle to be true. It violates some of the most clear and common and natural apprehensions that carry with them as much conviction and certainty as the existence of ideas themselves. Of these apprehensions, the principal are the existence of external objects different from the ideas by which they are perceived, or from the qualities which inhere in them, and impart those ideas: and the existence of a percipient mind distinct from the ideas which it frames. I say the conviction and certainty that accompany these, are as strong as it is possible for us to enjoy on any subject. What is the evidence on which we receive any axiom in the science of Mathematics? any intimation of the senses? these ideas themselves that are the all of the unsubstantial philosophers? By our own feelings we perceive that their existence cannot but be true. On the same proof- our own feelings, the common sentiments of our nature, we admit or rather cannot resist the certainty of the existence both of material & spiritual substances. The philosophy however which denies these, although first received with eclat, through the acuteness and sudden splendor of genius which distinguish both Berkley and Hume, is found at present to have but few advocates. It has been solidly and clearly refuted by Dr. Reid of Glasgow, in his essay on the active and intellectual powers of Man, a book that for a judicious and perspicuous metaphysic, is hardly equalled at present in the English language.-- This false philosophy was only an abuse of Mr. Locke's doctrine of ideas- an abuse which he certainly never designed nor foresaw. He supported that certain images of external objects affected the senses. That the mind contemplating these images from them concluded

cluded the existence of the objects themselves, to which however they had no resemblance. Mr. Locke ought to have maintained that not the images but the objects themselves were contemplated by the mind by means of those images or impressions.

End of Lecture 6th

LECTURE 7th

Having taken a general view of Man as composed of body and mind, I proceed now to a more particular analysis of his powers, as they relate to the philosophy of his morals. The material and immaterial parts of our nature reciprocally affect and act upon one another. We cannot always with certainty discriminate what in our actions, is peculiar to each. The soul seems to be the principle of life to the body, of intellect, and of all our moral actions. The body is the organ and machinery of the soul destined to convey to it, the necessary information with regard to outward objects, and to be the instrument of its operations. I shall not attempt to ascertain the degrees or limits of their mutual influence, We are not yet sufficiently acquainted with the secrets of nature, for this purpose; but there are certain powers or properties of our nature, which are intimately connected with the subject of these Lectures, some of which are more closely allied to the body, others to the mind, of which it will be necessary to give a brief illustration. I shall reduce them to the following heads, 1st. Sensation – 2nd. Sentiment – 3rd. Imagination – 4th. Reasoning – 5th. Affection – 6th. Volition – 7th. the Moral Faculty. ..... Sensation in its primary

signification

signification, is that perception which we have of external objects, and their qualities by means of the bodily organs of sense. Those organs are five – the smell, taste, – touch – hearing, and seeing. But sensation is divided into two kinds, external – which has been just mentioned, and internal, – which is that perception which we have of the actions and qualities of the mind. We understand the name of thought, volition, doubt, belief, desire, envy, hatred, love, sympathy by a direct and immediate sensation, as we do any of the objects of the external senses. It is however only in the actual exercise of these several powers, or operations of the soul, that we perceive their nature. And in as much as these objects of sensation are within our minds, our consciousness or perception of them is called internal sensation. Internal sensation however has been extended farther by some writers, to embrace certain qualities of external objects, or certain perceptions in us, with regard to them besides their dimensions, color, figure, motion, sound, which are attended with agreeable or disagreeable emotions, such as our perceptions of beauty, proportion, harmony or their contraries. These qualities of objects, or our ideas of them have been called by some writers, secondary sensations, because they do not regard the primary and immediate qualities of bodies, or of actions, such as color, extension, sound &c. but are something that result from them, and are additional to them. It is not of much consequence, by what denomination they are called, if they are only understood. I shall treat of them after having first considered the primary internal sensations. But before I proceed to them, I shall enter into a more particular consideration of the external senses. The external senses give us the only adequate proof of the existence of an external world, and of the natures and sensible properties of things. Their impressions are always accompanied with a conviction of the reality of the objects from which they are derived, and which are believed to exist distinct from our perceptions or ideas of them. We cannot indeed prove their existence by any argument; neither can we in this way prove our own existence, but we feel it to be a truth, its evidence is irresistible – it is a necessary law of nature that we should believe the being and reality of other

things

things as well as of ourselves. It is a First Truth that like an axiom cannot be demonstrated itself, but is necessary to the demonstration of all other truths: or like a simple idea that cannot be defined or made plainer, but is necessary to the definitions and illustrations of all other ideas. It is unnecessary to repeat to you the various hypotheses of Philosophers with regard to the modes in which the perceptions of objects are conveyed to the mind by the senses. You will meet with much on this subject both in physical and metaphysical writers. But we are not sufficiently acquainted with the finer and internal operations of our nature, nor with the nexus between the soul and body to be able to explain it with accuracy and certainty. It seems however to have been rendered clear enough that the impressions of outward objects, are conveyed to the mind by certain modes of motion, in the nerves that lead from the organs of sense to the brain. But what these modes are, or how the mind perceives in consequence of them, is wholly unknown to us. Yet the principle serves in some degree to explain certain phenomena in human nature, that have not generally been rationally accounted for.

Many persons of weak and nervous habits, or of imaginations that have been disordered by a superstitious education, have supposed that they have seen lights, have felt themselves to be struck, have perceived spectres, or the apparitions of their dead or distant friends.

Relations of this kind have been commonly supposed to have had their origin in imposture, in some kind of waking dream, or in some real appearances of nature, that have been mistaken by weak and ignorant persons, who had not the talents or courage to examine them accurately. And doubtless these causes have given rise to many wonderful relations that have been circulated in the world. We are not however to ascribe to them every narration of this kind: for if disease or any peculiar state of the imagination should give these motions to the nerves of any of the organs of sense, which would be excited in them by the real presence of objects, the same ideas will be produced, as if the objects were actually before us.

Thus

Thus many appearitions may be accounted for, without the supposition of imposture, and without supposing that nature ever goes so far out of her ordinary course, as to send back to us the inhabitants of the invisible world, or to impart to a few persons not distinguished by any talent, extraordinary visions or manifestations from Heaven, which are not followed by any important consequence to the world. I have known a man by no means of inferior understanding, but whose constitution had been weakned by intemperance, who believed that he saw his friend who was dead and was at a great distance from him, and that he distinctly heard his voice. I have known a woman whose veracity I could not doubt, but who usually lived a recluse and contemplative life, and whose nerves were consequently much debilitated, and subject to irregular movements, who thought more than once that she saw shining round her, a clear and resplendent light. Both of these cases I ascribe to motions in the organs of sense, such as light or the countenance or voice of the absent person would produce, and excited at the same time by a diseased state of the nerves, or by the force of imagination, or by both causes combined.

To the same causes we may also attribute a great part of those false ideas that disturb and mislead such persons as are deranged in their understandings. In the enumeration of the external senses, I mentioned in the first place that of smell; it is seated within the nostrils; its pleasures are perhaps of the lowest order: Yet it is the source of many agreeable and exhiliating sensations, and it is frequently also by the wisdom of the creator, made to contribute to our safety by indicating the qualities of food, by being offended by putrid & noxious exhalations. The organ of this sense opening immediately into the region of the palate, and the tongue, has a great affinity with the taste which is the sense next in order and which has its seat here. Anatomists have discovered that the upper surface of the tongue is covered with small conical protuberan-

ces

ces with openings at top like mouths, in the centre of which are very fine papil-
la which seem to be terminations of nerves destined to convey the ideas of taste
to the common ~~medium~~ sensorium. The word Taste in English is applied three
different ways: it is used to signify first, that quality in a body capable of ex-
citing the sensation of taste in us- 2^ly^ that power in us capable of receiving the
relish of a body when applied to the tongue- 3^ly^ the actual sensation itself.

This remark holds also with regard to the terms by which other senses or
their objects are expressed, as sight, sound, odour &c. The pleasures and the pains
or disgusts of taste, are usually indications of what is salutary or noxious in
food. It is a proof of the attention of the creator to the happiness of his crea-
tures to annex the pleasures of taste to the demands of appetite, when sustenance
is necessary or useful, and not less to prevent men from excess by the indifference
or satiety that succeeds after they have eaten as much as is sufficient for health
and nourishment. But taste we know is capable of being depraved by bad habits,
and made to disrelish wholesome food, and to solicit noxious sauces, and to urge
men both to gluttony and intoxication. God has placed the regulation of this sense
and the appetites connected with it, under our own management, and direction, in
order to exercise our virtue. The sense which I have mentioned next in order is
that of touch. The whole body is an organ of touch. Its pains are indications
of danger that excite us to guard against it. The greater part of the sensa-
tions of touch are indifferent, and shew the presence of innoxious bodies.

Its pleasures most commonly arise from being relieved from painful
sensations, as to moderate warmth after extreme cold, or a gentle coolness succee-
ding extreme heat. But there are some pleasures of touch arising from cer-
tain motions of the nerves that may be called pleasures sui generis, such as
tickling. The principal objects of this sense are hardness, softness, figure, heat,
and cold. But almost all bodily sensations, except light, colour, sound, odour,
taste may be referred to it. Hardness, softness and figure are real properties

of body.

of body as well as sensations in us. Heat and cold as perceived by us, are not real properties of the bodies in which they are perceived. The causes of these sensations as they exist in them, are very different from the sensations as they exist in us, and therefore they are called secondary qualities of bodies, as the former are called primary. The sensations afforded to the touch by the primary qualities of bodies, are almost all indifferent. Those afforded by the secondary, are almost all pleasing or painful.—I proceed to make a few remarks on the sense of hearing. Its seat is in the cavity of the ear: Its sensations are excited by pulses or tremors of the air, created by explosion, or propogated from the vibrations of very tense and elastic bodies, and collected within the ear, and communicating their impulse and undulations by means of the exquisite machinery of that organ to the brain. Sounds are secondary qualities of bodies. They have no resemblance to their exciting causes. Hearing is a sense of higher order, than any of the preceding: and it is a source of more refined and exquisite pleasures. It furnishes the means of the most extensive information, both from those sounds which are the natural and those which are the instituted signs of things.

To it belongs the field of melody and harmony, which are so intimately allied to the finer feelings of the soul. Sounds are distinguished by intensity and tone. Intensity arises from the degree of force or density in the pulses of air. Tone from the interval between the pulses. Tones being the natural language of sentiment, by a happy composition of them, the imagination may be kindled and the heart agitated every way. Gaiety and tenderness, courage & love, the noblest as well as the softest sentiments may be inspired. By the sense of hearing, the vast and various power of language has access to the soul. To it the orator chiefly, and the musician entirely addresses himself. Over morals, eloquence has an acknowledged and decided power, and music posesses so great an influence, that several of the ancient legislators have thought that its regulation ought to be made a subject of the laws. The sight is the last sense in

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the order mentioned. It is also the highest in importance, both from the variety of its informations, and the exquisiteness of its perceptions. The eye is its organ.

With its delicate and admirable structure, you have been made acquainted in the science of Optics. It forms the most commanding feature in the human countenance, and as it is the principal inlet of knowledge, it usually also expresses more than any other feature, the character of the Genius by which a man is distinguished. It takes in the whole external structure of nature. It takes in the whole language of visible signs, which is so forcible, and so various. By it the orator often reaches the heart with the greatest success. Of arbitrary signs particularly, it gives the most extensive command, and especially of written language, by which knowledge is accumulated, preserved, & imparted more successfully than by all other means. The primary and original perceptions of sight are of superficial extension and figure, of apparent magnitude, of light, shade and colour. Appearances of external things are conveyed to the eye by means of light reflected from their surfaces, and conveyed into images of them, on the fine expansion of the optic nerve at the bottom of the eye. Objects are perceived by means of these images. The mind does not contemplate these images as some philosophers have supposed, and thence infer the existence of their objects, but it contemplates the objects themselves by means of the pictures of these impressed in the eye. The picture of an object is always painted in an inverted position on the retina, but we see it erect: a proof that we contemplate the object, and not the image, and that we see it in the right line of the rays of light, which crossing in the pupil must at once paint the picture inverted, and shew the object erect. The colours of things are neither in the objects, nor in the mind, but in the rays of light reflected from their surfaces. Besides the primary perceptions of sight, we derive others from it by experience, of the real magnitudes, figures and distances of

Lect 8th

ces of bodies which are immediate and primary objects of touch. Figure is determined from the relations of light and shade. Magnitude from distance previously known: and distance from known compared with apparent magnitudes. The laws by which their calculations are made, are properly the objects of natural and mathematical Science.

End of Lecture 7th.

I. Croes Jun.r scripsit Oct. 16th. 1805.

LECTURE 8th.

I propose in the present lecture, to treat of internal sensation. The primary and original perception of any quality which is understood, only by the impresions it makes upon us, or by our feelings with respect to it, and which cannot be made plainer by any definition, or attempt to explain it, may be called a sensation, and that power or faculty by which we ~~per~~ receive the perception may be called a sense. From this view of the matter, we will find that ~~that~~ the knowledge which we have of the mind, and its properties and operations is as much the result of sensation, as that which we have of the body and the qualities which belong to it. We know what colour, sound, figure, corporeal pleasure and pain are by actual impresions on the senses of sight, hearing and touch. In the same manner, we perceive what thought is, we understand what is meant, when it is said, I love, I hate, I doubt, I am convinced, I will, I am in suspense, by actually perceiving these states, and operations of our

own minds

own minds, from turning our attention inward on ourselves. Both the one and the other are equally incapable of being defined, or understood, except from our own experience, that is, from exerting our powers, or receiving the impressions of objects on their proper organs. As the whole body was said to be an organ of touch, the whole mind is susceptible of those internal feelings, by which its own powers, acts and thoughts are understood. They afford ideas that are primary or ultimate - That is - there is nothing clearer by which to explain them, and they are necessary to explain all things. Every simple idea of mind as well as of matter, and their respective operations may be referred to some principle of sensation. The external senses have been already enumerated and are clearly distinct from one another in their organization, as well as the ideas they impart. The soul itself being a simple essence, is not divisible into different organs of sensation. All its simple ideas therefore may be considered as different modes of feeling, according as it applies its attention to its own operations, or to the contemplation of other things.

These modes are infinitely various, corresponding with the variety of our ideas. Each of these modes might be called a sense: or rather, if our ideas of mind were as accurately classed as those of body, each class might be referred to a separate sense. As this classification has not been made, or at least has not been carried to a great extent, I shall not attempt any considerable minuteness or exactitude on this subject, but shall content myself with taking notice of three principal divisions - 1st those that relate to the acts and sentiments of our own minds - 2dly those that relate to the fine arts, and 3dly those that relate to Morals. The first are all referred to consciousness or reflection. I am conscious of existing: I am conscious that my soul is not the same being or the same kind of being with my body. I am conscious of loving, of

hating

hating, of assenting, of denying, of willing, of liberty of choice, & therefore of pow-
er over my own actions and determinations. By consciousness or reflection,
then I become acquainted with all those ideas, and am able to affix the
just meaning to all these terms. In the same way I understand all oth-
er operations of the mind. Under the third division, are comprehended, all
those internal powers of sensation, which go to make up the Moral Faculty.

Thus we have a sense of right and wrong, a sense of justice, and a sense of
truth and others of this class. But the consideration of these I defer at present,
and reserve them till I come to treat more immediately of the moral faculty.

The second division which will compose the remaining part of this lecture, em-
braces all those ideas which are connected peculiarly with the fine arts, and
the powers by which we receive them. In these, different principles have
been discovered, and distinguished from one another, and referred to so many dif-
ferent senses to judge of them. All authors have not made the same enume-
ration of principles: and I shall rather select a few as examples of those pow-
ers of internal sensation, than pretend to go into a complete detail and explana-
tion of them which belongs more particularly to the province of criticism.

In the philosophy of morals, however some notice ought to be taken of these
because they are component principles of our nature: they serve to illustrate the
properties and powers of that being who is the subject of moral obligation &
they have in effect an important influence on Manners..... We have a
sense of sublimity, a sense of beauty, a sense of harmony, a sense of pleasure
in imitation, and I add, a sense of the ridiculous, which is connected partly
with the arts and partly with the morals. In the objects of sight and hearing &
in some of those of internal sense, besides the immediate and direct perception
of the object, there is something further discovered, that affects us with pleasure

or pain

a pain. So besides colour, figure, quantity, we frequently perceive something which we call proportion, order, symmetry, beauty, and in sounds, we perceive agreeable succesions or combinations of notes and tones, which we call melody or harmony, and because these ideas are additional to the original perception, they are called by some writers, as has already been remarked, secondary sensations.

1st^ly The first that I have mentioned is that of sublimity. — Whatever is great or lofty seems, when we contemplate it, to expand and swell and elevate our feelings: hence this sensation or emotion has been called the sublime. But it is not derived solely from objects of uncommon greatness or elevation: we feel a similar expansion or grandeur of soul at the sound of thunder, or the rushing of an impetuous torrent. It is created frequently by the view of human characters, that excite the respect and admiration of the world, genius, valour, undismayed and heroic virtue. Demosthenes agitating the people of Athens by his eloquence, or Cato struggling amidst the ruins of his country. There is a sublime that belongs to each of the fine arts, and is distinguished by peculiar characters, which fills the mind with great ideas and inspires it with elevated and noble passions & which it is the province of criticism to point out. But the most sublime object in the Universe is the DEITY. The contemplation of his infinite power, wisdom, goodness and justice: the immensity of his presence, the eternity of his being, are calculated to fill the mind with the greatest ideas and the most noble affections.

As there is something mean and degrading in vice, as virtue tends to exalt as well as purify the soul, and as the contemplation, the adoration, and the love of the deity seen either immediately or in his works, will probably form a principal employment and reward of the pious and virtuous, a final cause of the sense and taste of the sublime implanted in us by the Creator, may be to cultivate within us a superiority to low and vicious passions, and to prepare us by the love

of sublime enjoyments properly directed, and by habits of virtue corresponding with them, for that exalted state of perfection and happiness that awaits good men in another world.

2ndly The next sense which I mentioned, is that of beauty. This term by a figure is applied to almost every thing that gives us pleasure. Whether it be in nature, in art, or in human character and conduct. But it is confined here to those objects chiefly that are taken in by the eye. Beauty is discernible in colour, in figure, in motion, or in certain combinations of these qualities. Colours may please by the vivid, the gay, or the delicate emotions they excite. Or they please by being associated with other qualities that are agreeable to us, and being indications of them. Hence each nation is chiefly pleased with that complexion of the human countenance which is predominant among them, and in that complexion with those tinges of it that are commonly connected with youth and health. Several circumstances concur to the beauty of figure, as order, proportion, utility, each of which ideas may be, and by some writers has been referred to a distinct sense in the mind. Order is that arrangement of parts which exhibits them in the most natural relations, which aids the transition of the eye from one to another, and which sets off to the greatest advantage, and promotes the effect of the whole upon the mind. Proportion respects the relative magnitude of parts, which should be in any ratio to one another, which the eye requires in order to be pleased, and it respects also the fitness of any object to the end for which it is designed. It was the opinion of Socrates we are informed, that utility formed a principal part of beauty. And it is certain that although nature has made us to be pleased with particular colours, figures, and motions in themselves, yet we soon learn to judge of things by their aptitudes to

their

their ends, and to modify our other ideas or perceptions of beauty, by these reflexions: and fitness is one chief ingredient in our idea of proportion. We look for it and we perceive it with pleasure whenever it is found in works either of nature or of art. In animals therefore, a great part of their beauty arises from their aptness for their several destinations. One reason why fitness and propation please so much, arises from their being indications of wisdom and design. Intelligence and virtue to those who are capable of understanding them, afford the highest pleasures of which we are susceptible. That organization therefore, those proportions, that symmetry of parts and expression resulting from the whole, which suggest to us intelligence or amiable dispositions of Heart or which excites within us emotions allied to these qualities, are always esteemed beautiful. Here we discover a moral end in this sense, and taste of beauty which is implanted in us by nature; and when properly directed, it will always contribute to cherish and increase amiable and benevolent dispositions in the mind. The sense of beauty is also touched by certain easy and graceful motions. A wavering motion is generally more pleasing than motions in right lines. Hence it is perhaps that a curve line which suggests this kind of motion to the fancy, is generally esteemed more beautiful than a straight line: and streams that meander negligently through a plain, are much more delightful than canals cut by rule. If it should not be esteemed too fanciful, I would say that there is something in an easy and graceful motion, that seems to be connected with gentleness and sweetness of disposition. The variety of animated and easy motions in the countenance of an intelligent and well bred man or woman, which go to form its expression, when united with the requisites of beauty, symmetry, and complexion, render it the most interesting and beautiful object in nature. A proof this, how much the cul-

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tivation of the mind and heart, will contribute to create that beauty, or at least that noble stile of it, which is so charming, and which mankind are generally solicitous to posses, tho they often mistake the means.

LECTURE, 9th.

3rdly Another internal sense is that of Harmony. By the ear we perceive sounds, but it is by internal feeling that we discern that character of them, which is called Harmony. I mean by this term at present to embrace not only Harmony properly so called, which consists in an agreeable combination of sounds, but melody which consists in an agreeable succession of sounds. It belongs to the art of music to explain the laws of melody and harmony. I shall make here only two or three general observations upon that sense which judges of them. By it we perceive that some sounds in their combinations form a pleasing concord. The combinations of others are discordant and painful. The succession of agreeable sounds forms melody and agreeable concords harmony. Experience and a certain delicacy of sense of this subject, are necessary in order to produce the one or the other. Some men are almost wholly destitute of the sense of harmony. In this case, they are not only void of the power of excelling in the art, but even of conceiving of it justly, or feeling its effects. The charm of harmony is greatly augmented by being associated with sentiment. Some sounds a combinations of sounds accord more than others with certain states of feeling of the mind, and when these feelings are agreeable, they very much heighten its power of giving pleasure. If it is united with poetry that finely depicts the sentiments of the heart, or the objects of nature, this union with the power of genius and fancy, and the beautiful pictures which

they

they create, or the emotions which they call forth, serves greatly to enliven the charms of music. Music then also derives an additional power of pleasing from the aid of another sense.

4thly The sense of pleasure in imitation. This is a powerful principle of human nature. Man is more prone to imitation than all other animals: his character is chiefly formed by it. Thus has it an important effect upon morals: and it may be considered, as a wise and beneficent institution of nature in order to give us the advantages of the reason and experience of others in the formation of our manners, at that age in which we are utterly incapable of reason and experience ourselves.

The sense of imitation has given rise to the arts of painting, statuary, music and poetry, which have therefore been called the imitative arts. Painting and statuary give us visible and almost perfect representations in colour and in stone of the objects in nature. Natural sounds may be also perfectly imitated by music. But there is a secondary kind of imitation of which music is capable, and which is a principal source of its pleasures, as was suggested in the close of the last article that is by the power of sound exciting within us emotions analogous to those that are created by certain scenes of Nature, and thereby giving us more lively and agreable ideas of those scenes. The imitations of Poetry are made by language. It may represent to us natural objects as they actually exist, or it may create such pictures of natural objects or scenes as might with probability be supposed to exist. But whether its representations be real or imaginary, nature is the basis of them, and a resemblance to her works, constitutes the perfection of poetry. That I may not enter into discussions that belong to the art of criticism, I will only farther remark, that good imitation imparts a pleasure peculiar to itself independently on the beauty or agreableness of the objects it represents. Objects which it would be painful to see, become agreable on representation, and the

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more perfect the similitude, the greater is the pleasure. Imitation tho it represents nature, generally adds something to it, that is not however beyond the bounds of probability. It shews us rather what it might be, than what it really is. Thus it enlarges the field of pleasure, and increases the delight which nature herself is calculated to afford. The cultivation of the imitative arts when properly limited, and directed, is favourable to the moral disposition of the heart. The temper of man is softened by them and he becomes more prone to the exercise of the gentle and benevolent affections.

5th The last of the internal senses which I mentioned is the sense of the ridiculous, which like every other sense affords simple and ultimate ideas that can be explained only by being felt. Its effect is to produce smiling and laughter. There are different degrees or classes of the ridiculous. 1st The ridiculous properly so called, which is something in an object which excites pleasantry, but mingled with a degree of contempt. 2nd Ludicrous which excites pleasantry without contempt. 3dly Satire which is the ridiculous mingled with asperity. 4th Raillery which is the ludicrous applied to character, and mingled with good humour and friendship. 5th Buffoonry which consists in assuming the character of the ridiculous for the amusement of others. A Buffoon however can hardly make us laugh at his ridiculous actions without contracting a degree of contempt on himself.

Many writers have endeavoured to explain the feeling of ridicule and to define its object, but they are not more capable of being defined and explained than seeing or colour. Yet we perfectly understand them by having an object presented that will affect the sense. Look at Sir John Falstaff crammed into a basket by two jolly Fluzzies with whom he had been trifling and drenched in the mud and water of the Thames, and you will have a more perfect idea of the ridiculous than by all the attempts of metaphysicians

physicians to explain it. Aristotle says, it is some fault or turpitude not attended with pain and not destructive. This definition is not accurate. For there are many slight faults or turpitudes that do not provoke us to laugh- and we sometimes smile at objects in which there is no turpitude, as in the pun of Mr. Pope's when he says of Prince Eugene that "he was a great taker of snuff as well as of Towns." If we ask them more particularly, what is that fault or turpitude which excites laughter? We must say, it is a ridiculous one - that is we must appeal to sense itself, to enable us to understand the definition. The attempts to explain this feeling, have consisted chiefly in describing the objects that raise it. Some writers say, and Mr. Hutcheson in particular, that it is a contrast of dignity and meanness appearing in the same object, that occasions laughter, or excites that emotion which we call ridicule. This definition is liable to the same defect with that of Aristotle - for it is not every contrast of dignity and meanness that will produce pleasantry - they are only ridiculous contrasts - contrasts which can be discerned only by the sense of ridicule that occasions it.

Tho' all contrasts are not ridiculous, yet in most of the objects of ridicule, there is a certain kind of contrast or incongruity that produces a gay and quick vibration of mind between the opposite ideas that compose them. This incongruity also, must be sudden and unexpected, for when it is familiar and known, it ceases to move our laughter. Sometimes the mere juxta-position of such incongruities creates mirth, as in the little play stiled cross questions, and silly answers. Sometimes it is moved by unexpected resemblances discovered between a mean object, and a great one, as when the author of Hudibras says,

"The sun had long since in the lap,
"Of Thetis taken out his knap,
"And like a bobster boiled, the Morn,
"From black to red began to turn.

Sometimes certain littlenesses or slight blunders appearing in a character otherwise respectable: sometimes great causes assembled to produce a very small effect; pompous language employed to decorate a very trivial subject or their contraries, awaken pleasantry. The same effect often arises from parallels drawn between objects that are dignified and mean, from foolish pretensions to greatness, in a weak character unable to support them. Of all these we find many examples in ~~Gulliver's~~ Gulliver's Travels, Don Quixote, the history of John Bule, the Dunciad, and many other productions that are familiar to you.*

The sense of ridicule, is an important principle in human nature, and not in a slight degree connected with morals. It serves to multiply our refined pleasures, and may be made an instrument to correct errors and vices. Although it is not the test of truth, a strange principle maintained by Lord Shaftsbury, yet it is often a succesful weapon to destroy old errors that are maintained by habit and prejudice and not by reason. It serves to correct those light faults against which we cannot reason with advantage. It may be used to chasten greater vices that are protected from the remonstrances of reason by general custom a by the strength of the passions. It is an useful auxiliary when well directed to Taste in the arts and in morals to reason and conscience.

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* This subject will be found extensively treated in one of Dr. Beattie's Essays.

End of Lecture 9th.

John Bros Junior scripsit

Oct. 18th. 1805.

LECTURE 10th

We have now considered the means by which we become furnished with ideas that are the elements of our knowledge, and that form the objects which excite the active principles in man, and on which his active powers are exerted. These means are sensation external and internal. The principles of activity in man are propensity, sentiment, affection or desire and volition. Each of these I shall consider, but not in the order here named.

Propensity and sentiment will form the subject of this ~~letter~~ lecture. But as the affections and volitions of men are not a little influenced by the powers of imagination and reason, I shall introduce a few remarks on the latter before I speak of the former. Propensity is a ~~mechanical~~ natural tendency to certain actions & enjoyments prior to any experience of their good or ill effects. As it is one of our most powerful motives to action, so the love of action is itself one of our first and strongest propensities. Propensities are either bodily or mental, or mixed. Those that are bodily are otherwise called appetites, as the tendency or impulse to food, drink, sleep, and animal love. Mental propensities are natural tendencies of the mind, which resemble those of the body in this, that they excite us to pursue their objects antecedently to experience and reflection. Among these may be ranked, curiosity to know: the ambition of excelling: the love of imitation: a strong tendency to particular exertions of the mind, which forms or indicates a genius for particular arts. Those that are mixed include some gratifications both of the body and the mind but chiefly perhaps of the mind, as the protection and care of children, the impulse to society and especially the society and friendship between the sexes, which is the principal tie that connects mankind together.

Bodily propensities or appetites are not constant; they arise at intervals, and when their immediate ends are obtained, they are intermitted. To continue their indulgence, after their ends are obtained, is soon followed by satiety and disgust. The other propensities do not require similar intervals to renew them, and are not followed by similar disgust. ..... Habit which arises from the frequent

frequent repetition of particular acts may greatly strengthen natural propensities and may even create new ones towards objects which were originally indifferent and disagreable..... Men have a propensity to revenge injuries, but its gratifications in generous minds, is usually followed by pain.

When no injury has been received, they have many and strong propensities to acts of kindness of different kinds, and these are always accompanied and succeeded by pleasure. The gratification of our propensities contributes to our happiness. Unhappiness arises from contradicting or violating them.

Propensities are by many writers confounded with instincts. There is perhaps this difference between them. Propensity expresses the internal impulse a desire that prompts us to seek an object. Instinct relates to the manner of accomplishing that object, which is uniform in animals of the same species. Thus children have a propensity to nourishment, but it is by instinct they apply their mouths to the breast. Birds have a propensity to continue their species, ~~but it is~~ by instinct they build their nests and hatch their eggs. Spiders by instinct frame their webs, in order to catch the insects they have a propensity to devour. By the same principle, certain fowls in the winter season, seek a warm climate. The animals which are void of reason, are endowed by the creator, with a greater number of instincts for their preservation and defence than Man. Man by the divine wisdom, is endowed with fewer, that he may have stronger inducements to cultivate his rational powers, and exercise his benevolent affections in the care of his children and of Society. Our propensities have certain limits, within which they are all consistent with one another, and contribute to the happiness and perfection of the individual. But the error of judgement or wrong habits or accidental circumstances that inflame particular ~~passions~~ propensities, some are frequently raised to a disproportioned strength above others. It is the province of reason aided by good and established principles of conduct to check those that are too strong, to encourage those that are too weak and to preserve among them that just

just proportion that is most favourable to virtue. Our sensations and propensities lead us to divide objects into two classes, good and evil. All those that afford agreeable sensations or that gratify our natural propensities, we call good; all those that affect us with painful or disagreeable sensations, or that contradict or violate our propensities, we call evils. Whatever therefore contributes to our own preservation or that of others, whatever tends to promote the interests of society, whatever is supposed to give eminence and distinction, or to promote the perfection of the individual is esteemed good – whatever is contrary to these is ~~esteemed~~ held to be evil. The way is now opened to explain 3.dly the next principle or power which is Sentiment. Sentiment is defined to be some emotion of the mind, relative to good and evil, present or future in ourselves or others. A few examples will make it more intelligible. The posession of what is esteemed to be Good, produces that sprightly and agreeable emotion which we call joy. The suffering of pain, or the depriviation of Good excites those distressing and unpleasant emotions that make up the sentiment of grief. The prospect of good to be enjoyed, or evil escaped; the apprehension of good that is probably to be lost, or evil to be suffered, create those sentiments which we distinguish by the names of Hope and Fear. Many writers have attempted to divide all our sentiments and even all our pasions into the classes of joy and sorrow. But the names of these divisions seem to be illy chosen. There is but little resemblance in the inward feeling at least between these sentiments, and some of those that are classed along with them: for example between insolence and pride and the sentiment of joy – or between scorn and rage and that of grief. Without making any regular classification of them, I shall only give a few examples of sentiments which arise from the considerations of the different kinds of goods or evils in ourselves or others. When we contemplate our own preservation and safety, and the circumstances that contribute to it, we feel the sentiment of security. In great succes, we perceive the sentiment of exultation. In contrary circumstances, we perceive those of apprehension, terror, despair. When we see others enjoying happiness, between whom and us, there is no rival-

ship

ships or ground of disaffection, we indulge the sentiment of congratulation. In their distresses we feel that of sympathy or compassion. When men contemplate real excellencies in themselves, they feel the sentiment of self-approbation, elation of mind, conscious worth. Defects and vices when they are perceived, produce the sentiments of shame, compunction, self-reproach and remorse. Superiority to others in qualities that are excellent, or in singular advantages and especially if they attract the esteem, and admiration of the world, produce according to the minds in which they reside, the sentiments of dignity, of pride, of vanity, of insolence. The sentiments arising from the view of the superiority of other men, are different according to the state of affections to them and according as the comparison is made between them and ourselves, or between them and others. If we love them, we feel the sentiment of deference, respect, esteem, veneration. If we dislike them, the sentiment of envy is apt to affect the mind. When the comparison is made with others, the superiority of those whom we love produces exultation, and triumph; of those whom we hate, animosity and regret. Some vices in others, raise in us the sentiment of resentment, others of horror. Certain vices as well as certain defects produce that of contempt, others that of ridicule.* But our sentiments are almost infinitely various in nature and degree according to the objects from which they spring.

Having mentioned the sentiment of ridicule, it may be necessary to call to your recollection, that the sense of the ridiculous was given as an example of in tenuae

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*Among our sentiments, none have a greater influence on human character and conduct, nor except the moral sentiment, are more nearly allied to virtue, than those of honour and shame... They are affected not only by the rectitude or criminality of an action: but perhaps even more by the opinions of others. General opinion is commonly coincident with virtue, because virtue tends to the general interest: Sometimes however, the splendor of actions outweighs their morality. If we consider only their effects, the sentiments of virtue give more tranquility to the mind, those of honour more elevation. The sentiments of guilt create more compunction, those of shame more humiliation.

ternal sensation. Lest the sense and the sentiment should seem to be confounded, let me state in an example or two the difference between them: In the first place, that quality in objects which we call the ridiculous, is perceived by the sense. That emotion which the quality excites in us is called the sentiment.

To give another examples -- We perceive sound by the external sense of hearing: Harmony which is the agreeable combination of different sounds, we perceive by an internal sensation. The emotions excited in us by the different stiles of harmony, as the sublime, the solemn, the tender, the gay, are so many different sensations.

I remark finally, that as our sentiments are produced by the action of the senses; so reflexly, we perceive our sentiments themselves, as well as our thoughts, affections, reasonings, and all other acts, emotions & operations of the mind by an internal power of sensation.

End of Lecture 10th

John Cross scripsit Oct. 19th 1805.

LECTURE 11th.

The next power which I am to consider is that of the imagination. Imagination is the faculty of creating in the mind the images of the objects or scenes which have no real existence in nature: or it is the faculty of representing real objects or scenes invested with all their circumstances and qualities— those circumstances and qualities in particular, which would escape ordinary observers. and which are derived from the finer, or what some writers call, secondary powers of internal sensation, such as beauty, sublimity, harmony, dignity or their contraries. The creations or fictions of the imagination are composed of ideas, that have previously entered the mind by their proper inlets: but they are arranged in such a manner, as to form a picture which has no real archetype in nature, as the paradise of Milton, or the island of Calypso of Fenelon. —— The description of real scenes and objects is a history formed from memory, which is a power wholly different from that of imagination. Memory is the power of recalling what was known before- Imagination of inventing what is new. A man may have a strong memory, with little imagination. When both powers are united in the same person, along with a sound judgement, they form what is called a Great Genius. But genius ~~which~~ which is the faculty of inventing, depends chiefly on the imagination, and takes its character from that, I say its character, for there is a great variety in the imagination, and consequently in the genius of men as in their features. Some are most affected by sublime objects and scenes- others by such as are beautiful. Some seek the serious and pensive in objects, others the sprightly and gay. Some always contemplate things with a certain decency and gravity, others are ever prone to seize them on their ludicrous, and ridiculous sides. The imagination of some burns with a

constant

constant, equal and resplendent flame; that of others is perpetually flashing and sparkling with brilliant points of Wit. We see some men who have a peculiar genius for one or an other of the fine arts: others who are calculated to excel in the Mechanical arts, and others who have such a flexibility of genius that they can turn it with equal succes to almost any art. The imagination is intimately connected in its operations, both with the understanding and the heart.

It asists the Logician in the discovery of those intermediate ideas, by which his comparisons, and reasonings are conducted. It furnishes the Orator with allusions, with figure, with illustration and arguments. By it, the Poet is enabled to describe human characters, and natural scenes in such a manner as to excite various emotions, sentiments and pasions. It is therefore the principal faculty employed in invention, description, persuasion, and in determining our pursuits. Associated with virtue, it becomes a noble and sucessful instrument in doing good, but it is also capable of abuse: and in the service of vice, it may be rendered dangerous and pernicious. As an encouragement to Orators, Poets, and Painters to give an useful direction, let it be remarked, that the most beautiful efforts of the imagination, appear in those works that contribute to innocent entertainment, or are calculated to awaken social, benevolent and virtuous sentiments.

As the imagination must draw the materials of its pictures from nature; so the more nearly it can approach to nature, in their disposition and arrangement, the more perfect is the work. The principles of beauty and taste in the works of art, to which this remark points, have been already illustrated, when you were studying the principles of criticism. But as the imagination in framing its pictures, or assembling its images, is generally guided by some principles of association: I shall close my remarks on this subject with concisely stating a few of these principles.

1st. Resemblance is a principle of association... This comprehends not only actual similitude, or likeness of parts to one another, but analogy, or the similarity of the relations or proportions of parts in different objects. It comprehends also all those objects that excite the same or correspondent emotions in the mind. The imagination when it seizes one of these objects, easily runs along these different lines of resemblance.

Similitude leads us to grouping or classing objects together: analogy or the relation of parts, suggests emblematic representations and various figures of speech, such as metaphors, similies, allegories. And finally every strong emotion tends to call up before the imagination, such objects as favour it, as contribute to increase it, or excite emotions that commonly attend it, or easily blend with it. E.G. Rage, Love, Grief.

2nd Another principle of association is opposition or contrast. Opposites easily suggest one another. The imagination is often delighted with the figure of antithesis, and contrast is the source of many beauties in the arts. Distinctions must enter into the accurate discussions of all subjects, and oppositions suggest many illustrations and reflections in Eloquence.

3rd Contiguity is a principle of association in description.

4th Fitness or correspondence in the different parts of single images, or in the different groups that make up a singl view, or a series of views.

5th The relations of cause and effect: and lastly, Custom and Habit.

Ideas that have been customarily united, readily connect themselves together in the mind. Thus, as we advance in life, we connect the most pleasing ideas with the objects and scenes with which we are conversant in Childhood and Youth. With the ideas of our country, when we are absent from it, we connect those of our friends whom we enjoyed there, and of the places where we were happy in the freshness of our being, when every thing

new

was new and charming, and made upon us, the most delightful and permanent impresions. With the church we are prone to unite the serious impresions derived from the important truths that are taught there, and the sacred offices of religion that are performed there. From this effect of custom, it is at all times dangerous to mingle unseasonable levity with serious subjects, or to admit into conversation and society, where manners and language ought to be chaste and pure, double entendres, loose wit, or any thing that borders on indecency or indelicacy. Many advantages are to be derived from this kind of association, and many evils are to be guarded against, that may occasionally result from it. 5. The next power of which I propose to treat is that of reason. It is the power of comparing ideas and objects together, and from their agreements or differences, inferring conclusions relative to truth or duty. ..... The principles of the legitimate modes of reasoning, have already been the objects of your study. I shall here lay down only a few general observations on the nature and application of this power. Reason is derived from a word* which signifies comparison, proportion, relation. And reason consists in comparing things together, in examining their proportions and relations, and determining their results. In its application, it has usually one of three great objects in view; The first is, to refer things to general classes, or by the relations of resemblance, to arrange them under their several genera, or species. The second is, to discover general rules or laws of action, both in the physical and moral world, which are to be ascertained in the natural world, by uniformity among certain effects, which leads us to ascribe to them some common principle or law. And in the moral world, by an uniformity of sentiment in the

*The latin word Ratio.

in the human mind, on the subjects of conduct and action which lead to the establishment of general rules of duty. For example, the laws of gravitation in Physics is derived from the uniformity of the effects in falling bodies. In morals, the laws of justice or charity are derived from collecting the sentiments of mankind upon these subjects, and from the agreement forming the rules of conduct. The third object of reasoning is to apply general rules to particular cases, or to ascribe to individuals comprehended under general classes, their several characters, qualities or properties. But I will not pursue here a subject, that must be already in some degree familiar to you: I will only remark, that from this summary account of the nature and objects of reasoning, must appear the necessity and importance of generalizing, or of that faculty of abstraction, by which we reduce them into classes, and which we enjoy in a degree so greatly superior to the Brutes, if it be not an absolute and distinguishing criterion of the two natures. Reasoning is in a great measure dependant upon it, either as a mean or as an end. I shall add therefore one or two observations on this faculty and its operations. It is the power of considering qualities and circumstances separately from their subjects, or from other qualities or circumstances with which they are naturally connected. All our ideas of the species and general classes of things are formed by this power. These ideas are formed by assembling together the resembling qualities of a common tribe. They are expressed by general terms. Our abstractions are in some degree arbitrary. That is, men do not always class subjects in the same way. The tribes of nature, seem frequently to run into one another so much, that many individuals may without inconvenience be ranged

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in different classes. Or we may make our classification by the resemblances of different properties. Thus a bat in Natural History, may be classe with birds by the resemblance of wings, or with beasts, by that of hair, feet, and bodi- by figure. or in Morals, the voluntary returning to a son, the favours we may have received from a father, may be ranked under the head of Justice or Generosity. But wherever a common tribe is marked by the resemblance that takes among the individuals included under it, and by differences that discriminate them from all others, there the ground of arbitrary abstraction or classification is taken away, and the general idea seems to be pointed out and limited by nature itself. Our abstractions are among our most important ideas. They lay the foundations for general truths, and of systems in all sciences. Some sciences are wholly occupied in them, as Arithmetic and Geometry, in which number and quantity and their respective relations are considered abstractedly, or separately from any subject.... Having seen how general and comprehensive reasoning is promoted by abstraction, I conclude my remarks upon it by observing that reasoning in order to proof or demonstration is conducted in two ways. The one is inferring the effect from the cause, or deriving from the nature of the cause itself, the nature and certainty of the effect. The other is inferring the cause from the effects, or by induction from a number of particular facts, establishing a general law or cause from which they proceed. The former is called ~~the~~ in technical language, reasoning a priori, the Latter reasoning a posteriori. It may be positive or negative, i.e. it may affirm the cause or the effect. ---- End of Lecture 11th

J. Cross Junr scripsit Oct 21 1805.

LECTURE, 12th.....

I come now to treat of the affections and pasions, as constituent prin-
ciples of Human Nature. They are ranked together because of their affinity.
They make up the same geneal clafs of principles in Man, only the pafsions
are higher degrees of the affections. They result from our feelings or opinions of
good and evil. The things that give us pleasure, or that we conceive to be means
of our happiney we desire to pofsefs. Those that we know or apprehend to be
causes of pain, we endeavour to avoid, and feel towards them an emotion that
is called aversion or hatred. If they are sensible beings that have done us
injury or good, or that we conceive to be capable of doing either, we not only feel
towards them, the emotions of desire or aversion, of love or hatred, but we invol-
untarily feel a strong inward impulse, that prompts us to do good or injury
to them. The affections and pafsions therefore, may be defined to be strong em-
otions and tendencies of mind towards objects that we esteem to be good or evil,
leading us to desire, to enjoy the one, and shun the other, or if they be sensible beings, to
do good to the one and injury to the other. Circumstances may render it improper, or
impofsible to pofsefs the good that we perceive. In a virtuous or prudent man, the af-
fection is then limited: it produces no effort to obtain it. But if these reasonable
obstructions are removed out of the way, the effort always accompanies the affect-
ion. If a sensible being be too great or too distant to receive from us either good or in-
jury, the affection, in this case, is also limited to good-will, and rejoicing in the hap-
pineſs of such being, or the inward workings of hatred. We can enjoy the good qualities
and perfections of other sensible beings besides ourselves, and in that view, tho' they do

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not belong to us, we may be said to posess them, (which is one object generally of the pleasant or kind affections,) by the principle of sympathy implanted in our nature which disposes us to participate in the good or the happiness of others. as well as to share in their griefs. This principle which occasions us to feel along with others, if it be not as perhaps it ought not to be, ranked among the affections, is at least a fruitful cause of many of our affections.*

Sympathy is a kind of mental attraction, that communicates the virtue and action of one mind to another. It deserves to be cultivated, as one of the most amiable and praise-worthy principles of our nature. It is among the strongest cements of society, and among the highest sources both of our pleasures & our virtues. Indeed, none of the unamiable or unsocial affections, are fitted by our nature to excite our sympathy. It appears chiefly in congratulation with the happy and compassion for the distressed, and in entering into all their reasonable and moderate feelings. This principle, it may be remarked, exerts an important influence, not only in exciting certain affections, but on many other emotions and sentiments of the heart. It disposes us to assume the tone of the society in which we may happen to be, if it be not too remote from our present dispositions and feelings. By sympathy, men are prone to adopt the fears a the courage of others. Sympathy contributes to form the manners of society. It is probably the great principle of imitation to which such important effects have been ascribed. It is the life and charm of social manners, without which, they are necessarily hypocritical

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* That principle in nature, which disposes us to feel along with others, and which is called sympathy, is certainly not an affection; but the exercise of that disposition in actually feeling along with others, (which is also called sympathy) may be considered as belonging to the system of affection. (See page where it is given as an example of benevolent affec.s)

itical, insincere and cold. The forms of politeness pay homage to this principle, and demonstrate how amiable and useful it is, and consequently how essential to true virtue. If the image of sympathetic feeling, in the manners of a well-bred man, be so beautiful, how much more lively and interesting is the real sympathy of a virtuous and sensible heart! It certainly goes far, toward making up a perfect moral character. It is capable however of being abused, as may be seen in associations for loose pleasure; and unfortunately too often in theatrical exhibitions: and against its abuse we ought sedulously to guard. In proportion to its utility, is the danger of its corruption.

To return more directly to the considerations of the affections and passions. The etymology of these words, will serve in some measure to explain the acts of the mind, they are intended to express. The word affection derived from the Latin words, ad & facio, conveys to us in its very composition, the most essential characters of this act of the soul: that is, its strong tendency to do either good or evil to the object of its love or hatred. It suggests to us also, that nothing strictly speaking, can be the object of our affections, but sensible beings. For altho' a miser is said to love money, it is only for the relation it bears to his own preservation or happiness. We are said to love even the houses where we have been happy, or the places which have been the scenes of our early pleasures: but when we distinguish accurately, we will find that we love only the ideas or persons connected with them, and the intimacy of association seems to transfer part of the affection to those inanimate objects. By a little confusion or inaccuracy of language, we apply the term love to signify the relish and the craving of the appetite for certain kinds of food or drink.* But appetite and affection, are distinct principles of nature. A foolish boy will sometimes strike a stone that has hurt, and seems to hate

*Thus one man is said to love Claret, another Madeira.

to hate it for the injury it has done him. But the delirium of his passion has for a moment transfered to it an imaginary sensibility.

Passion being derived from a word* that signifies suffering, a being the subject of the action of some other thing, it seems as if the framers of language considered man when under their influence, as not properly master of himself. They intended to express by the term a violent emotion, that hurries a man away with it, as if he were mechanically acted upon by the object that excites it, and irresistibly impelled to seek the gratification of his passion. This is too generally true with regard to men in a state of uncultivated nature. But cultivation, reason and just principles of virtue, serve to impose a restraint upon those violent tendencies of the heart, and to bring them under our own controul. Our affections therefore may be divided in the first place, into those that are calm and temperate, and those that are violent. The violent affections take the name of passions. These are chiefly of an injurious kind, as Hatred, Anger, Rage Fury. Animal love is an example of the opposite kind, and is indeed the principal example of a passion, that has not immediately and intentionally an injurious tendency. By an easy and natural figure however, any strong propensity or tendency of the mind towards a particular pleasure, or a fondness for particular objects, if it is excessive or unreasonable, is called a passion. Thus some inconsiderate profligates are said to have a passion for gaming- some men have an extraordinary passion for dogs. Many old maids have a passion for bats. And one of the Kings of Prussia had a passion for men seven feet high. Some of the ancient philosophers maintained that a wise man had no passions. They consequently made it a principal object of their philosophy, to extinguish

* Passus and that from Patior.

to extinguish all strong emotions in their disciples. On this subject we may say that there is no principle in nature, that in itself is wrong. It is wrong only by misapplication, by excess or by defect. And a man may be faulty in having his passions too weak, as well as too violent. Every thing that nature has implanted within us, is capable of a useful application. It is not the business therefore either of philosophy or of religion, entirely to eradicate the passions but to direct them on proper objects, and to prescribe to them reasonable limits. A man without resentment for instance, is a tame, contemptible beast of burden; a man who is provoked at trifles, or whose resentments hurry him blindly and precipitately to revenge, is an odious and dangerous beast of prey. An ardent love of glory and of Country, and a warm indignation against its enemies, which are passions, are necessary to form the character of a Hero. But tho' the passions may be rendered useful and noble principles of action, yet they are so prone to excess, and by indulgence easily acquire such a dangerous dominion over the Heart, that one of the most important objects of a virtuous education, is to select and point out their lawful objects, and to impose upon them prudent restraints.

The affections may be ranged under two great heads or classes in another way. The first comprehending those that lead us to offices of kindness, preservation and care towards their objects. The second comprehending those that are but different expressions of aversion towards their objects, or that prompt us to hurt or destroy them. These when attempted to be distinguished by single epithets, have been called by most writers, the classes of love and hatred, sometimes of desire and aversion. They might with propriety be termed the beneficent and injurious affections. But the names are of but small moment, if the things be understood. To these have been frequently added, joy and sorrow as different classes of the affections. But they are rather to be considered as emo-

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tions, sentiments, or states of the mind, arising from the gratification or disappointments of our affections. Between the claſses of love and hatred, jealousy seems to be placed as a middle link. It partakes equally of hatred and love, or rather perhaps, it is such a rapid vibration of the mind between both, as the object is viewed in different lights, that they seem to be confounded together in the same paſsion. ..... The last claſsification of the affections which I shall make is into the selfish and the benevolent; or those that aim immediately at our own interest or happineſs, or those that aim at the interest and happineſs of others. The former is a very numerous claſs, tho it does not by any means, as some writers contend, embrace them all. I do not intend here, to go into a complete enumeration of the affections, but shall as usual content myself with a few examples, leaving the detail to your own reading and observations. Dr. Watts and Dr. Beattie have each aimed at something like a regular treatise on this subject, and both these writers are well worthy your perusal. But both of them have ranked under the head of paſsions and affections, many of those emotions and tendencies of our nature, that I have claſsed with propensities and sentiments. Propensities and Sentiments may generate, or by indulgence may grow into paſsions, but originally and in their own nature, there is a clear distinction between them. As examples of the selfish affections, you may consider animate love, the love of riches, power, popularity, not only for themselves, but as means also of farther pleasures. As examples of benevolent affections, take, the love of Children, the love of Country, the love of mankind, friendship, charity, sympathy both with the happy and miserable.

It is rare to find the benevolent principles pure and unmixed with selfish considerations. And as the paſsion of jealousy was given as an instance of the equal mixture of love and hatred, so perhaps conjugal love, when it is

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sincere and tender, may be given as another instance of the equal mixture of selfish and benevolent principles in the same affection. Two questions only upon this subject remain, to which I shall call your attention.

Is the indulgence of the selfish affections consistent with virtue?

Is there in Human nature really any affection that aims directly and disinterestedly at promoting the happiness of another?

The contradictory questions have both been asked and both equally denied by different writers. But by a greater number and better writers, they have been both asserted. Our Creator has placed the care and preservation of ourselves chiefly in ~~our~~ our own custody. Self-love therefore, within due bounds, is an evident dictate of Nature, and is both a lawful and a useful principle of action. It becomes like other affections, criminal only by excess, that is, when it defeats our end, the safety and happiness of the individual, or interferes with the reasonable self-love of others. An example of the former is, when sensual pleasure is pursued to the injury of our own health, fortune or reputation. An example of the latter is when wealth ~~is~~ is pursued to the injury of our fellow-citizens. That there are in human nature, principles of benevolence, that aim directly and disinterestedly at promoting the good of others, every man of generosity and sensibility, perhaps I should say, every man without exception knows from his own experience. These have been denied to be benevolent, in the meaning here affixed to the term, because of the pleasures that accompany their exercise; the very argument to prove their reality. Thus writers say, we serve a friend or relieve the distressed, not for their own sakes, but for the delight that accompanies these acts of friendship and charity. But we may ask them, would we have ever known that such delights attends these benevolent acts, if we were not prompted to exercise them by a previous impulse of nature? Is it not the disposition to benevolence, that creates the delight, and not the delight that creates the disposition. End of Lecture 12th

J. Broes Junior scripsit Oct. 23 1805.

LECTURE 13th

7th The principle that I proposed next to consider, is volition. Volition or will is that power or enegy in the mind which is the immediate cause of our actions. Propensities, sentiments, affections, pasions, may incline us to act, and thus prove motives to the will. They may be considered therefore as the primary or the remote causes of action; But the will is the immediate or proximate cause. The Nature of the will, as that of our other internal powers and operations, is understood only by consciousnes or internal sensation. And in this way every person understands what is meant when we say, I will, or I will not. Some writers and speakers have confounded the ideas of desire and will and treated of them as if they were the same principle. Desire is a motive of volition, but it is not volition itsely. The distinction between them may be easily discerned by considering desire as terminating on an attainable or an an unattainable object. If the object is attainable it is accompanied by an act of the will and an endeavour to gain it on our part. If the object is unattainable the desire remains, but the will, and endeavour ceases. The principal enquiry on this subject which merits your attention, relates to the freedom of the will, as it has been generaly stylea, or as perhaps it ought to be styled the freedom of the mind in her volitions: it is an enquiry on which volumes have been written by the most acute and distinguished metaphysicians and moral writers who have embraced the different sides of the question: some maintaining that the will is entirely free and self determinated. Others determining maintaining that it is determined solely by the

force of the motives that act upon it, and therefore, that in all its operations, it is subjected to physical, as some writers assert, or as others say, to a moral necessity.

This is a question of no small importance. The doctrine of necessity seems to destroy moral distinctions, and to take away merit from virtue and demerit from vice. And it appears to be, in fact, the design of some modern Necessitarians, particularly of those who materialize the human soul, to overthrow these distinctions. These writers who have embraced the system of necessity and who are at the same time friends to religion and morality, have endeavoured to avoid this consequence, by stating a difference between moral and physical necessity. After all the explanations, however, that have been given of these phrases, they seem only to amount to this, that the one is the necessity of matter, the other the necessity of the mind. The consequences of the doctrine on the merit and demerit of virtue or vice have not been perfectly, at least not clearly guarded against, by the friends of the latter phraseology, more than by the advocates of the former. On the other hand the doctrine of liberty has been sometimes so managed, as to take away rule and certainty in human conduct. The theories and reasonings of these several classes of writers and the meanings which they affix to their particular terms, and phrases you must learn from consulting their own works. It would be too tedious and too dry in this place to give even a concise abridgement of them that would at the same time be intelligible. All that I propose at present, is to state in a few propositions, in as clear and comprehensible manner as I am able, what I conceive to be the truth on this subject. And in the first place, it is necessary

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to correct an errour in language which has probably contributed in a degree to involve the question of liberty & necesity in that obscurity which has so remarkably surrounded it. The freedom of the will is a phrase that has been familiarly employed by all parties, and the propriety of which, seems not to have been questioned by any. But volition being only an act of the mind, liberty or necesity cannot properly be predicated of an act; but of the mind which exerts that act. The question ought to be. Is the mind, free, in her volitions? In like manner, a phraseology relative to the influence, and effect, of motives, which has led to some errors in this subject, should be changed. It has been taken for granted by one party that motives determine the will, and therfore they conclude with an appearance of reason, that it must be necesarily determined by the last or the strongest motive that is at that time in the view of the mind. Another party in order to avoid this consequence, assert that the will determines itself. But this principle as it is expressed is liable to unanswerable objections. In the first place the will is an act of the mind and although the mind may determine its own acts, yet no act can determine itself. In the next place if we should admit that the will can determine itself, how does the will make any determination? only by an act of volition It cannot therefore determine itself fully by a previous act of the will, and if we demand how that previous act is determined? by one still prior, thus are we pushed from step to step thro an infinite train of volitions in order to accomplish one. We shall arrive perhaps at clearer ideas on this subject and sooner attain to the truth by rejecting the phraseology of both parties and instead of saying that the will is determined by motives or that the will determines itself, laying down as a princi-

ple in this question that the mind determines the will as well as all its other acts. If it be asked what advantage we gain by this change of lan guage? I answer much. I have shewn the absurdities that will follow from maintaining that the will determines itself. If on the other hand we say that motives necessarily determine the will, the will must change at the impulse of every motive, and therefore be constantly vibrating among them. Each motive as it occurs must be immediately followed by some transient act of volition in proportion to its strength till at last some one motive stronger than the rest fixes it in a more permanent and decided act. This principle takes away the power of deliberation in acting, for the will never deliberates and it seems to compound together the two acts of will and desire. But when we say the mind determines its own volitions, and that motives operate upon it only by persuasive power to influence determinations, there is room here for deliberation and freedom of choice. Motives have on the mind only an exciting and persuasive; not a con controulable and necessitating effect. It never acts without a motive, and yet motives are in a great measure under its own power, just as we never reason without ideas, and yet we have power over these ideas to compare and combine various ly as we please. In every discussion we ought to fix in the beginning some clear and invariable ideas and principles, that should govern all the con clusions which we form. The present subject although it has been embar rassed by wrong principles and abstruse speculations, affords some ele mentary ideas and propositions as clear and as precise as those of any metaphysical question whatever. A few of them I shall here state, and give them a very brief illustration as it is not my intention to go into a full investigation of the doctrine of liberty and necessity, but to

to open such an introduction, as will assist your future enquiries. In the first place, then we shall always act thro the impulse or solicitation of some motive; that is we have some end in view, in every action we perform; the gratification of some propensity, sentiment, or affection, or obedience to some dictate of reason or of conscience. In the next place although these motives have an exciting influence to prompt the mind to act, yet none of them have the power to necessitate the action, for we find that we can suspend action or vary it in any way. It has been answered that this suspension or change of action is the effect of some new motive, which having taken place of all the rest, possesses in its turn the necessitating influence. But that the effect of this new motive whatever it is, is not necessary is evident from hence, that we can again suspend action or we can act in a manner different from that to which we should be naturally led by the influence of the suspending motive. And although our liberty does not consist in suspending or varying our actions; yet the power of suspension or change which we always feel that we possess whenever we please to exert it is a decisive proof that we are free in yielding to the impulse of any motive.

In the third place the mind has the power of beginning action; It is not mechanically dependent upon the extraneous impulse of motive, as it would be if it were a material being. But always surrounded and excited by a vast variety of motives, it has power to chose among them: it can even change at pleasure the train of motives that it will suffer to be present to its view, and to the influence of which, it will yield itself. It has consequently a self determining power, or a power of determining its own volitions. This, it does not by a previous act of volition, an absurdity that has been objected to the self determining power of the will.

will. But by an internal energy and controul over the will which we feel, and cannot any other way explain, but by referring it to that feeling. After taking a view of the motives before it, as far as it pleases, and considering what is proper or agreable at the moment it resolves to act. That resolution is its will: and in determining it, it does it like a master who has power to resolve in different ways concerning the objects, and not like a slave who is necessitated to resolve only in one way. That we have a power of beginning action, that we have a controul even over the motives that solicit us, so as to vary their train, or consider them more or less extensively at pleasure, and that we are not subject to necessity in acting, are truths of feeling and experience, as much as the reality and nature of colors and sounds. Like them they are primary, original and simple ideas, of which no farther analeysis or explanation can be given, than our own sensations. Ignorance or the subtilties of an ambitious philosophy may involve both the one and the other in obscurity and doubt. But plain and common sense, which is the best of all primary and axiomatic truths in science, will render them sufficiently intelligible.

The powers of the mind to begin action, without being necessarily impelled by extraneous impulse, is one of the principal distinctions between spirit and matter. Matter is necessarily impelled by other matter, according to the quantity and ~~direction~~ direction of the force impressed upon it. Without such impressed force, it is motionless, but mind is essentially active, it is capable of beginning motion and of moving matter, when even itself is not moved by an anteceant force. Otherwise how shall we account for all the motions in the universe; without the supposition of an infinite succession, which is absurd? or how account for creation itself? as the Deity has power over all things, to make and move them at his pleasure, without

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being moved by any motive extraneous to himself, so [redacted] he has given to the human mind an original and self moving power over the body and all its actions without being necessarily impelled or determined by any thing extraneous to itself. as he is free, so has he imparted the precious prerogative to liberty to man.

In the fourth place. In all disquisitions concerning the will, it ought to be laid down as a primary principle, or axiom, that we are free in acting; no proposition can be more plain than from experience; it is as plain as any testimony of sense. This sensation of liberty is real, and not delusive; as has been supposed observed by Lord Kaimes. This writer, after having established as it as a truth that we act from motive; endeavours to deduce it as a consequence from this principle, that all our actions are necessary and are governed by the impulse of the strongest motive: He concludes therefore that our feeling of liberty in acting is only a pleasing deception of nature. With more honesty than prudence; he carries these principles to their ultimate and proper conclusion; to destroy the distinction between vice and virtue; he makes virtue and vice to be but names invented for the convenience and use of society. But how does he know that the feeling of liberty is delusive. If it be delusive all other perceptions may be delusive too. For there is none of them that is clearer or stronger than this. Is it not fully as strong and does it not seem to be as real as that perception which he admits to be true, that we act from motive? But one he assumes as a principle, the other he considers as a delusion, only because to do so, accords with the object of his philosophy. A philosophy unhappily too prevalent; the annihilation of moral distinctions. On this subject I may

may repeat what has been said before; That our sensations external and internal and the clear and evident fellings of nature, are the foundation of all knowledge and certainty. and none of our feelings are more evident and clear than this; that we are free in acting, notwithstanding the fatalism that has been so generally introduced into the modern philosophy. I add further that we are not only free to act as we please, that is, according to motives furnished by our internal dispositions, and inclinations, But we are ever free to act against these motives. We are so far free as to have power over our dispositions and inclinations themselves, and to be able to change them. This is demonstrated by the effects of moral culture, and education, and by that change of character which we see men deliberately produce in themselves. Long habits indeed, may give them such strength, as to render it extremely difficult to change or contradict them*, but difficulty and necessity are different ideas. Indeed the increasing strength of habit, and the difficulty of overcoming it, is a proof against the necessitarians; because necessity cannot be augmented. If we should admit that inclination, strengthened by the utmost force of habit, is necessary in its effects upon the will, it surely cannot be equally necessary before habit has operated at all, or when it has made as yet only a small progress.

The last observation I shall make upon this subject is, that reason and conscience are principles of motives of action, paramount in their authority to all others, and they contribute also to preserve the moral liberty of the mind;

* In the strength of confirmed habits alone I find any meaning in that phrase moral necessity, which was formerly so much used by metaphysicians.

in its volitions, by restraining the pasions.

If man were actuated by his appetites and pasions, he would rush precipitately and almost necessarily to the attainment of their several objects, as they happened to be uppermost in the view of the mind. But conscience and reason serve to check their force and to regulate their tendencies. The impulse of the pasions is violent, but transient; and exerted only at intervals. The influence of reason and conscience, though gentle is permanent and uniform. The former move us by the ardor of their feelings. The latter restrain or guide us by the magesty of their authority. As the regulator of a time piece is sufficient, by the most gentle checks, to govern the motions of the whole machine, though urged by the force of the spring, so these, if properly applied, are capable of regulating by their mild and secret influence, the most impetuous movements of the heart. &c

This sentiment, "I ought" "it is my duty", is sufficient, and was evidently intended by the Creator to govern and regulate all our other principles of action. We perceive our obligation to obey it; we are sensible that it is in our power to obey it; and because it is in our power we are conscious of guilt, and apprehensive of merited punishment if we disobey it. Thus conscience is paramount to all other motives, in its authority over the will; not that it always actually governs, but that it ought, to govern; and that we feel it in our power to make it govern. It assists us in the exercise of our moral liberty, by weakening, and restraining, those vicent principles that tend to impair it: and obedience to it dictates the noblest example of the freedom of the will; because it is able to overcome those powerful obstacles that are opposed to it in the pasions. - End of Lecture 13th.

William Croes scripsit, October 25th 1805.

LECTURE 14th

8th The moral faculty, which is the last of the constituent powers of human nature of which I mean to treat, is that internal sense which enables us to understand the terms, duty, obligation, right, wrong, when applied to moral objects, or gives us the ideas which these terms express; I say when applied to moral objects, or to human dispositions and conduct, because there may be other applications of these terms in which the moral sense is not concerned; thus we say of any work or piece of mechanism that it is rightly executed, when it is executed according to a certain rule, or in such a manner, as to answer the end for which it was intended.

This sense is as much the natural and the only organ, if I may speak so, of these moral ideas, as the eye is of colours, or the ear of sounds. Without it we might have ideas of reasonableness, propriety gracefulness, or the contrary in human actions; but we could not have the ideas of merit, or demerit, of moral excellence, or guilt in human conduct.-----

I shall consider, the nature, the objects, the extent, and the end of this faculty; after which I shall take notice of some objections that have been made to considering it as a distinct and peculiar power of the mind, by some writers who attempt to account for all its ideas from other principles.-----

1st The nature of the faculty, must be learned as far as we can understand it from the nature of the ideas with which it furnishes the mind. When, therefore, I say, with regard to any action, I ought to do it, it is my duty, when I approve myself afterwards for doing or

or having done what was right; or on the other hand when I say I am guilty. I deserve blame or punishment; I feel compunction or remorse. I understand these terms perfectly, and am understood by others. They express however a new class of ideas, different from any that we have hitherto considered and not furnished by any of the powers or senses, external or internal that have been before mentioned. From this sense therefore are derived those ideas that belong peculiarly to duty, obligation, moral rectitude, or that may be ranked under the heads of merit, or demerit. .....—

2nd. By actually discriminating the objects of this sense, we shall arrive at a more perfect knowledge of its nature. In observing a moral action we consider not solely nor indeed chiefly what is its immediate effect. But what is the disposition and intention, from which it spring. Not its momentary, but permanent consequences, not such as are particular and peculiar to an individual act; but those that would result, if such actions were admitted, as a general law. For example if an accidental good or evil flow from my action, which I did not foresee or intend, neither merit, nor demerit, is properly imputable to me; unless evils have resulted from a careless action for in that case I may be criminal however unassigned the consequence may be, if it manifests a disposition too inattentive to my own duty, or to the happiness of others. In like manner if our intentions be good or evil, although unexpected, or unsurmountable objects should prevent the effect, still merit or guilt will attach to us: except that, injurious, and by parity of reasoning, imprudent actions, may sometimes be criminal, notwithstanding good intentions; if men have not taken sufficient pains, to inform themselves on the subject of their duty; as in persecuting men for conscience

science sake or putting them to death for the glory of God.

But if they have used every means of information in their power, and still are in an errour, the intention will be held to excuse the action. The objects of the moral sense therefore are chiefly the dispositions and intentions of men and their external actions only as indicative of these inward principles.

Those dispositions, principally, are the objects of moral approbation, that go to promote the happiness of mankind; a proof this that man was made for society. A proof it is of the benignity of the Creator, in thus placing in his breast the law of happiness and guarding and enforcing it by powerful sanctions: and a proof also that the end and rule of virtue is its tendency to general happiness.

Here it is necessary to take into view a remark or limitation which was stated in the beginning of this article; that it is not the momentary good ~~good~~ or evil that flows from action, but its permanent effect; not the immediate consequence of a single act, but the consequence that would result to social order, and human happiness, from a general performance of such actions, that should make it the object of our approbation or censure. The merit of Leonidas devoting himself for his country did not consist in the check he gave the army of Xerxes, but in the extensive and durable effects it had in intimidating and disconcerting the barbarians, and in the inconquerable patriotism with which it teached to inflame all Greece. In like manner in theft, murder it is not the ill consequences alone that flow from an individual act that makes its guilt, but chiefly the evil that would result to society, if they became general principles or habits of acting. In the estimating the

the merit or demerit of actions or intentions Therefore, we inquire which will produce upon the whole the greatest or most lasting happiness or misery to society? A smaller good that opposes a greater becomes an evil. The tendency of an action to promote happiness ~~is misery~~ a object of the moral sense. It is not however, always, the immediate view of the tendency of an action to individual or to genral happiness, that is, the ground to moral approbation - but frequently a certain perfection of rectitude, duty, or excellence, appearing in the action itself. The firmness of a hero encountering danger in a good cause; the patience of a virtuous man suffering unavoidable affliction and pain with resignation to the will of Heaven. The dutiful daughter giving her breast to nourish her father in prison, are acts that not only excite our admiration but are approved as moral excelencies and virtues that in themselves, and independently on their consequences, derive the highest praise and reward. It is true that the Creator has connected such virtues with the happiness of mankind. but often that connection does not appear immediately. And in order to attain his benevolent end, he has so constituted our nature, that the acts themselves, and for their own sakes, become the objects of moral approbation. - - - - - - - - -

This is especially true of those virtues that respect ourselves, or our Creator, and do not immediately terminate on mankind - for example, temperance patience fortitude, the moderation of our passions, diligence, the wise improvement of our time - of our personal duties to GOD. of submission, adoration, thanksgiving and love. These virtues we do not approve so much for the happiness which they produce to ourselves: although they do tend to happiness as for their own rectitude and their conformity to a law to which we feel ourselves to be justly subjected. - - - - - - - -

formity, to a law, and the will of a lawgiver who has a right to impose its commands upon us. These sentiments are essentially connected with those of duty and obligation, which belong to the moral sense. We perceive ourselves to be subject to a law, and [redacted] accountable to a supreme judge, yet this law seems not to be arbitrary or such as might have established ~~vice~~ instead of virtue, or change the ideas of right and wrong. It is a law only because it establishes original and eternal ideas, of rectitude and excellence. Thus the ideas of a supreme legislator and judge, who will reward or punish us: of a law which is his will: and of essential rectitude or vice: merit or demerit in actions independent on the law, and on which the law is founded, are all objects, or if you will dictates of the moral faculty. These ideas seem to have created that anticipation which is universal among mankind of a future state of retribution to the virtuous and to the wicked: Unless we suppose it has been derived by an original revelation, to the father of the race, and communicated from him to all nations. Admitting the supposition of such a revelation which is not improbable, Yet still these ideas imparted by the moral faculty, or to use more familiar language that conveys the same meaning, these native sentiments of the human heart, could alone enable mankind to understand the doctrine of a future judgement and retribution, or procure it such a firm and general belief as it has obtained in the world. By these sentiments it at once creates for us, so to speak, a law of conduct, and adds to that law the most powerful sanction. - - - - - - - - - - - -

3rd I come now to consider the extent of the moral faculty or to point out what is [redacted] proper office in our moral system. This is the more necessary because some writers have extended its effect beyond the intention

attention of nature, and others perhaps in opposition to this errour have limited it too much, or even denied its existence altogether.

The former have endeavoured to make a universal list or criterion of what is virtuous or vicious in conduct so that by intuition alone, and without any aid from reason, if can actually rank all actions under one or other of these clapes. This is arrogating too much even to the noblest power of our nature. It can pronounce upon an action whether it be good or bad, right or wrong, only when that action is fairly and fully before the mind. To present it in this manner is generally the office of reason. Dispositions and intentions, as has been before explained, are among the chief objects of the moral sense. Actions are the outward expresions of these inward principles. And actions are invested with various circumstances, according to the state of society in any country or the manners and habits of education, that prevail in any nation, sect, or association of people with whom we are connected.

Certain circumstances accompanying an action may to one people be indications of good dispositions and virtuous intentions, and therefore the actions may be approved. The same circumstances may convey entirely different indications to another people, and therefore the action although flowing from dispositions equally good, may through prejudice and misconception be disapproved.* This is the

*For example a simple or ceremonious worship in religion. French gaiety or English reserve. The free intercourse of sexes among Europeans, or the confinement of one of them in the East. For a like reason Capt. Cook in his first voyage, formed an unfavourable opinion of the chastity of the people of Otaheite which he afterwards corrected.

principal cause of the Bigotry and uncharitableness of many religious sects, and that mutual contempt and aversion which different nations entertain for one another. This diversity of judgement does not demonstrate any weakness or uncertainty in the decisions of the moral faculty: for when the action is placed fairly before the mind, its motives, and its consequences, disentangled from those adventitious circumstances with which habit, and education have connected it, and which obscure, and misrepresent it to those persons, whose education, and habits, have been different, this faculty will usually pronounce a clear and uniform judgement. But it is the business of reason and observation thus to present actions in their true light before their views. Those who would assign this office to the moral faculty give it an extent which nature never designed. .....

In this respect the power under consideration bears an analogy to other faculties and senses external, and internal. I shall exemplify this analogy in the two faculties of seeing and of taste; one of which is external, and the other may be called an internal sense. Seeing gives the perceptions of colour, and figure in bodies. Taste the perception of beauty in the works of nature or of art: as the moral sense does of right and wrong in conduct. In a natural or sound state of these powers, in a proper position with regard to their objects, and in similar circumstances they will impart nearly the same notices to all men. But the objects of sight may be placed in an unfavourable position, with regard to the eye, or they may be surrounded by

dark

an obscuring or discolouring medium - In these cases it will require the aid of reason and observation to correct the errours occasioned by the position, or the medium. But corrected by reasoning, the sense will still give a certain information. In like manner in objects of taste, the beauties of some are obvious on ~~sum~~ bare inspection, and they would be pronounced beautiful, by all men who should see them, yet there require a careful examination before any just decision can be made concerning them. In works of genius, in particular, it is necessary to ascertain their conformity to nature, and to those great principles of beauty derived from an accurate study of nature. This is the office of reason and of culture. And when the effect of taste is ascertained and in proportion to the clearness and accuracy with which it has been examined and stated, the power of taste will give a certain and in general a pretty uniform decision with regard to its merit. These examples illustrate the proper office, or the extent of the moral sense. It gives us the ideas of right and wrong, of merit and demerit, and accordingly pronounces on actions when they are before the mind. But it is the business of reason, aided by custom and experience, to present them fairly. ——————

Thus, by giving a proper extent to the moral sense, or assigning to it its proper office, we shall not only be better acquainted with its dictates, but more convinced of the reality of its existence as a separate and peculiar power of our nature. ——————

I remark with regard to each of the senses, or powers just mentioned, that as reason employs the sense of ~~vision~~ sight to correct its own errours, so it uses the powers of taste, and of the moral sense ~~excellence~~ to

to ascertain and define more accurately their respective objects.

Finally, By such use of reason we will frequently discern virtue in the most of appearances which at the first view were unfavourable, and vice amidst the more plausible appearances of virtue.

4. The end for which this faculty was implanted in human nature, was evidently to regulate the exercises of all other powers according to the laws of virtue.

Nature has endowed us with various appetites and passions which acting violently, according to their several impulses, without proper controul, would only produce discord and misery; but when justly regulated are capable of increasing our powers and promoting our happiness. The government of these she has committed to reason and conscience, or the moral faculty. Reason alone would be incapable of governing them. It might point out what is fit, what is proper, what is safe, what is useful; but conscience alone can add to these ideas the impression of duty, and give them the authority and sanction of a law. It enjoins, it commands, it rewards, it punishes, it points to the justice, and power of a supreme Lawgiver. That it was intended to be the commanding and controuling power of our nature, is evident from the authority of its sentiments. A man may be defective in other powers, of his nature; and incur only pity or contempt; but if he he is defective in moral principles we feel that he deserves abhorrence: if he should violate the principles of taste, or of sound reasoning in any work of genius, our censure is very different from that which we should pass on him for violating the principles of morality and good conscience; and is undoubtedly much more slight. The censure of impudence is more easily

to

be born than the remorse of guilt: And if the understanding has erred, we can more readily forgive ourselves or others, than if the heart has been criminal. On the whole, conscience, or the moral faculty evidently gives the law to our conduct, and is intended to be the controuling principle of our nature. Reason assists it in limiting, defining and stating accurately actions and their circumstances. But conscience pronounces with regard to them the law, and adds to that law the sanction of self approbation or remorse, of the sense of merited reward, or merited punishment.

I meant in the last place, to consider the objections which have been made by some writers to the reality of the moral faculty, or its existence as a distinct power or principle of our nature, which objections arise from the different opinions that have prevailed in different ages and nations with regard to the morality of certain actions. But so much has been said on the other branches of the subject, that in order to save your time I will decline the discussion. I will only remark that a great part of the actions or opinions of nations on which the objections are founded have been either falsely, or very inaccurately narrated by travellers and historians; and with regard to such as may be true, the principles on which the objections may be answered, have been in some degree laid down in what has been said under the heads of the objects and the extent, or the proper office of the moral faculty.

End of Lecture 14.th

Wm. Croes scripsit Oct. 28.th 1805

LECTURE 15

Natural Theology which is the knowledge of what can be discovered by reason concerning the being and attributes of God, is intimately connected with the science of duty and morals. God hath created us susceptible of moral obligation; that sense of morality which he hath implanted in us not only requires the intrinsic excellence of moral ideas, but suggests to us as, has already been said, a law to which we are subject, and a lawgiver who requires our obedience under high and awful sanctions. conscience intimates to us, therefore, the existence of a holy and righteous deity, the judge of our actions, as reason teaches us to believe, the being of a deity, wise powerful, and benevolent. The clear and firm persuasion of this truth is of the greatest importance to virtue and good morals. Without it the admonitions and censure of conscience would form too feeble ~~effect~~ a check to the force of irregular propensities and passions. A vicious man accountable only to himself, would soon learn to overbear the remonstrances of his own mind, or by the perpetual din of his passions, would prevent their being heard. The sense of a divine being holy, perfect, infinite, the judge of our conduct and our thoughts, gives them unspeakable authority and strength. An Atheist may in some instances be preserved within the bounds of decency and propriety, by respect for himself or for the opinions of the world. But if there were no God, the bulk of mankind would only esteem secrecy to be necessary in order to justify any pursuit. Besides those public opinions in favour of virtue, which the wiser few would be taught by the hands of prudent education, to respect, are so intimately connected, in the mass of the people, with the belief of a holy and

religious

righteous GOD, That a general Atheism would soon make them cease to exist, and supplant them by a general knavery, chicanery, and cunning self interest.

Natural Theology therefore, furnishes the most powerful sanction to the moral law. It renders the law itself more evident by discovering the source from which it emanates, and gives it indeed the only effectual influence and authority on the mind of such an imperfect and dependent creature as man.

The proofs of the being of GOD have usually been derived from two sources. The necessary nature of our ideas, and the structure of the universe. Hence has been called the scientific, the other the popular manner of reasoning, or in the language of the schools reasoning a priori, and a posteriori. The former is reasoning from the cause to the effect. the latter from the effect to the cause. Both these modes of proof rest on the same principle a necessary idea in us. And that is that every effect, or every thing that begins to be must have a cause. Mr. Hume has endeavoured to destroy the idea of ~~causality~~ causality. He says, That in seeing the production of any effect we have no other notion, than that one event succeeds another. Every man finds the refutation of this opinion in his own ideas. Admitting then the principle, that every thing which begins to be must have a cause; we must either consider the universe as an eternal succession of causes, or we must look for its existence, to some first cause, eternal, unproduced, the beginning of motion, the source of all power, the cause of whose being is to be found only in itself, and the necessity of its own nature. An eternal succession of events ~~or~~ is absurd and impossible we must therefore admit the existence of a first cause independent on any thing preceding, from which all things else have been derived. Being independent and original it must exist by a necessity of

of nature. No other reason of its being can be found. If it exists by necessity, it must be eternal. Necessity that does not depend on something preceding, must be always the same. For if it be necessary, how should it be limited, unless there were something before it to bound it. If it be necessary likewise it is one. Two equal and necessary, infinite beings are inconceivable. They could serve no useful purpose that one could not supply, and therefore we are not to suppose their existence. If they are equally infinite, they must occupy the same space. They must be of the same essence, they must possess the same perfections. They must be the same being. It must be almighty; because whatever can exist must exist by it alone. It must be always, because it must know the natures and powers of all things possible, for nothing is possible but by it.

I have thus given you a brief and partial sketch of the reasoning a priori on this subject. For the most masterly and perfect example of which it is to be found in the English, or perhaps in any language. I refer you to Dr. Clarks demonstration of the being and attributes of G.D.

The reasoning a posteriori, or from the effect to the cause, is much more simple and obvious. It is a kind of argumentation which every man naturally pursues. It affords a species of evidence, which when fairly laid before the mind, every man can estimate; and the evidence continually increases, in proportion as we extend our observation and enquiries into nature. When we behold the order, the variety, the beauty, the proportion and correspondance of parts, and the appearances of wisdom, intention, and design in the animal, vegetable, and mineral world; in the structure of the earth; of the planetary system; of the universe, can we forbear to acknowledge a wise and designing first cause that planned and arranged the whole? and an infinite cause that very

every where presides over the opeations of the whole by his providence? These argu-
ments are beautifully detailed and illustrated by Dorham in his Phisico-the
ology, and by Ray in his treatise concerning the wisdom of GOD in the
Creation. They examine the universe, and in the whole and every part
of it discover such proofs of design, of exquisite contrivance, and of incom-
prehensible power, as can leave no doubt in a reflecting mind, that is not
perverted by the subtleneſs of science, of the existence of a wise, supreme
and omnipotent being who is the author of all.*

Another argument, which may be considered either as different from the
other two, or as shewing in a stronger light their indubitable evidence
and certainty, is derived from the universal concurrence of all nations
and of all men in this truth. The genral sentiments of mankind
point to truth. They are commonly intuitive perceptions, arising nat
urally, if not necesarily from the bare inspection of objects. We have
no other or stronger reason for believeing the testimony of our senses.
On like ground, we believe the reality of a world external to ourselves;
and it is by relying on these common sentiments alone, that we can
destroy the foundations of the sceptical philosophy. The concurrence of
all nations therefore, ~~therefore~~ in believing the being of a GOD, is a
proof, that it is a native sentiment of human nature, noting on the
same footing, and entitled to the same credit with any of our internal
sensations or that it is a conclusion so clearly, easily, and necesarily
drawn from the reasonings already mentioned, as to be obvious, equally

*We see says a good writer, final causes every where. (that is the correspondance of means to their ends) Final causes may be considered as the language in which the existence of GOD is revealed to man. In this language, the sign is natural, the interpretation in-stinctive.

Fergusons Institutes, Part 3.rd Chapter 1.st Section. 2.nd

to the simple and the wise, hence to have become universal.

To this proof it is not a sufficient objection to say, that in many nations, ~~that~~ men have acknowledged a multiplicity of GODs, and that in all nations the multitude have had unworthy conceptions of the divine nature. We know that the sentiments of nature may be corrupted, as well as improved. Even their corruption however, is a proof that they exist. All men have acknowledged one supreme deity in different ages, and countries. ignorance policy or poetry have added to him a multitude of inferior agents; but these do not destroy or weaken the evidence of one supreme being. Our object is at present to establish this single truth, that GOD exists. This truth is simple, and appears to be almost irresistable; it is not impaired by diversity of opinion concerning his perfections. The knowledge of his perfections requiring a greater compass of reasoning, which is a voluntary act in man. They may with regard to some of these, have more inadequate or more just conceptions, according to the pains which they employ. Thus we believe that Shakespeare and Milton existed, from their works, but that does not preclude different opinions about their character and genius.

The existence of GOD is rendered more certain by the absurd reasons to which Atheists are obliged to resort, in order to account for the origin of things. They suppose that sensation and reason are the result merely of organization. That the matter of the universe is eternal, and that an accidental collision of atoms has produced that order which we observe in its great bodies, and that organization which distinguishes animals from the inert masses of matter. This account needs no refutation. It pretends however to derive support from those appearances of disorder or of accident which sometimes takes place in the operations

tions, or even in the structure of nature: but we are incompetent judges of regularity and disorder, unless we were intimately acquainted with the whole system of the universe, and the particular end of every movement in it; without this knowledge imaginary irregularities will exist. but they will exist only in the imperfections of their own minds. The justness of this observation is verified in the judgements we are apt to form of human works of mechanism, where their end or their entire structure is either not at all or but imperfectly understood.

This is certain. that in proportion as our knowledge of nature has been improved, many of those phenomena which before had been judged to be irregularities have been discovered to be governed by the most wise and certain laws. The universe indeed is governed by general laws which to us will sometimes seem productive of accidental evils. But that very disorder is wise and good. It is calculated to awaken the enquiry, and to exercise the ingenuity, the foresight, the precautions and virtues of mankind. The different opinions of the ancient greek philosophers on the subject of the Deity and of nature, you will see beautifully illustrated in the travels of Anacharsis the younger by the Abbe Barthelemi.

Of the Attributes of GOD.

The attributes of GOD may be divided into the natural and moral. these may be again divided into a greater number of particular perfections, according as each is made more or less comprehensive. I shall consider them under the following division. His natural attributes, are, spirituality, unity, eternity, power, and wisdom. His moral attributes, holiness, goodness, and justice. . . . . The spirituality

ity of the Deity is opposed to every form and refinement of matter. It is opposed to the opinions of those philosophers, who have substituted a blind and fatal necessity the result of the powers of matter, in the room of the Deity, or who have regarded him merely as the soul of the world; that is a certain power which although, intelligent, results from a peculiar organization of matter. Matter is generally inert, and incapable of beginning motion; Spirit has a self motive power, and gives motion to all things else. The existence and the movements of the universe, are proofs of an original spirit, who formed it and gave its impulse, ~~and those~~ and those powers by which its order is still preserved. . . . . The only knowledge which we can have of spirit, is derived from our own minds. But as we have reason to believe that there are different species of spirit, as there are of matter, there must be a wide distinction between the creating and every created mind. We mean therefore by this term as applied to the Deity, to express a substance wholly different from matter, simple, uncompounded, essentially active, and intelligent.

Another attribute of the Deity is unity. We see evident proofs of the existence of one GOD. We see no proofs of more than one. The unity of design apparent in all the parts of nature, leads us to ascribe absolute unity to its author. How far he may commit the government of particular districts of the universe to subordinate agents, in order to employ their activity, is not known to us: Having no knowledge of this subject, we should have no belief; still less should we pay such imaginary beings any worship. This reflection alone destroys the whole system of pagan idolatry.

Concerning the almighty power and the infinite wisdom of the Deity, there can be no doubt. I shall not now consume your time in stating or resolving questions that have arisen, or may arise, on those heads. No more

more can we doubt his eternity and his universal presence, although we are not able to form any distinct or definite ideas concerning his relations to duration and space. I proceed then to the consideration of his moral attributes and in the first place of his holiness.

Holiness expresses the purity of the divine nature and its infinite distance from all moral imperfection. It is the best and strongest term in our language to convey to us the perfect and unchangeable love of GD, for the essential rectitude of his own law, the ideas of which are eternal, necessary and perfect, like his own being. It seems further to carry in its meaning not only a pure and unchangeable love of rectitude, but an infinite abhorrence of all vice. Besides this peculiar meaning of the term holiness, as expressing a single attribute of the Deity, it is often used to signify the aggregate of all his moral perfections.

The Goodness of GD is his inclination to impart happiness. This perfection we ascribe to him for the tendencies to benevolence which he hath implanted in our own hearts; for the existence of so many beings capable of happiness and actually enjoying it; and from the beauty and order in the universe so well fitted to communicate it. - - - ——

But it is not so necessary to prove the existence, of the attribute, as to remove objections, or to account for appearances that seem to contradict it. These consist in the physical and moral evils that afflict the world. It is true the preominance of good over evil, is manifest and great, but it is said, if GD were perfectly benevolent and at the same time omnipotent, even partial evil would not have existed. To account for it, some of the eastern

nations

nations, supposed an eternal and necessary principle of evil in the universe, as well as of good: and that in the conflicts of these two principles with one another, they became blended together in the proportions in which we see them in this world. Some of the Greek philosophers, on the other hand, maintained, that matter is eternal, that it is in its nature intractable, and perverse, and incapable, of being reduced to perfect order, even by the power of the Creator. From this inherent and incurable perversity of matter, spring the disorders which we see in nature. Atheists account for it from a fatality supposed to be incident to matter, but which is an unintelligible name employed to cover their own ignorance. Others have supposed it to be the necessary result of general laws.* The evils to which man is subject are of two kinds; physical and moral. They are the necessary consequences of the imperfection of his nature, and they are necessary also to the improvement of his nature. Physical evil is only the disagreement of things to mens feelings and desires. Their chief purpose seems to be to prompt our activity, and to promote our ingenuity, on which both the improvement and the happiness of our nature principally depend. A nature so imperfect as that of man, which should perceive no wants, or should have no evils to avoid would be destitute of a sufficient principle of action. action is necessary to the advancement of all our powers

* The true source of all the evils in the world is pointed out in revelation. Man by his own fault has lost the perfection of his nature. The evils therefore which we feel, are not only a punishment, but a corrective discipline to bring us back again to perfection. In this view they will appear to be the fruits of Divine goodness.

powers, to virtue and to happiness. Enjoyment does not yield as much
pleasure as the activity required to produce it. Pain and want produce
satisfactions greater than their evils, by the efforts which they excite to avoid
or throw them off. our happiness consists greatly in courage and for
titude, which a discipline of danger and suffering is necessary to
create. The evil endured under this discipline is not to be compared
with the good that is produced. That firmness of mind, indeed, which
is essential to fortitude, and courage in a great measure annihilates
the sense of the evil of life, after they have continued to form this
noble character of the soul. A character that may be singularly adapted to procure us the purest and sublimest enjoyments in higher
gradations of our existence. The happiness of man depends, more
on habits of virtuous employments, on the temper and disposition
of the soul, and on the proper order of just pursuits, than on any ex
ternal circumstances, which habits and dispositions, the circum
stances of danger and want contribute greatly to form. —

The next class of evils of which we have to complain, are mor
al evils. They are the necessary consequences of an imperfect nature.
But they tend to correct themselves, by the pains which they bring
after them; it is essential to imperfect beings to err, and by their
errours, gradually to approach to what is right. The compunctions
of conscience discover in man, notwithstanding the corruption of
his nature, an idea of perfection for which his creator has destined
him. The pain of self reproach is evidently intended to be a cor
rective principle, and a motive of improvement. Liberty of ac
tion is necessarily connected, in an imperfect being with possible
vice.

vice. But the creator has rendered actions and dispositions, which are hurtful to others painful to ourselves. These very pains therefore are proofs of the goodness and beneficence of the Deity.

Justice which is the last of the divine attributes which I proposed to consider, is an invariable determination to render to all their due: rewards to the virtuous: punishments to the vicious. We ascribe this attribute to GOD, from the dictates of conscience, and the sentiments of justice in our own breasts. It may be considered as one mode of his infinite benevolence, in which by proper correctives and restraints, he would prevent all injurious passions, and preclude individuals in seeking their own enjoyments from violating the order and happiness of the whole.

Justice is distinguished by two kinds; distributive, and vindictive. The former has been just explained, and is always administered in order to promote some good end to individuals, or to the whole body of rational beings. The latter is the infliction of punishment on vice, merely for its own intrinsic demerit, without respect to the reformation of the offender, or any farther good end. Conscience teaches us that guilt deserves such punishment, and therefore leads us to fear it.*

End of lecture 15.

Wm. Groes, scripsit, Octob.r 30, 1805.

* After all that reason can demonstrate to us on the subject of the divine nature, and attributes, we shall derive our clearest views of them from revelation, and the humblest christian may be better instructed on these great truths, than were the most penetrating and distinguished Philosophers of Pagan antiquity:: Finis.

LECTURE 16th.

Of the immortality of the soul.

It is not sufficient that we lay a foundation for the knowledge of virtue in the knowledge of human nature, unless we can furnish at the same time motives to its practice powerful enough to overcome those passions that by their excess would contradict it. With this view I have proposed the evidences of the being and attributes of GOD, that the authority of his comm and, the consciousness of his inspection and the apprehensions of his judgment may contribute to enforce the moral law. &c. With the same view I shall now state a few general arguments drawn from reason for the immortality of the soul. The authority of virtue would be very weak in the breasts of a great part of mankind if the expectations of an immortal existence after this life were not shown to rest on at least probable foundations. Probability however is the utmost to which the wisest of men have been able to attain on this subject, by the aid of reason alone. Cicero in speaking of it could only say that if he were deceived in hoping that the mind is immortal, he wished not to be awakened from a delusion so agreable. Socrates in his last conversation with his friends, before drinking the fatal cup said to them. "Ye go to your ordinary occupations, I to my fate, which of us shall enjoy the happier lot, is known only to the GODs". It is the christian revelation alone that has shed such evidence on this doctrine as leaves no doubt concerning it on the mind of a true believer. But as this is not the place to discuss the evidences of Christianity, and we are merely examining what reason can discover on the subject, I proceed to lay before you a concise view of the arguments by which

which she has been able to support this important truth. The physicae principles on which we may expect the immortality of the soul or at least ~~between~~ believe its possibility have been already stated in the 6th lecture. I am now very shortly to state the moral reasons of our assent to this truth. In the first place the intention of nature, (to speak in the style of some philosophers) would seem to be defeated, or to speak more properly the design of the creator would not seem to be perfectly fulfilled, if the present were to be the only state of human existence. We perceive in ourselves powers that are progressive to an indefinite degree of improvement. No one man has ever yet carried any one talent to the utmost perfection of which it is susceptible. much less has any man carried all the powers of his nature to the highest pitch of improvement of which they are capable, and to which they seem in some period of his being to be destined. To stop them in the midst of their course or rather when they are just beginning to unfold, appears not to be consistent with the wise and benevolent will of the creator. all other things on earth have an ultimate point of maturity to which they arrive, after which they gradually decay. Other animals increase in strength and a certain kind of sagacity, till they reach a point beyond which they never advance. Their several species seem to be equal in all ages, and not to be capable of any further improvement. This is not the case with man. The greatest part of his powers would be lost if there were not an other state of being where they might unfold themselves, and advance towards perfection. We judge it therefore not consistent with the wisdom and goodness of D.D. to bestow on man so many useless powers which never are and never can be excited. And we reasonably look forward to a future state, as the proper field on which they shall be perfectly displayed; moral and religious sentiments

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particularly would be useless, and without an object if we were to perish like the brutes, if we had not beyond this life, the hope of some nearer approach to the deity and an eternal destination in view; that must depend upon our conduct here.

2nd. Another argument for the immortality of the soul, is the general belief of mankind. It has made a part of all religions and entered into all the ancient political institutions. It is found among the most rude as well as the civilized nations. This universal consent can arise only from the constitution of human nature, or from education. But we never see such a uniform direction given to education among all nations except with regard to such duties, and practices, as antecedently nature strongly points to, for example, filial duty, respect for age &c. will it be said, that this doctrine originally was only an artifice of priests to establish their authority, or of politicians to give effect to their laws. But when had priests or politicians more cunning than all the rest of mankind? or whence did they derive that superiority of mind to which the whole world bowed with implicit submission? The same men who gave such ascendancy to the genius of priests in one age represent them in another as the weakest of mortals.

But whether they were ingenious or weak how could mankind all at once be induced to receive an improbable fiction and persevere so constantly in the belief of it. How could priests and politicians of the remotest nations who had no communication with one another concur in the same fiction if it were merely an arbitrary opinion and had no ground in nature. Arbitrary opinions and customs have not such uniformity among different nations.

And

And after they have been established they are liable to change like other fashions, that depend upon the caprice of men. The cunning of politicians and priests therefore will not furnish as sufficient reason for the universality of this belief. It has been supposed that the belief of this doctrine, was necessary to procure a perfect obedience to human laws and therefore politicians invented it. But I ask why the rest of mankind could not see, the cheat, if it were one, as well as the politicians invent it. And then the effect would be defeated. But if it be true that the order of human society cannot be perfectly maintained without the expectation of a state of future retribution, this is an argument of no inconsiderable force for the reality of the doctrine. Otherwise GOD would have created man under the necessity of being continually deceived. This is a consequence which we ought not to imputte to infinite wisdom, goodness, and truth.

We must refer the universality of this expectation therefore to an original sentiment of human nature, or at least to a conclusion that so necessarily obtrudes itself upon us from the reflections of reason, and sentiments of conscience, that it may be considered as a natural feeling. It has been before shewn in proving the being of GOD, that these pointings of nature always lead to truth. We ascribe to the constitutions of our nature any feeling, idea or sentiment that is general among mankind. Such natural principles carry with them an evidence, persuasion, and force almost irresistable. On the ground of their evidence, it is that we believe our own being and the being of other things, we rely on the truth of nature. The principles which GOD as it were, hath worked up in our constitution we receive not

not only for the force with which they urge our assent but because we cannot see how he should be willing to deceive his creatures and we cannot conceive that it should be necessary for him to govern them by deceptions.

It is not a proper objection against the universality and consequent truth of this doctrine, that some philosophers have denied it, or that ignorant nations have blended it with many superstitious opinions. A minute and subtle philosophy has at different times denied or doubted of every principle and every conclusion of reason. It has denied the existence of matter. It has denied the existence of mind. It has denied the existence of both matter and mind. The derangements of abstraction more than those of imagination, are not to be received as criterions of truth and nature.

As to the errours that may be mingled with any principle of nature or may be added to it, they do not destroy the truth to which that principle points. Nature points with sufficient certainty to truth, all her dictates are founded on truth. She however only gives the general impressions of what is true; she has left it to ourselves in the exercise of reason and experience, to perfect or to modify our original informations. According to the industry, or skill or use, therefore, they may be less or more mingled with error. Thus as was shewn in the last lecture nature infallibly leads us to the acknowledgements of the being of a God: but superstition may corrupt that sentiment by admitting a plurality of Gods. Nature has implanted in us the principles of taste, but we may neglect to improve them or we may corrupt them so as to create a false taste. But even the corruption of a principle is a proof of its existence; and we are always

ways furnished with means of ascertaining the truths to which it leads and of clearing them from errours, so far as it is necessary for conduct and duty. We have grounds therefore to believe notwithstanding the errours and superstitions that may be mixed with the doctrine of immortality that there is a state of future existence. What reason and conscience teach us to expect in it will be a subject of after consideration.

3rd Another argument on which we found the belief of a future existence is the ardent desire which good men have after it and the apprehensions of bad men.

The desire of immortality seems to be a natural as well as a very strong tendency of the human heart. All men cherish the precious idea till they have made it their interest to fear it. It is the greatest consolation and most powerful motive of virtue. It imposes the most essential restraints on vice. The hopes and fears of mankind therefore equally confirm its reality. If it is a desire and an anticipation implanted in man by the author of his being; shall we believe that our most merciful father hath created in his children, desires only to disappoint them and inspired them with hopes only to tantalize them? After exciting these expectations to encourage virtue shall they be made its severest scourge? For nothing can be more painful to a good man than to find those glorious expectations, which in him are more lively and strong in proportion to the perfection of his virtue, all an unreal dream. As the hopes of the good so the fears of the wicked serve to confirm the expectation of a future state of retribution. Conscious of guilt the sinner apprehends a punishment for his crimes far exceeding what is inflicted upon him in this life. This is a senti-

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ment of nature, it is in general, however, it may be weakened by bad habits or varied by education. Shall vice then go without its proper punishments; shall it be freed from its most effectual restraints? Or shall the restraint which the wisdom of the creator hath thought proper to impose upon it, be only a delusion?

4thly Another argument for the reality of future existence, is derived from the effect which the general belief or discredit of this doctrine would have upon the morals of mankind. It's acknowledged influence upon morals is one reason of ascribing so much as has been done to the craft of politicians. The good would hardly have in this world adequate motives to support them in their conflicts with vice, or to encourage the constant efforts of virtue, which are often laborious painful, and dangerous. If the passions of men were freed from this restraint, and secrecy were the effectual protection of crimes the greatest disorder and unhappiness would probably reign in the world.

Let us take an example from the courts of princes, and the capitals of wealthy nations, where this doctrine is most discredited, and moral principles most dissolved; if the whole capital were as corrupted as part. If the country were as corrupted as the capital, and all the grades of the people as the court; would such a nation preserve it's existence? Whenever the mass of the people in any state become so depraved we always see that state sink immediately into ruin. Among the chief symtons and causes of that depravity may usually be reckoned contempt of religion and a disbelief of the immortality of the soul.* If this be the case and the doctrine of immorta

* It will appear from the history of the manners and opinions of those nations whose decline and fall have made the most conspicuous figure in the annals of mankind.

mortality be necessary to the peace and order of human society the truth of the doctrine is strongly to be presumed.

It is unreasonable to believe that GOD has created human nature in such a manner as to render it necessary that it should be governed by falsehood. All the plans of infinite wisdom will so correspond that virtue and happiness, which appear to be the end of the whole, must be supported and promoted by truth alone.

5th. An additional argument is drawn from the unequal distribution of good and evil to mankind in this life according to their characters. From the holiness goodness and justice of GOD we reasonably expect to see virtue rewarded and vice punished. Yet contrary to this reasonable expectation we often see virtue in affliction and vice triumphant. Such a mixed and unequal distribution of good and evil, is proper, probably it is best for a state of probation, where virtue is to be exercised, tried and cultivated into perfect unchangeable habits. But it is contrary to every principle of reason, and to all our ideas of the divine character to believe that these probationary sufferings are to be its ultimate reward, and that vice which tends to impair and destroy the work of the creator, should be put on the same footing with the most perfect obedience to his will. This mixed state therefore, is only a state of discipline and trial preparatory to another. And we ought hereafter to expect a righteous and eternal retribution from GOD according to the character of men; and this expectation as we have seen is confirmed by the dictates of conscience which teach us that vice deserves a penalty which it never suffers in this world, and leads us to hope for virtue, a reward far above any that it meets with in

in the present life. It is confirmed by the general suffrage and sentiments of all nations, and by the reasonings and belief of the wisest men in every nation.

These moral reasons for the immortality of the soul when taken separately may not produce entire conviction in the mind; but when assembled together produce such accumulated evidence as hardly leaves any room to doubt, yet we must acknowledge that the only source of absolute certainty on this subject is to be found in revelation which not only assures of the truth of that state but discloses to us in some measure what it is.

With regard to the nature of that future state reason can discover little except that it will be a condition of happiness to the virtuous and misery to the wicked. We have reason to believe that the present powers of our nature will be highly improved, and perhaps that many new powers of which we cannot now conceive, will be there disclosed. It will probably be a state eternally progressing towards perfection both in knowledge power and happiness which however created beings can never reach. And in fine it will be a state in which we shall probably behold all the perfections of GOD more conspicuously and more gloriously displayed than in the present; and where especially we shall see virtue and happiness ultimately triumph in the order of nature over vice and misery.

End of Lecture 16th.

Wm Croes scripsit, oct 30th, 1805.

LECTURE 17th

Of the nature of Virtue.

Having stated the principles of human nature generally, and illustrated them as far as I thought it necessary in that system, I proposed to give you of morals, and having set before you the principal evidences of the being of GOD, and of the immortality of the soul; which doctrines give the greatest efficacy to the law of duty. It is time now to come to the consideration of our duties themselves, and of the great principles of our conduct in life, the end to which all these preliminary speculations are directed.

The discharge of these duties from proper principles is denominated virtue. But before we enter into a particular detail of them, I shall make a few observations upon the subject of virtue generally.

Virtue is a denomination taken from a word that signifies strength, or power; because in the first rude ages when language was beginning to be formed, personal vigour and the courage that was usually connected with it were the qualities that most attracted admiration. Virtue was a term that signified the perfection of man, which was then supposed to consist chiefly in the force of body and mind. As other qualities grew into admiration, and esteem in the progress of society, and especially the moral qualities of the heart, which are so necessary to social happiness, the same term was easily applied to designate them; and the more easily because the highest courage is commonly united with the greatest benevolence, and all those dispositions which contribute most to human happiness. At length the improved state of

of society, where the law governs all, and the public force depends the community, rendering general and individual happiness less dependent on personal bravery; and the moral dispositions, from their influence in promoting these ends becoming more and more the objects of esteem, they have now appropriated the name of virtue almost exclusively to themselves. The term virtue may still be considered as expressing the perfection of our nature generally. as virtue signifies any quality that contributes to it, and he is the most virtuous man, who studies most to promote this perfection. We apply this meaning of the term, likewise to other animals, and even to inanimate substances. Thus we speak familiarly of the virtues of a horse the virtues of a soil, the virtues of a plant, the virtue of a magnet, meaning those peculiar powers or perfections that belong to these objects respectively.

In treating on the subject of virtue three questions arise. What is virtue? What is its excellence? What is its sanction? on the first question we enquire into its nature, or into the nature of those actions generally, which constitute virtue. On the second question we enquire wherein its excellence consists? Why it is preferable to vice? Whether it is of a fixed and unchangeable nature, or is mutable and arbitrary? The last question supposes, that virtue is a law or rule of duty, and we enquire by what authority it is enjoined? and under what rewards, and penalties obedience to it is required? Of each of these I shall treat separately and very briefly; and in the first place

Of the Nature of Virtue:

Different opinions, or rather different modes of expressing the same truth

truth, have been accepted on this subject. Some philosophers have supposed that virtue consists in acting agreably to the will of GOD; others have said that is only the wisest means of promoting our own happiness. Others that it is a well directed care to promote general good. And lastly, others that it consists in acting according to the reason and nature of things. With regard to these opinions we may remark that there is truth in them all. For example whenever we can discover the will of GOD, that will is perfect, and we ought to obey it. But the advocates of the opinion first stated too frequently speak of virtue, as an effect of mere will, and therefore arbitrary in its nature; without sufficiently considering its essential, intrinsic, and immutable rectitude.

It is true also in the next place, that virtue contributes to promote individual and general happiness. But this should rather be considered as an effect, resulting from the wise and benevolent constitution of man, than as forming the nature of virtue; neither is the consideration of our own happiness or that of others always the direct and immediate motive of virtue. In many acts of duty, we do not immediately perceive the happiness that is to result from them, but we are urged to them from the sentiments of piety, justice, charity, and prudence them, simply from the authority of conscience.

When virtue is said in the last place, to consist in acting according to the nature and reason of things; the expression seems to be too general. The nature and consequently the reason of things is subject to our cognizance, to a very narrow extent only.

ly. Such a general standard of duty must be extremely vague and obscure to us, unless we were acquainted, as GOD is, with the infinite relations of things. Besides the generality of the rule is defective in another respect. For there are physical as well as moral relations among things. It would make virtue consist in skill in the arts as well as in the practice of duty.

The definition of the ancient philosophers, seems to be more just than any of the preceding, who said, that virtue consists in acting agreably to our own nature: that is according to the principles of which it is composed, and their mutual relations to one another; according to its relations to other sensible beings within the sphere of its action and according to the end for which it seems to be created. Agreably to this definition, there is no appetite, propensity, affection or power of our nature which is not lawful and right for us to indulge or exert, to a certain degree. It would be wrong when we have a fit occasion, not to exert or indulge them to that degree. The lawful and virtuous degree of their action is to be ascertained from their natural proportions to one another: from their relative dignity and importance in the constitution of man; their mutual dependencies, and from subordination to one another. In any system, whether mechanical, or moral, as in a watch or in a man, it is not according to the nature of that system for one or a few parts to move themselves, they must move in concert and harmony with the whole. Thus if any appetite

should

should excite a man to act, although it may seem in one
view natural, or according to the nature of that appetite to indul-
ge it to excess, because a very strong impulse prompts to its
gratification and a lively pleasure accompanies it, yet it would
not be agreeable to the nature of man, that one or a few appetites
should govern him, and so impede or interfere with the proper
action of his other powers. They ought to be subject to the check of
those principles which are superiour to them, in the order of hu-
man nature, and especially of reason and conscience which
seem to be designed to regulate the whole. just as in a watch.
the analogy which has been already used, each wheel is checked
by that which follows, and all together are regulated by the balance.
In order to virtue therefore, all our powers ought to be cultivated
and made to act in their just proportion to one another.

That we may ascertain the nature of virtue, or determine
that course of conduct which is agreeable to the constitution of our
own [redacted] nature, it is necessary to consider the parts or prin-
ciples of which it is composed. To observe what evidences of dignity
and worth attend them; and which of them yield us the most
pure, exquisite, noble and durable enjoyments. For in proportion
to these, ought to be the cultivation which we bestow on different
parts of our own nature. The principles that make up human
nature may be ranged under the following heads. The sensual
appetites. The social affections. The intellectual powers. And the mor-
al sentiments. And these may again be subdivided into a great
variety of different principles, some of which are coordinate with, and
thus subordinate to, one another, in [redacted] point of excellence. It would
be impossible to enumerate them all; to estimate their different
degree

degrees of worth, and to state their various relations to one another. These minute details must be left to the reason and experience of every person, as objects occur in life on which to exercise his powers. . . . . But we may remark on those general divisions, that have been just mentioned, that the sensual appetites are evidently the lowest, and the moral sentiments the highest in the scale of excellence and dignity. And perhaps the social affections are superiour in worth and importance; that is in their influence on human happiness even to the intellectual powers. The comparative value of all these principles is estimated from the sentiments of dignity and excellence which accompany their exercise, from their utility and as I have before said, from the nobleness and durability of their pleasures.

From this concise and general view it will appear, that the appetites of the body should be less indulged and cultivated than the other powers of human nature and this only at intervals. When the pursuit of sensual pleasure forms the chief employment of a mans life, nature becomes wholly inverted. When it occupies a large portion of his time, the system of nature is necessarily deranged, and runs into vice.

Virtue however does not require us to extinguish our appetites, or forbid us to taste of sensual pleasures, as some visionary pietists have imagined. On the other hand their action or indulgence to a certain degree is necessary to the happiness and perfection of human nature as was intimated in the introduction of this lecture, have nearly the same meaning. Virtue then requires such a measure [redacted] exercise and gratification of our bodily powers and appetites, and indeed of all the physical faculties

system. And virtue is the perfection of human.

faculties of our nature, as is necessary to give the greatest vigour and perfection to the whole, and permits, or rather commands us to enjoy those pleasures which naturally result from such a vigorous and perfect state, both of body and mind, and which will excite us to perform, and qualify us for the discharge of other and higher duties. In this view attention to the means of improving corporeal beauty strength and activity, when kept in just subordination to other duties and pursuits may be considered as an exercise of virtue. And the opinion of Mr. Hume on this subject is not altogether as ridiculous as it has been sometimes represented to be.

If our bodily powers merit our care, still more do our intellectual faculties require to be cultivated with all the assiduity and attention which is consistent with the practical duties which we owe to ourselves, to society, to religion, or which arise out of our state or relations in life. The last limitation I mention, because some men are more favourably situated than others for the improvement of their minds. And their stations in society more immediately require it. More of their attention and care therefore should be bestowed on this subject, than can be demanded from others.

The principles in the next grade above these, are our social affections. These are almost infinitely varied according to our relations to mankind, and to the objects at which they aim. Taking them generally, virtue requires perhaps that the principal portion of our time and of our activity should be employed in fulfilling our relations to others, and promoting their satisfaction and happiness.

Virtue, however, is not always occupied with great interests; it descends to regulate the smaller sources of enjoyment. And those qualities and those exercises of benevolence, which are known by the names

names of amiable manners and sociability of disposition form a part of the character of virtue, where they are all perfect, and de-serve. The cultivation of every wise and virtuous man. These small acts of benevolence, which, however have an important effect on human happiness have been too often overlooked in the ideas which good men have framed of duties and have therefore been omitted in their system of virtue. Virtue is impaired by the omision. I add that it is impaired also, when the social principle is of a disproportioned strength, that is, when it leads a man to neglect his own proper in-terests, and the interest of others, who immediately depend upon him. Some examples occur among weak men of this excess, but much more commonly, we find the selfish principles too strong for the benevolent.

Finally the highest class of our powers is that of our moral powers. These are the most noble and commanding principles of our na-ture. They yield us the most pure, exquisite, and permanent enjoyments. They not only form separate and peculiar principles of action, but ought to regulate the exercise of all our other powers. They should operate ha-bitually and universally. Having thus laid a foundation for under-standing what it is to act according to nature by stating generally the constituent principles of our nature, their comparative importance and relations to one another in the human system, I might illus-trate the subject farther, by considering the end for which man ap-pears to have been created.

Every system that is wisely constructed, has all its movements directed to produce some useful end. And in proportion as it attains this end with ease, with certainty and without irregular-ity, it is said to be perfect. In like manner the human system or the

The nature of man points to one great end, which is to enjoy and communicate happiness as a sensible, active, rational, social and moral being. When he fulfills this end perfectly, and to the utmost extent of his powers, he acts agreeably to his nature; he is perfectly virtuous. This is a perfection however, at which we can only aim in this life. Its complete attainment is reserved for a higher state of existence. Human nature is evidently in a state of derangement at present. and in the best of men is only approaching to order under the discipline of divine providence. I conclude with this remark. That when it is said virtue consists in acting according to nature, we must beware of concluding that it is according to the irregular impulses of a corrupted nature. It is nature as it appears to reason to have come from the hand of the creator, and as it is fitted to promote that end for which it seems to have been designed by him.

End of Lecture 17th.

Wm. Croes inspit November 1st 1805.

John J. Stoddert June 26th 1810.

LECTURE 18th

Of the Excellence of Virtue.–

When we ask what is the excellence of virtue! we enquire wherein this excellence consists? what is the foundation of our esteem for it? why is it preferable to vice? whether it is of a fixed & unchangeable nature or is it mutable and arbitrary? The same diversity of opinion has existed on this, as on the last question, concerning the nature of virtue. Some have supposed that its excellency consists in its conformity to the will of GOD, or that the single reason why it deserves our esteem, or is preferable to vice; is because GOD has willed it to be so. This opinion seems to make virtue arbitrary & to imply that our preference might have been required for vice & misery, if such had been the order of the creator. It is inconceivable however, that there should be such mutability in the nature of the thing. Virtue seems to possess as necessary and immutable an excellence as the deity himself. Goodness as an attribute in him, is as eternal & unchangeable in its nature, as is wisdom or intelligence– and divine goodness is the source, and as far as our nature can resemble his, the pattern of virtue in man. The ideas of virtue therefore partake of the same eternal & immutable excellence... Reflections of this kind have laid the foundation for the second opinion, that the excellence of virtue is to be sought for in the nature & reason of things, which is but another way of saying, its excellence is intrinsic, in the nature of the thing; it is eternal, immutable, and not dependent on mere will

mere will. The third opinion is, That its excellency consists in its tendency to promote general happiness. The last opinion is, That it is excellent or is to be held so, by each man, merely from its relation to his own happiness. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ On this subject we may say, That perhaps there is in virtue, that is in moral rectitude & goodness, an intrinsic & essential excellence & worth as was shewn in our reflections on the moral faculty. It is not arbitrary and dependent upon will alone, but rests upon the same foundation with our ideas of the divine perfection. No will can make wright & wrong, happiness and misery to be the same thing, or to be equally good, more than it can make white and black to be the same. The excellence of virtue, therefore is in the nature of the thing itself - and that nature seems principally to consist in its tendency to promote general and individual happiness: I say principally: because the whole excellence of virtue does not consist in the happiness that results from it: there are some virtuous sentiments - such as the duty of a child to a parent; the veneration of a creature towards the creator, that are in themselves, and independently of their relation to human happiness, beautiful and deserving of approbation.

Of the above mentioned opinions, therefore, the second seems to approach nearest the truth. There is much truth in the third - the fourth is more remote from it. With regard to the first we may remark that altho' the will of God does not constitute the excellence of virtue: yet that will is always right and perfect; it is whenever we can consider it, whether it be in the constitution of our own nature, in the relation he has established between us & other beings, or

in his

in his revealed word, our surest rule of duty. — —

In order to prove that virtue both as to its nature & excellence depends wholly on the divine will, it has been asked might not God have created us with other faculties than those we posess, & established between us & other beings different relations from those which we now sustain? In that case would not virtue have been a different thing from what it now is? I answer, its acts or expressions would have been different, its essence & substance which consists in respect for the authority of God, & regard to the happiness of all beings would have been the same. Will & power, therefore can only alter the modifications of virtue — they do not change the spirit & foundation. To illustrate this by analogy — Different states of society which produce some change in the human character in various climates & nations, have given rise among them, to different forms of politeness, which are only the external modes of expressing the social dispositions & the benevolence of Man to Man. The external acts of politeness then, are various among various people; while the dispositions of mutual respect and good will, which they express, remain the same. In like manner, if our nature, instead of suffering an alteration from the climate or the state of society, had received different faculties & relations from the hands of the creator, the forms of virtue & many of its individual acts would doubtless have been different from what they are — but its basis which consists in benevolence and piety, would have remained the same. Mere will

Therefore

therefore, altho' it be the rule of duty, is not a sufficient account of the foundation & excellence of virtue.

Of the Sanction of Virtue.

The third question, or what is the sanction of virtue? implies that it contains a law or rule of conduct. And we ask by what authority it is enjoined? And under what rewards & penalties or under what sanction strictly taken, it is required. For strictly, the sanction of a law signifies the Good, which by the constitution of the lawgiver is made to follow obedience, as its reward, & the suffering which he has annexed to disobedience as its penalty. ~~~~

The authority by which this law is enjoined we will find in our own breast & in the will of God. In conscience we perceive an authority that is fitted to command our obedience, as well as a power that is able to punish our disobedience. It is this peculiar power of conscience which makes us susceptible of moral obligation. and the perception of this command actually lays us under the bonds of the law.

The authority of conscience, however is subordinate & points immediately to one still higher in the will of God from which it is derived. The law as I have said, possesses an intrinsic excellence, on account of which it deserves our obedience; but it would be dead as to any authority to enjoin, or any power to compel obedience, without a legislator to impose it by his command. Nothing but will armed with a power to reward or punish, can oblige.

Our next enquiry then is, what sanctions, the supreme

legislator

legislator hath annexed to his law, in order to procure it obedience?

These have been by many writers ranked under the heads of duty & interest— the former comprehending our inward sentiments of obligation— the latter all external advantages & disadvantages that result from obedience or disobedience.

This manner of expression is not perfectly accurate, duty or the sense of obligation not describing the whole of that sanction which is added to the law by conscience. I will divide its sanctions therefore into those of conscience of religion & of general interest— meaning by the last that happiness which usually accompanies the practice of virtue in this life and that misery which commonly follows vice.

The sanction of conscience consists in the internal satisfaction, & self approbation which men perceive in doing right, & the compunction, remorse, & fear that accompany a vicious conduct.

The sanctions of religion consist in the hope of the favour of God & in the fear of his displeasure, even in the present world, which considering our ideas of his infinite perfection, and of our dependence upon him necessarily have a great influence on every serious & reflecting mind.

But religion has a farther sanction in our ideas of the future judgment of God & of a righteous retribution in another world, according to the characters of men in the present. The apprehension of such a retribution seems to be a natural principle of the human heart. We find it among all nations, & the judgments of conscience upon our own conduct always points beyond ourselves to the supreme and final judgment

judement of GOd. Here appears the great importance & the mighty force of the doctrine of immortality. ~~~~.

It has been questioned whether the lights of reason & of nature direct us only to look for a corrective & therefore temporary punishment in a future state; or for a vindictive justice which will consequently be eternal. The former opinion was embraced by the disciples of Pythagoras who brought his doctrine from India. The latter especially with regard to certain degrees of wickedness - seems to have been the more general sentiment of mankind - of pagans as well as of Christians. —

They have been probably led to the idea of eternal sufferings from those natural apprehensions of conscience, which persuaded them that guilt merited & would receive a future punishment, & from not seeing any of the sufferers released & returning again to life. The idea was strengthned by observing many crimes drawing after them, even in this world irreparable evils. No repentance can efface the stain that is imprinted on the character by some infamous offences, nor repair the ravages committed on the constitution by certain vices of intemperance; seeing these calamities endure as long as the existence of the offender. ~~~~.

The last sanction of virtue is general interest; that is, the happiness that usually accompanies the practice of virtue, & the misery that follows vice. This happiness or this misery arises from peace of mind or from compunction of conscience - from the approbation or hatred of the world, & from external circumstances of prosperity or adversity.

There are doubtless particular instances in which virtue is seen

to be

to be followed by misfortune. Misrepresentation may take from it the esteem of the world. Some advantages may now & then appear to be gained by a departure from Moral principle. But certainly, virtue, as a general law of conduct leads to inward tranquility & public respect. It is also the best mean of health, external comfort & success in busineſs.— The occasional advantages ~~of vice~~ derived from vice, are more apparent than real; at best they are but temporary.— and when a man is known to act from vicious principles, he infallibly defeats his ſucceſs, or he loſes in reputation and peace of mind more than he can gain in wealth or power. Great affluence or extenſive power; altho' they may be often productive of many conveniences, are not neceſsarily connected with happineſs, which ariſes chiefly from inward peace and self approbation; from moderate, conſtant, and uſeful employment, and from the regular & the virtuous exercise of all the powers of our nature, & eſpecially of the kind & benevolent affections of the heart.

Here may with propriety be conſidered the famous queſtion that ſo much employed the ancient ſchools.— What is the Chief Good?

There were three opinions on this ſubject, that of the Epicureans, that of the Stoics, and that of the Peripateticks. The Epicureans, who derived their name from their founder, maintained that animal & ſenſual enjoyments formed the whole happineſs of man, and that what are called intellectual pleaſures are only the recollection of theſe. Epicurus was himself a man of moderate appetites & paſsions & maintained that moderation is neceſsary to enjoyment.— But his followers abuſed his doctrine to the groſseſt ſenſuality.— This philoſophy has been revived in Modern Europe, and will al-

ways

ways find advocates among a luxurious people, & in a corrupted state of manners.

The Stoics who borrowed their denomination from the Στοα or portico in which their school was held, maintained that happiness lay only in the mind and was not affected by external circumstances. They endeavoured to extinguish a great part of the sensibilities of human nature, because they were supposed to lead to weakness. They contended that there is nothing good but virtue & nothing evil but vice. Their virtue however, was proud & selfish. It excluded almost entirely the sympathetic feelings, and the benevolent affections. Their philosophy was more fitted to create heroes, than to form amiable & useful men.

The Peripatetics, so called from their practise of walking while they communicated & received instruction, pursued a middle track between these extremes & I beleive, a much more just one than either. They did not hold intellectual or sensual pleasures, or the advantages of fortune to be indifferent. They esteemed them to be good and desirable provided they could be acquired with fairness & honesty, but they held virtue to be the chief good, and their virtue was sociable, benevolent, and useful. This philosophy agrees with that account of the nature of virtue which I have before given.- It is the exercise of all the powers of our nature in their proper proportion & subordination. It is the mean of preserving every faculty in its greatest vigor, & perfection, & thereby not only applying it to its best uses, but deriving from it its highest enjoyments. Over all presides the moral faculty to direct both their exercises and enjoyments, and itself

itself the source of the purest & sublimest pleasures. - So that virtue if not the only good, is certainly the chief Good; and taken as a general law of action, & judging from its general effects, it may be said to be its own rewarder even in this world, & vice in a great measure, at least when we take in the sum of life, its own punishment. Such is the foundation on which I have made general interest, a sanction of the law of virtue. And it will appear more reasonable when we take into view, not the interest of any individual merely, but that of communities, of nations, of mankind. Virtue is undoubtedly the common interest of the World. -

I confess that the depravity of human nature, & the imperfection of virtue in the best of men on earth would render this sanction too feeble, if it were not aided by that of religion. But religion, conscience & general interest taken together will form a sanction that will necessarily possess great force on every serious and reflecting mind. . . . . .

I shall conclude this lecture with a few reflections on the morality, & on the merit and demerit of actions.

Of the morality of actions.

The morality of an action is its conformity to the moral law. The law regards principally & chiefly the dispositions & intentions and secondarily, only the external conduct. - External action separated from intention possesses no moral quality more than the movement of a machine. But in connexion with this, forms the complete object of the law; Where we are free to act, the external conduct necessarily flows from the internal affection. Both therefore must be connected in the view of the law.

the law. Human laws on the other hand, regard only external actions, for they have no other means of determining the intention of the agent. ~

If the intention of a man is good, the merit of virtue is imputed to him, altho some necessary impediment should prevent the effect of his benevolent purpose, or altho casual & unforeseen injury should result from his actions. It has been made a question by casuists how far a mistaken conscience will excuse or justify injurious conduct that may spring from it. We may safely answer that it can only be justified or excused when the intentions of the actor are really benevolent, & when he has faithfully used every mean which nature and providence have put within his power to obtain information with regard to his duty. Voluntary ignorance is criminal, especially when it leads to the hurt of others. When hurt to others or any violation of natural propriety, is to be the consequence of our actions, it should be a sacred & invariable rule in morals, never to proceed to act without the most faithful investigation, of the subject & the clearest light. If this rule were followed, we should seldom meet with those violences & absurdities springing from enthusiasm & superstition, which have been so often imputed as a disgrace to religion. The difference of opinion that prevails among different sects or different nations, with regard to the morality of particular actions, does not destroy the certainty of the moral law or the usefulness of moral discussions. The general principles, on which these diversities may be accounted for, have been suggested under the heads of the moral faculty & of the excellence of virtue.

Of Merit and Demerit.

Actions are said to have merit or demerit according to the nature & degrees of the moral dispositions, of which they are the exercise or expression.— Merit signifies their being entitled to praise, esteem & reward: demerit their deserving our condemnation hatred & punishment. Actions may have merit with regard to our fellow men, but the imperfection of human virtue takes away from them any proper merit with respect to God. At least the common blessings of existence are far beyond their desert. They are not of themselves entitled to any future recompence. A recompence in another life can be reasonably expected only on the ground of revelation. The most beneficent and useful actions have the highest merit. If they are disinterested, the merit increases by the purity of the benevolent principle from which they spring. If they have been performed in opposition to difficulties & dangers, it is increased by the strength of the principle. Actions injurious that spring from malice, and that are done without provocation have the greatest demerit. The degrees of demerit are expressed by three terms, Crimes, Offences Faults. Crimes are injuries done from some malevolent principle. Offences are injuries caused by some temporary passion, or view of interest, while notwithstanding, a general benevolence or good will may exist between the parties. Faults are committed thro' ignorance or inattention. Ignorance or inattention are blameable in proportion to the magnitude of the injuries that may arise from them, because they discover a proportionable neglect of duty. Ignorance of our duty is a great and most censurable defect.— For there is nothing which we ought to be so solicitous to understand.

End of Lecture 18th

J. Innes scripsit

LECTURE 19.th

Detail of Moral duties.

The principal part of Moral Philosophy consists in the detail of its duties. These embrace an immense compass, & necessarily take into view all our moral relations. The ancients whose religion consisted in ceremony, and not in moral precepts, had no means of public & genuine instruction, such as we enjoy in our churches. In the schools alone, the system of duty was taught. Its details therefor were necessarily spread out to a great extent, in the discourses of their philosophers. But among Christians particularly, duties are so well understood - we hear them so constantly explained & inculcated in the pulpit, that this part of your philosophical course may be greatly abridged. All that I shall aim at, will be to reduce our duties under general classes, & to inform you of some controversies that have arisen on particular branches of them.

Duties may be divided according to the principles from which they spring, into justice, prudence, temperance, fortitude, or according to their objects, into those we owe to GOD, to our fellowmen and to ourselves. The former was the division of the ancients, the latter obtains chiefly among the Moderns.

I shall place before you a brief sketch of both.—

Justice among the old Philosophers was taken more extensively, than it generally is among us, & embraced the duties of benevolence as well as of strict equity. Their rule of justice, altho' no where so clearly

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and concisely expressed in their writings as it is in the Gospel, was the same as that prescribed by our Saviour- "Whatever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so to them." The duties of justice therefore according to them are innocence or abstaining from doing injury to others, equity, or returning an equivalent for the good we have received & beneficence or promoting by our exertions or our liberality objects of public utility in proportion to their worth, and conferring those favours on others, which in exchange of circumstances we could reasonably desire from them. Piety, Parental & Filial duties, friendship, gratitude & candor, liberality, charity, & even civility & Politeness were all comprehended under the head of justice. To this head were likewise referred our public duties as citizens or magistrates- Obedience to the Magistrate, protection to the citizen, and patriotism in all.

The duties of innocence & of equity are the subjects of compulsory law, & may be required by force, or the violation of them may be punished by the ordinary magistrate. Those of beneficence on the other hand, have not such definite limits. It would not be safe to trust their regulation or punishment to any human tribunals. They are enjoined therefore only under the sanction of conscience & religion.

Prudence is the pursuit of objects according to their value and the application of the fittest means to attain them. This has often

often been been said by Modern writers to be a natural talent rather than a moral quality. But it is without doubt, intimately connected with morals. It is susceptible of being cultivated & virtue requires its cultivation. Without it men are not prepared to act to any useful purpose, & cannot form to themselves or preserve any respectability of character. A man may by imprudence defeat the best intentions, derange the whole system of his virtues, & inevitably involve himself in vice & in contempt. An imprudent man may embarrass himself in the most dishonourable difficulties. He may neglect or throw into confusion, his own interests, & the dearest interests of those who depend upon him. Some of these imprudent people say, it is a meritorious act of religion to trust in providence to relieve wants, or help them out of difficulties into which their own indolence or folly has plunged them. This is mistaking the idea of providence altogether, which has never charged itself with the peculiar care of lazy people or of fools. Christianity of this kind might be much mended by considering the fable of Hercules & the Waggoner. Prudence then was justly reckoned among the virtues by the Ancients. ~~~~~~~ According to the general definition just given of prudence, it may be considered as a necessary guide in the discharge of every duty. – But there is a more limited acceptation, in which it is taken, in which it respects particularly those duties that affect a man's state or condition. These are a decency or a just respect in our conduct to the opinions, ideas & feelings of others. Propriety which con-

sists

sists in a proper attention to our spirit & manners, to what our own age & station requires—Economy in expenditures, which in commercial countries is so necessary to freedom & independence.—Decision, which is a firm & resolute choice of conduct at the proper moment, when hesitation & indecision would be loss of opportunity, & finally, caution which foresees & provides against all difficulties, which weighs characters well, and balances the magnitude & importance of an undertaking with our own talents.*

Temperance includes moderation in all animal enjoyments together with healthful & useful employments and exercise. This is necessary to promote the vigor & perfection of our nature and to preserve the passions & appetites in such a state, as instead of making them the enemies will render them useful auxiliaries of Virtue. Intemperance debilitates both mind and body, produces neglect & incapacity for business & infallibly corrupts the heart. Fortitude comprises the three virtues of patience, intrepidity & constancy. By patience is meant firmness in enduring suffering. by intrepidity courage & resolution in encountering danger, & by constancy that strength of mind which enables a man to persevere in opposition to difficulties or temptations in a course which he has once chosen with wisdom.

Fortitude it has been said, is as well as prudence a natural rather than a moral quality & depends upon a certain bodily constitution. Nature has certainly done more for some men than for others, in this as well as in all her gifts. But it is a cultivable quality & it is essential to virtue to cultivate it. Native timidity may be overcome as well

* See Ferguson's Institutes, part. 6. chap. 5. Section 3rd as

as habitual intemperance. The weakest natures have been enabled by the powers of religion to endure the greatest sufferings with firmness. Courage & intrepidity may also be acquired by force of principle, & by being accustomed to dangers. If Demosthenes had taken as much pains on this subject as he did to improve his eloquence, instead of being justly reproached for his cowardice, he might have been as great a soldier as he was an orator. Weakness & timidity as certainly expose a man to some kinds of vice, as passions & appetites do to others. Fortitude therefore has the same relations as temperance to virtue.

I am next to consider duties as their objects are different, GOD our Fellow-men & ourselves.

Of our duties to GOD.

Our duties to GOD are either external or internal, General or particular. Our General duties embrace universal virtue & sanctity of life; because these being his law, compliance with them is obedience to Him. The particular duties are such as immediately terminate on GOD as their object, & embrace the first two classes, the internal & external. The internal are those affections of the mind from which as their natural effect springs universal obedience to the divine will. These are supreme love, profound reverence & absolute resignation. Love is the active spring of obedience & respects chiefly the infinite moral perfection and especially the goodness of GOD. In order to be sincere, it must be supreme.

Reverence is more a restraining than an active principle. Its influence is to prevent the violation of the divine law, to which man from the imperfection of his virtue & the strength of the temptations with which he is

he is surrounded, is extremely prone, unless his passions are subjected to such a powerful check. Reverence respects chiefly the infinite greatness, wisdom, power & holiness of GOD. It is a principle essential to Piety & Virtue, in creatures so weak, dependent & prone to evil as we are. From the profound degree in which it ought to prevail in a pious mind, it is often denominated in the scriptures, the fear of GOD.

Resignation, I mentioned last of the internal duties. It implies entire confidence in the wisdom, the justice, & the goodness of GOD: a deep conviction of our unworthiness, & of the narrowness of our understanding with regard to what is good or ill for us. Resignation resting upon these principles, begets a submissive acquiescence in the will of GOD, even under the most afflicting dispensations of his providence; believing that altho we cannot discern their ultimate relations to our own happiness or that of others, yet they are allwise & just & good. This disposition is an enemy to all murmuring & discontent with our lot in this life, but is connected with every prudent exertion in dependence on divine aid to better our state. — Our external duties comprise every decent outward expression of these internal sentiments of the heart. They are comprised under the general name of worship; different forms & rites for which have prevailed among different nations & different Sects. There is no sanctity annexed to rites farther than as they are proper expressions of pious dispositions: and all rites are useful & deserve to be regarded with respect, which custom among any people has so associated with the sentiments of picty, as to be to such people, the best vehicles or the best expressions of these sentiments. Rights & forms however, in order to answer their intention in the most effectual manner, ought not to be too simple nor

too

too multifarious. The greater part of mankind, are so much governed by sensible impressions, as not to be able to support with proper fervency, a religion that is wholly intellectual, and void of form. — On the other hand a multifarious ceremonial is apt to occupy the senses to the exclusion of the heart & the understanding, & to degenerate into superstition. The essential parts of a rational worship in whatever ceremonies it is clothed are Adoration, thanksgiving, confession & prayer. Adoration relates to the perfection of GOD, for whom we ought to feel & express the highest veneration: thanksgiving relates to those mercies which we continually receive from him: confession regards our own ingratitude & offences, the recollection of which will serve to augment our grateful sentiments of his goodness, & prayer respects those blessings which we implore from him, either for ourselves or others for time to come. ~~~~ These duties being continually explained in the public institutions of religion, are perhaps sufficiently understood.

I shall not enter into any further illustrations of them, but shall conclude my observations on this class of duties, by obviating some objections which have been raised by men of irreligious principles, against divine worship in general.

Two objections chiefly have been urged on this subject. The first is, — that it is an unworthy idea of GOD, to suppose that he derives pleasure, from hearing his perfections repeated or his praises extolled by mortals, as is done in adoration — or that degrading & humiliating confessions on their part can be acceptable to him, or that he can require from them acknowledgements of

acts of

acts of beneficence which it is agreeable to his nature to bestow, or for which they cannot make him requital. In answer to all this we may remark, that it is a law of our nature, that when any high sentiment or strong emotion fills the heart, it necessarily seeks some mode externally to express itself. If therefore, we rially feel, as virtuous and pious ~~persons~~ men ought to feel, to check this expression will be to stifle the most reasonable dictates & impulses of nature; & not to feel these sentiments, is a proof of a cold, an impious & corrupted heart. — Besides, sentiments & affections not expressed soon languish & at last cease to be perceived. Such is the necessary connection which nature has established between the internal emotion & external action, that internal emotion prompts to the action by which it is expressed. — External action serves to augment & continue the emotion. These acts of worship are therefore required by God in the first place because they are right in themselves and conformable to the laws of our moral nature. In the next place because they serve to cultivate our hearts, & to strengthen the affections and habits of virtue.

The second objection relates to the efficacy and consequently the utility of prayer. The order of the universe say the objectors & the eternal train of causes & effects have been fixed by infinite wisdom. The laws of wisdom are as immutable as those of fatality. Why then should we pray? If established causes will produce an event, it will take place independently of our prayers, if not we pray in vain, for the breath of mortals cannot change the order of things. This is the objection placed in its strongest point of view. To obviate it, we may observe, that prayer can have only two ends in view, to cultivate

cultivate the moral qualities of the heart, & to procure temporal and eternal good. To obtain the first, prayer has a natural & acknowledged good tendency. The stress of the objection bears upon the second, and it is capable of a very obvious solution. The physical was created in relation & subserviency to the moral world. The creator therefore, may have so adjusted the one to the other, that foreseeing the sincere & fervent prayers of his children, he may have so laid the train of natural causes, as at a proper time, & in the way most agreeable to infinite wisdom, to answer their desires. —— Besides, prayer may have similar influence on the event, as any other secondary cause: many physical effects particularly depend, upon moral springs, and prayer affecting these, must possess a proportionable influence on the event.*

Of our duties to our fellow men.

Our duties to our fellow-men include a greater compass and variety than all others. They respect the infinite relations that subsist between man & man. —— There are few actions in life which have not a reference to some of these relations. It would not be possible in a system like the present, to go into a minute detail of this class of duties. — And it is not necessary. All that I shall attempt, is, to state a few general principles relative to it, and to subdivide it into subordinate classes. Our duties on this subject, may be divided in the first place, into negative, or those that consist merely in abstaining from unnecessary injuries, or positive, or those that consist in doing actual

* E.g. The prosperity of nations, or the fortunes of individuals, which may depend upon their virtue & the means used to cultivate virtuous habits among them, & which are promoted by prayers in particular & by divine worship in general.

actual good. Every other clafs might admit of such division: but this particularly requires it, because there are so many and such strong paſsions in Man, that often impel him to injure others unjustly. I say unjustly because there are injuries, or at least evils that may neceſsarily and properly be inflicted upon other men, as in the case of a majistrate punishing a criminal, & sometimes defending his safety or his right against oppreſsion.—— The positive duties of this clafs, may all be ranked under the heads of justice & beneficence. But they are greatly varied according to the relations we sustain to mankind in general— our country—— our family—— our neighbours—— our friends—— to those who are invested with power over us—— or are subject to our authority—— to objects of our charity—— to men in our commercial connections with them. On the duties that result from all these relations, & many others that have not been named, volumns have been written.

They are subjects that constantly demand our attention, & on which we can never cease to be active and to learn.

Of The Duties to Ourselves.

The duties which we owe to ourselves, are as real & in some respects as important as any other clafs. They may be divided into those which relate to self preservation—— to self enjoyment—— to self interest, & to the improvement of our natures.—— Self preservation includes the case of health, liberty & life. He is criminal who neglects his health which ought to be employed for useful purposes— he is much more criminal, who barters his liberty, which is one of the most noble & precious prerogatives of our nature. It is a certain proof of a base & corrupted mind, either to part with it, or not defend it— And to sacrifice life, or unneceſsarily to hazard it in a cause that is not great & generous, if it does not flow—

flow from insanity, is the evidence of a mind void of firmness and virtue. ~~~~~ Self enjoyment springs from sense, from interest, from the benevolent & moral sentiments & affections - and it is the duty of a man to seek his own happiness, in order to render him more grateful to divine providence, & to answer the end of the Creator in every way that is consistent with every other duty. — Self-interest relates to necessary provisions and comfortable accomodations in the present life and to the favour of GOD & eternal happiness in the world to come. ~~~~~

The improvement of our nature has for its objects our bodily powers & the faculties of the mind, & the affections of the heart ~~. To cultivate these in their proper proportions, that is, according to their dignity, & usefulness, & thereby to promote the greatest possible perfection of human nature, is a duety which every man owes to himself. ~~. To promote all these ends, temperance, application of mind, & habitual industry in some useful occupation, are absolutely necessary — Without temperance, we can neither enjoy health, nor cultivate virtue: and without useful application & industry, a man infallibly degenerates in his powers, & falls into vice. —— These are among the important duties we owe ourselves

End of Lecture 19th

I. Croes Junr scripsit August 13th 1805.

LECTURE 20th.

Of Family Relations and Duties

In speaking of the detail of virtues or duties, those that spring out of the relations of husband & wife of parent & child - of master & servant were just suggested & mentioned generally among others. - They are however of such importance, as on several accounts, to merit a more particular consideration. In the system of many writers, they form one complete head of Philosophy, distinct from Ethics & Politicks, under the title of Oeconomics: a word derived from a greek original, which signifies the law or duties of a family. Other writers have referred the consideration of them to the head of Politics. A family forms the smallest social system in the large society of the state. It is of but little consequence, under what title they are treated. The duties themselves are so obvious, have been so often illustrated by preachers and moral writers, and are so generally understood, that nothing seems necessary to be added in a system like this, to explain them.

Some controversies have arisen concerning the relations themselves, and the degree of power on one side, and subjection on the other, to which they may be made to extend. These disputed points therefore shall form the principal subject of the present lecture: they relate chiefly to marriage & servitude. We shall have an opportunity afterwards of considering both these subjects in a political light, when we come to treat of the principles of legislation. At present I shall speak of them only in a moral View.

Of Marriage.

The union of the sexes is evidently a law of nature, as appears both from their formation & their instinctive propensities towards one another.

other. But the nature of this law & the modification of that union, which results from it, must be determined by the end which the Creator seems to have had in view; which is the continuance of the species, the harmony of society & the happiness of Man. A promiscuous commerce of the sexes would defeat this end entirely. It is necessary therefore to submit to some restraints in it, & to impose upon this union, some precise, known & general regulations. If not general, it is useless. For if there may be any exception to it, every man may persuade himself that he is the exception. Marriage as distinguished from illicit commerce, is the union of the sexes under known public & established regulations. It is a question whether regulations are preserved by the laws of nature, or by the laws of society. The meaning of this question respects chiefly the duration of the contract of marriage, and the number of wives which one man may be permitted to possess: for it is generally agreed, that the ceremonials by which the contract is authenticated, are in themselves different, and may be varied at the pleasure of society. With regard to other circumstances of the contract, the law of nature when discovered, will be found to contribute most to general happiness. But as the bulk of mankind when especially under the influence of strong passions, which they necessarily are, either in forming or breaking connections with the other sex, are very incompetent judges of what is right or wrong on this subject, or of what will promote or impair the common happiness, and it would therefore seem as if the whole regulation of marriage ought to be made an Aject of the civil authority.

ought to be made an object of civil authority. There are certainly some laws of nature on the subject, that is, some requisites in the connection more favourable than others to mutual happiness, on which as far as they extend the laws of society ought to rest. They ought particularly to protect the weakness of the female sex, and to save the tenderness and delicacy of their attachments as much as possible from being wounded by the hardness and violence of men who have so many advantages over them. Nothing will contribute more to promote this effect, and to procure not only Justice but kindness to a wife, than the perpetuity of the contract. If it were capable of being dissolved on slight occasions those occasions would be easily created by the party who wished it. Every little umbrage would be magnified into a cause of a most cruel animosity and injustice. Perpetuity is a guard which reason and justice require chiefly for the security of the women. If the contract were transient and uncertain, She would commit her peace and safety in the most essential points to the capricious will of another. An additional reason for the perpetuity of marriage is that it is one of the best guards of the public morals. It is necessary also in order to a proper education of the children that may spring from it, and a just provision for their wants. The law of nature therefore seems to require that the contract should be permanent. And this would always be ratified and strengthened by the law of society. Although the principle is generally agreed on by civilians and moral writers, several causes have been stated as sufficient to dissolve the connection. Of these the

the principle is infidelity to the marriage bed - It would be unjust however to suffer the parties respectively to plead their own infidelity as a cause of discord. They ought to suffer for their fault and not be rewarded by it. And however painful the idea of infidelity in a husband or in a wife may be to the jealousy of honor or of love; yet there are situations in which one of the parties particularly the wife may suffer much more cruelly by a forced separation than by remaining together. Contrariety of temper has been assigned by some writers as a sufficient cause of divorce. It is a cause so vague and uncertain, that it seems impossible to give it that precision in a law which would be necessary in order to its execution. Besides the most illdisposed could always create quarrels to serve as a pretext to separation. The only remedy on this subject is preventative, and that is to be guarded and cautious before forming the connection. Some have made certain incurable diseases, such as insanity, epilepsy &c, a foundation for dissolving the contract. But besides the difficulty of ascertaining an incurable disease by any general law, there seems to be a peculiar cruelty involved in the rule. After the fortunes and happiness of two persons have become so intimately blended together, because it has pleased providence severely to affect one of the parties it seems unreasonable and inhuman that man should not only increase the affliction but take away the last ray of consolation a hope, by the severity of the law of divorce. Mutual consent has always been said to be a sufficient reason to justify a divorce, because if both parties are willing, no injury can be

done to either. By the law of nature, I confess, that, if proper provision be made for their common children, if any they have, consent, may be under certain provisions of the law for the safety of society, a sufficient ground of separation from one another, but not of divorce, which implies a right of marrying again. The civil law which has the supreme controul over marriage, ought not in such a case to permit any new connection, lest either party, thro' the hope of this privilege should undertake to harrass the other into a consent by injustice and intolerable vexations. Obstinate desertion of one party, without sufficient cause given by the other, is a much more reasonable cause of divorce, and perhaps it ought to be permitted so far as to suffer the innocent party to marry again; but it would ~~not~~ be contrary to reason, to the good of society and the principles of perpetuity, to suffer the offender to marry. This would be a privelege to encourage a fault. Vices ought not to be encouraged; but whatever wholly frustrates the end of marriage, when it can be clearly ascertained by general rules, and when at the same time it shall encourage vice and invite cruelty and inhumanity towards the most helpless sex, or promote wanton or unnecessary infractions of a contract so sacred, may be a just ~~occasion~~ occasion of divorce. No other can. The rule of our saviour that a man shall not put away his wife except for infidelity to him as her husband, is perfectly conformable to these maxims, and shews a most equitable and benevolent regard to the weakness of that sex. He may not put her away for any other cause, but if she causelessly

and obstinately forsakes him, he is not guilty of a violation of that rule although the law permits him to marry another. She has herself broken the ties that united him with her.* Except in these two cases, infidelity and desertion the causes of divorce should be made chiefly in favour of the woman. because the delicacy, the modesty, and dependence, of the sex render it generally improbable that they would seek such a separation, unless it be for the cause of great urgency. In this view inhumanity of treatment from a husband may be a reasonable cause of divorce, in favour of a wife, but he should not be permitted to derive any benefit from his own fault and to marry again.†

Thus I have considered the law of divorce generally as respecting the separation of a husband and wife, in whatever way it may be affected, yet strictly speaking there is a difference between divorce and repudiation. The former is a separation obtained by the consent of both parties, the latter by the will only of one. As the power of the husband among the Jews, as in all Eastern Countries, was very great, the right of repudiation by their law was given to him alone. As he had therefore such an entire controul, over the person and happiness of his wife, and she had no reciprocal privilege the right of repudiation was justly limited by our saviour to the case of infidelity. This rule for the Jews however was not intended to be binding on other nations who may be placed in different circumstances, and be governed on this subject by very different laws.

* Perhaps habetual intoxication might be added to the reasonable causes of divorce, because it not only defeats the intention of marriage which is the happiness of the parties united by this tie; and the proper care and education of a family: but if it be the wife who is addicted to this vice, there can be no security for her fidelity- if it be the husband, there can be no security either for his fidelity or for a humane treatment of his wife.

Some inconveniences may arise to individuals from a rigid adherence to these rules, in favour of whom, if their cases alone were to be considered, reason and good morals might admit an exception. General rules were always to be attended with particular examples that will seem to be, and that will really be hard. But the evil is infinitely less than the good that results from them. The world must be governed by general rules. No tribunal can be instituted, on which we may safely rely for a just judgement, with regard to individual cases, that may be excepted from them. And permitting one man to judge in his own case, would be opening the door to every man to form a like judgment, that, is, would destroy the rule altogether.

The next question is, whether or not the law of nature prescribes any rule with regard to the number of wives a man may posses, consistently with vertue and good morals In the greater part of the world, polygamy has prevailed in every age to which history reaches back. Europe, however has been remarkable for a general adherence to the law of one wife Some writers have supposed that there is a natural immorality in polygamy, independently on the laws of religion or of society, that forbidd it. Others have supposed that nature prescribed no law on this subject, and that ~~human nature~~ it is an object simply of social regulations. The fact is, that human nature has generally appeared to more advantage, and approached nearer to perfection in those countries where the law of one wife

&c

has prevailed, than where polygamy has been permitted. But how far this is to be accounted for from the prevalence of that custom, or from other circumstances, in the state of society, of climate of the face of the country the occupation of the people and the form of government, has not been so clearly ascertained. We know that some of the greatest and noblest characters in the world have sprung up in the East, where polygamy has always prevailed; On the other hand, nothing could be more degenerate than the latter Romans among whom the opposite custom prevailed. Polygamy has generally been supposed by European writers to promote licentious ~~practices~~ to be unfavourable to the rights of women, and to nourish the passions of jealousy and envy. These are suppositions that must be verified or rejected by the fact as it exists in different countries. One nation can never reason with certainty from its own ideas and customs, to the effects that will result from the ideas and customs of any other nation. From a certain ignorant and emphilosophical presumption that prompts men to do so, we see constant errours committed in history, and the grossest misrepresentations of the characters and manners of different people made by one another. By a ~~liberal~~ candid spirit of travel and research you must learn in a course of time to estimate the reason that has been just mentioned. An argument still more plausible for proving polygamy to be contrary to the law of nature and consequently in itself immoral is drawn from the natural

natural equality of sexes in point of number, the males being to the females nearly as twenty to nineteen: or as some say thirteen to twelve. This equality of proportion between the sexes, it is said, is a clear indication of the intention of nature in opposition to polygamy. For if some men be allowed to marry more wives than one, others must necessarily be left without any. More stress I am inclined to believe has been laid upon that argument than it is able to bear. The laws of marriage should be relative not so much to the numbers of the sexes, as to the power of maintaining a family. In the progress of society multitudes will necessarily become too poor to provide for children. It is then criminal to marry because marriage must be productive of misery both to parents and offspring, so that on any supposition great numbers in society must always be left without husbands, or without wives. I confess therefore that I tend to the opinions of those that think that marriage is an object chiefly of political regulation and that the wisdom and immorality of those regulations have a preference in a good degree to the nature of the climate and the form of civil government and the state of society in general. I believe the wisest institutions and the greatest happiness and perfection of society are most commonly connected with the law of one wife, but I cannot suppose that there is a natural immorality attached to the law of polygamy. This opinion is justified by our own religion which teaches us that the greatest and most pious men and those who enjoyed the most familiar intercourse with heaven have submitted to this law. It is incredible that GOD should communicate himself so freely

men who were living in the habitual endulgence of grofs sin, and make them the instructors of the world and models of piety and virtue of all ages.* The institutions of Moses relative to marriage were evidently political, though mistaken by some good men as being an exhibition of the law of nature on this subject and in the strictest sense ~~im~~moral. Therefore Our Saviour says with regard to some of these institutions, that Moses permitted them to the people of Israel on accounts of the hardnefs of their hearts. And the prophet Ezekiel says in the name of God and referring to the Mosaic law. I gave them statutes that were not good. The meaning of these expresions may be illustrated by the reply of Solon to one who asked him if he had given the Athenians the best laws, I have given them says he the the best they are able to bear. It is necefsary, as will afterwards be seen, in a wise legislator, to conform in some degree and to make sacrifices to the fixed ideas and habits of people in things purely civil and political otherwise they would revolt against the Legislator. But it never can be necefsary to establish immorality by a law much lefs can we suppose that GOD would give his sanction to vice. Polygamy therefore in certain cases cannot be a vice. These reflections will exempt some of the moft respectable characters of the Old Testament from many of the censures that have been ignorantly and injudiciously cast upon them by writers who could not separate their reasoning from the influence of national and habitual ideas.

* S. Ambrose in speaking of the marriages of the Patriarchs gives it as his opinion that there is no immorality in Polygamy considered in itself, It becomes criminal only in consequence of positive institutions.

If marriage be so much a subject of political regulation and Polygamy, have nothing in it essentially immoral it may be asked perhaps if a man might not even in those countries where it is prohibited innocently connect himself with other women besides a wife altho he could not publicly give them the same title and privileges? I answer by no means. The violation of this rule where it is established by law become one of the highest immoralities and the more so because the infraction of it tends to open the door to overturn the whole order and happiness of society. This may be illustrated by example. property is in great measure established by the laws of society. for there can be but little of it in a state of Nature. The species of property. its tenure alienation descent are all regulated by civil institutions, but is it the less sacred for this? Is not the man who violates these institutions a thief a robber, fraudulent, unjust? And does he not merit both the detestation of his fellow citizens, and the punishment of the law? And are not chastity, and Modesty, as valuable as riches? And are not the rights of a wife as certain and precious as the rights of property? Misery and licentiousness are the consequences of an union of the sexes not sanctioned regulated, and guarded by the law. And no one man has a right to do in this way what every other man may not—

The prohibitions contained in the Mosaic of marrying within a certain degree of blood, which have been adopted in the most Christian Countries have created many enquiries into the reasons of such prohibiting laws. Some have believed them to be wholly political. Others have said that they

Law

are wholly moral, and others that they are partly moral and partly political. Perhaps the last is the most just opinion. In prohibiting marriage between brothers and sisters and some other near relations he seems to have been governed by a care for domestic purity of manners. Against the connection belwen parents and children nature hersely revolts. It would be to invent all the duties that naturally spring from these relations. But there are other prohibitions as well as positive on this subject, that plainey have a reference to ideas merely political. Thus if a man has left an heir by his wife, his brother in that case could not marry her: but if he died without issue in that case his brother was obliged to marry the widow or if he declined the connection them the obligation devolved on the nearest male relation after him. This law had a reference to the rules established by Moses concerning succesion and inheritance. The Mosaic however was confined singly to the nation of Israel. It never was designed for universal institutions. We are consequently no obliged to be governed by its civil presciptions. And when we examine particullarly into the causes for which each of the connections just referred to, was prohibited. I confess I can discover no natural immorality in any of them except that between parents and children. The time has been when by a necesity of nature brothers must have intermarried with sisters. Yet when this necesity no longer exists there are many powerful reasons which render these connections and many other between near relations highly improper. Besides the importance of

of extending the ties of society and the necessity of guarding the chastity of morals in their fountain, the family of parent, naturalists assign one physical reason, which if it be well founded ought to bar such marriages by the laws of of all countries. It is that they will in the course of time degenerate the species. As families are found to have a general resemblance to one another, this resemblance it is said, holds in their constitutional defects as well as other qualities, so that the marriage between very near relations tend only to increase the defects and to debilitate the offspring. But whatever be the cause, the fact is said to be a degeneracy in those families that often intermarry themselves.* But all these are rules of policy and prudence rather than moral laws which in their nature, are immutable and perpetual and cannot depend upon the civil authority and indeed are not susceptible of any modification from the will of society.

Of Parents and Children.

The next domestic relation is that of parent and child. The duties on one side may be summed up in protection, provision, and education. Those on the other in duty and obedience. The whole authority of the parent must be limited by the benefit of the child or the common interest of the family. And sanction of that authority can be nothing more than moderate correction in infancy and at the utmost for gross disobedience exclusion from the privileges of the family. Some nations have given to the parent entire power over the life of the child. This is a most unreasonable extension of authority, for the parent having been the cause of existence to the child, he cannot have the right to make the existence miserable. As provision is one subject of parental duty and authority, he may justly require a

a child to assist him according to his strength in procuring it.
If he is too poor to be able to procure it by his own industry, he has
a right to send his child to the service of those who can afford it
to him at present and can furnish him with the means of pro-
curing for himself in future life. This power however over the liber-
ty of the child should extend only to a limited time of service,
as shall be mutually useful to the child and to the master.
A like power may be exercised by any parent where there is an evi-
dent prospect arising from it of utility to the child.
Another subject of parental duty is education. Education respects
both habits and principles. It is the duty of a parent for the ben
efit of those who derive their being from him to cultivate in them
as far as he has understanding and means for it, habits of temperance,
patience, courage, prudence, sociability, justice, and useful indus-
try and inspire them with the principles of duty and good man-
als. Without such principles and habits, being cannot be a blessing
to themselves or to society. Some writers thorough antipathy to the
Christian religion have asserted that no religious instruction
whatever should be given to children, for fear of filling their
minds with prejudice. This is a very mistaken maxim. Without
education the most pernicious prejudices will take possession of
their minds from that necessary intercourse which they must
have with the world; and from the growth of their own pas-
sions I may add likewise that without religious instruction
moral principles will lose great part of their authority
and force on young minds and especially on those among the
among the lowest orders of society in whom those principles are
not fortified by sentiments of Honor and of interest. It is true
many

x will often be inculcated in this way: but even an erroneous religion

many false principles of religion[x] is preferable to no religion at all, because all religions with the exceptions only of some abuses that have been made of them by a few enthusiasts and madmen inculcate the obligations of justice and humanity and social order and strengthen this obligation by the fear of GOD. And the errors which a weak judgement and a timid conscience may mingle with such principles are not so dangerous as the errors of the passions.

Of Masters and Servants.

In the progress of society an unequal distribution of property will necessarily result from the laws that secure to every man the profits of his own industry. And disparity of rank must grow from disparity of fortune. The wealthy will be able to purchase the labor of the poor and the poor will find it necessary to sel their labour to the wealthy. Hence will arise the relation of Master and servant. But so far it is a free and mutual compact in which there is nothing that is unjust or that does not tend to the good of Society. But the principal question on this subject in the view I am now considering regards the lawfulness of slavery. It is consistent with the rights of human nature and the principles of good morals that the power of one man over another should extend to his liberty. Slavery cannot pretend to be justly founded only on the rights of War, or the rights of purchase for the idle claim which some writers have set up in favor of civilized over savage nations does not deserve refutation. With regard to the former it has been maintained that the principles of war give a right to the victor to put the vanquished to death and therefore with still more reason to reduce them to slavery. And the

the fact is that the greatest part of the nations of antiquity, made slaves of their captives of war. and the custom still exists in the east in Africa and among most barbarous and savage nations. But the consequences is drawn from principles that are false. The principles of war as will hereafter be seen do not justify the putting captives to Death after the ardor and immediate danger of the battle is over. One hostile nation ought not to revenge upon the individuals of another the offences of their goverment. When the object of a just war is attained defence, reparation, and security, the Victor has no farther right over the person of his enemies on the footing of humanity and justice. Making slaves of prisoners is unnecesary and therefore unjustly multiplying the miseries of human nature. With regard to the second way of making slaves that is by purchase, it has been denied by many good writers that liberty is alienable more than life, and therefore one man cannot sell his own freedom nor another purchase it. On the contrary I do not hold Liberty to be absolutely unalienable and I think it possible for men sometimes to be reduced to such a state as that it may be both just and prudent in them to part with their personal freedom for a certain and comfortable provision. But they cannot in the same way dispose of the freedom of a child unless it be for a limited time and to the manifest benefit of the child. As by the laws of most civilized nations children may be bound to service till a certain age in order to acquire the means of a more secure subsistence afterwards than they could otherwise obtain. Indeed in the case of a man who parts with his own liberty his own benefit should prescribe the alienation and limit his services, and the power of his master. Thus there is no way except one in which a man

can

John Croes Junior

1806

John Croes June 6

1806

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